People ex rel. Pennsylvania Railroad v. Knight

I agree with Judge Babtlett that the only question presented on this appeal is whether the business carried on by- the relator, and for which a franchise tax has been imposed, is interstate commerce or-not. For, though it may be that the state of Flew York could levy a franchise tax on the gross earnings of a foreign corporation for the privilege given it of running a cab line within this state, even for the purposes of interstate commerce (see Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217 ; cited with approval, American Refrigerator T. Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70 ), section 184 of

If this cab service can in any way become part of interstate commerce (of which there may be some doubt as I shall show by the authorities), I insist it can only be such when the service is rendered under an entire contract for continuous carriage to or from some point without the state. It may he that there is no case in the Supreme Court of the United States which directly decides this proposition. But there is no authority to the contrary and there are a number of cases in that court which seem to recognize this as the true test of what transportation constitutes interstate commerce. The question has been presented in litigations arising under the Interstate Commerce Act with reference to railroad companies whose roads lay entirely within a single state. Of such a case the Supreme Court said in Cincinnati, New Orleans, etc., Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission ( 162 U. S. 184 ): “ It may be true that the Georgia Railroad Company,’ as a corporation of the State of Georgia, and whose entire road is within that State, may not be legally compelled to sub

I have suggested that there was some doubt whether under the authorities the relator’s cab service could become a part of interstate commerce. In Munn v. Illinois ( 94 U. S. 113 , Chicago elevator cases), in answer to the claim that the warehouses and elevators were instrumentalities of interstate commerce, it was said by the court: “ The warehouses of these plaintiffs in error are situated and their business carried on exclusively within the limits of the State of Illinois. They are used as instruments by those engaged m State as well as^

There remain to be considered two cases on which the relator largely relies as authorities for its contention. The first is a case of the relator in this court reported in 138 N. Y. (p. 1). There it was held that a franchise tax could not be impdsed on the relator for capital invested in its ferry station and terminal grounds in the city of New York, although the property itself was subject to taxation. At that time the business of the relator, so far as it was prosecuted within this state, was confined to the operation of a ferry from Jersey City to New York and to the maintenance at the latter place of its wharves, ferry house and terminal facilities. The case was unquestionably properly decided under the doctrine declared in Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania ( 114 U. S. 196 ). There the plaintiff, a New Jersey corporation, ran a ferry from Gloucester in that state to Philadelphia. It had no property in the latter city other than a wharf which it leased. Its steamboats were registered in New Jersey.. A tax imposed by the state of Pennsylvania upon the dividends of all corporations doing business within the state was held illegal as against that company. Judge Field said: “ As to the second reason given for the decision below, that the company could not lease its. wharf in Philadelphia except by the implied consent of the Legislature of the Commonwealth, and thus is dependent upon the Commonwealth to do its business, and, therefore, can be taxed there, it may be answered that no foreign or interstate commerce can be carried on with the citizens of a State without the use of a wharf, or other place within its limits on which passengers' and freight can be landed and received, and the existence of power in a State to impose a tax upon the capital of all corporations engaged in foreign or

The second case relied on by the appellant is The Daniel Ball ( 10 Wall. 557 ). In that case the question was whether a steamboat engaged in navigating Grand river, Michigan, wholly within that state, was required to take out a license in compliance with the provisions of the United States statute. Some articles of freight carried by the vessel were marked for points without the state, though it did not appear that they were being transported under any agreement for continuous transportation to such points. It was held that the steamer was engaged in interstate commerce and subject to the regulations of Congress. Doubtless this case would be an authority for the position of the relator had not the court been careful to say: “ The present case relates to transportation on the navigable waters of the United States, and we are not called upon to express an opinion upon the power of Congress over interstate commerce when carried on by land transportation.” In Lord v. Steamship Company ( 102 U. S. 541 ) the question was as to the application of an act of Congress limiting the liability of shipowners to the case of a vessel navigating the high seas between ports of the same state. It was held that the transportation was subject to congressional regulation. In that case there appears to have been found no freight destined to points without the state. So it was necessary to 'place the decision on a different ground from that on which the decision in The Daniel Ball rested. It was held that while Congress had no control over the internal commerce of the state, still the vessel when navigating the Pacific ocean,

In closing, reference should be made to the recent decision of this court in People ex rel. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. v. Morgan, Comptroller ( 168 N. Y. 1 ). That case, so far from being in conflict with the views I have expressed, is a direct authority for the proposition that the liability of a carrier corporation to a franchise tax on its transportation depends not on the question whether the carrier is a domestic or foreign corporation, but on the character of the transportation itself.

The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

(dissenting). The relator is a foreign corporation, chartered by the state of Pennsylvania, and engaged in the transportation of freight, mails and passengers in the states of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland. Its rail terminus is in the state of New Jersey, at Jersey City, from which point it conveys passengers and their baggage by ferry boats operated by it to various points in the city of New York, including Twenty-third street and North river.

The sole business of the relator in the city of New York, with reference to passengers and their baggage, was taking them from and landing them on the New York shore of the North river, until the month of May, 1897, when it established

The facts are undisputed, and the statements contained in the petition for the writ of certiorari, and the affidavit of the officer of the relator subsequently submitted, are the foundation upon which the assessments involved herein rest.

The relator alleges that the cab service is incidental to and part of its business of interstate commerce, and is of no value whatever except as a part thereof, because it is, and always has been, separately considered, carried on at a loss.

It is further alleged that the charge for cabs is separate from the charge for the balance of the passenger’s transportation, and that it is necessarily so from the nature of things, it being impossible to include in the railroad and ferry tickets the price of the cab service, as it varies in amount in every case, according to the distance the passenger is to be carried ; and, also, for the reason that passengers buying railroad tickets to New York do not know whether they will employ a cab or not; and in respect to passengers starting from New York it would be impossible to supply the drivers of the cabs with tickets to distant destinations in other states.

The record discloses that the state comptroller did not assess a tax on this cab service until the autumn of the year 1900, when he applied to the relator for a statement of the gross receipts and gross expenses of the cab service to June 30th, 1900, and also for the value of personal property employed during that time, and the value of any real estate used by the relator in the city of New York in connection with such cab service.

The comptroller seeks to assess the relator under two distinct sections of the Tax Law (Laws of 1890, chap. 908) upon the business of the cab service thus conducted in connection with its interstate railway service.

Section 182 of the Tax Law imposes a franchise tax on domestic corporations. At the close of this section it is pro

Section 184 of the Tax Law provides for an additional frail-" chise tax on transportation and transmission corporations and associations, which reads as follows : “ Every corporation and joint stock association formed for steam surface railroad, canal, steamboat, ferry, express, navigation, pipe-line, transfer, baggage express, telegraph, telephone, palace car or sleeping car purposes, and all other transportation corporations not liable to taxes under sections one hundred and eighty-five or one hundred and eighty-six of this chapter, shall pay for the privilege of exercising its corporate franchises of carrying on its business in such corporate or organized capacity in this state, an annual excise tax or license fee which shall be equal to five-tenths of one percentum upon its gross earnings within the state, which shall include its gross earnings from its transportation or transmission business originating and terminating within this state, but shall not include earnings derived from business of an interstate character.”

The return called for was duly made to the comptroller, who assessed a tax under section 182 of $934.07, based on the gross earnings of the cab service for the four years ending October 31st, 1900; also, a tax was assessed under section 184 of $1,422.54, being equal to five-tenths of one "percentum upon the gross earnings within this state.

It was stipulated before the comptroller, on the application to review this assessment, that it was made solely upon the ground that the relator’s cab service in the city óf Hew York is a part of and incidental to its interstate commerce business and, therefore, not taxable. The comptroller after a hearing duly had refused to make any revision or restatement of the assessment and tax.

If the relator is legally taxable on its cab service, no question is made as to the manner in which the taxes were assessed.

The legislature has stated in express terms in section 184, in computing a tax thereunder, that earnings derived from a business of an interstate character should not be included.

It is true, as suggested by counsel, that the precise point presented by this appeal has never been considered by the court. It is, however, equally true that the controlling principles involved in this case were carefully considered by the court in People ex rel. Pennsylvania Railroad, Company v. Wemple, Comptroller ( 138 N. Y. 1 ). The opinion in the case cited was written by Chief Judge Andrews, wherein is elaborately discussed the constitutional question now presented for decision. The learned judge thus states the facts in the case before him: “ The relator is a Pennsylvania corporation, operating a line of railroad for the transportation of freight and passengers, extending through the state of Hew Jersey into other states of the Union. Ho part of its road is within the state of Hew York. But it operates in connection with its road a ferry from the Hew Jersey shore across the Hudson river to the city of Hew York, where it has terminal facilities, consisting of wharves, piers, docks and buildings connected therewith, used in the prosecution of the business of delivering freight and passengers carried over its line to that city, and of receiving freight and passengers to be carried from the city into Hew Jersey and other states reached by its system of roads. The only transportation over Hew York territory, carried on by the relator, is over that part of the Hudson river within the territorial boundaries of the State by means of its ferry boats. It collects in the city of Hew York money due for transportation to that point and for transportation from that city and there makes contracts for transportation of freight and passengers over its lines and issues and sells pas

It was claimed on behalf of the relator in the case cited that the tax imposed was upon interstate commerce in violation of the so-called “ Commerce Clause ” of the Federal Constitution. (Article 1, § 8, clause 3.)

The learned judge further stated in his opinion as follows : “In determining the question now presented, two propositions must be deemed established. One is that the business in which the relator was engaged in this state ivas exclusively that of interstate commerce. Whatever it did here was incident to and in aid of the business of interstate transportation. Interstate transportation was hot a part of its business only in this state., * * * The second point which must be deemed to be established is that the tax imposed upon corporations * * * is a tax upon the ‘ corporate franchise or business,’ and is not a tax upon property. * * * We come, therefore, to the crucial question in the case — can the state of New York tax the relator, a foreign corporation, upon its business carried on in this state, which is exclusively the business of interstate commerce. The question stated in another form is, may a state tax a foreign corporation whose business in such state is exclusively that of interstate commerce for the privilege of transacting that business here because, as we have held, this is the essential nature of the tax under the act of 1880. (People ex rel. S. C. O. Co. v. Wemple, 131 N. Y. 68 .) The state may subject to a property tax, in common with other property, every description of property, real and personal, having its situs there, although used or employed exclusively in the business of foreign or interstate commerce. Ships or.vessels engaged in foreign or coastwise commerce may be taxed at their home port and the products of one state carried into another and there held for sale by the original purchaser, and may be tax-ed even before

I have thus indicated the precise points upon which the decision in the case cited rests. In that case, as in this, the relator was the Pennsylvania Kailroad Company. The question in that case was whether the transportation of passengers from its railway terminus in Jersey City, over certain territory of the state of Kew York, in ferry boats, was a continuation of its interstate commerce. In this case the question is, that if the same relator continues the transportation of its passengers still further into the territory of the state of Kew York by cab, whether it is a continuation of its interstate business.

The only point raised by the relator in this appeal is based upon the proposition that the transportation of passengers from the Hew York side of the ferry to and from their residences or hotels is as much a part of its interstate business as was the transportation of its passengers by ferry boat, which was approved by this court and held to be exclusively interstate commerce.

It is uncontroverted in this record that the relator does not seek to do, and does not carry on a general cab business in the city of Kew York. It further appears that these cabs are

The argument on behalf of the state comptroller is that this cab service is tq be regarded, necessarily, as an independent business; that it is no part of the transportation of a passenger (by way of illustration) traveling from, Washington to the Fifth Avenue Hotel in the city of Hew York.

We are unable to see any distinction between the right of the relator to transport its passengers by ferry, or by cab, to or from points in the city of Hew York. It can be said of the relator in this case, as it was said of it in the case cited, that “ it is engaged in no business in that city except such as relates to the transportation of passengers * * * over its lines.”

It is insisted on behalf of the state comptroller that the cab service is to be regarded as starting and terminating within the state of Hew York. Even if this were so, that fact alone does not characterize the cab service exclusively as a domestic business.

While we are to be controlled by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, when applicable to a case involving a Federal question, I am of opinion that to extend the rule, as laid down in the case involving the rights of this relator and already cited, to the new facts now presented is not in conflict with any decision of that court, but, on the contrary, is in harmony with a number of well-considered authorities.

In the case of The Daniel Ball (10 Wall. [77 U. S.] 557) the question was whether the steamboat named, which - was engaged in navigating Grand river, Michigan, wholly within the limits of that state, should be licensed under the United States statute. It appeared that some of the goods carried by it were destined to and marked for points beyond the state of Michigan. The court said (p. 565), referring to the question of interstate commerce: “ She was employed as an instrument of that commerce; for, whenever a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from one • state to another, com

The relator, by its cab service, simply extended its care of passengers at a loss to itself and provided an additional means of transportation which conveyed them for a reasonable compensation to their destinations in the city of Pew York. These passengers, when in the cabs of the relator, were in the process of transportation precisely as were the goods carried by the vessel Daniel Ball marked for points beyond the state of Michigan. (Lord v. Steamboat Co., 102 U. S. 541 ; Foster v. Davenport, 63 U. S. [22 How.] 244; Cutting v. Florida Railway and Navigation Co., 46 Fed. Repr. 641; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 .)

In the Leloup case Bradley, J. (at page 647), said : “ But it is urged that a portion of the.telegraph company’s business is internal to the State of Alabama, and, therefore, taxable by the State. But that fact does not remove the difficulty. The tax affects the whole business without discrimination. There are sufficient modes in which the internal business, if not already taxed in some other way, may be subjected to taxation without the imposition of a tax which covers the entire operations of the company.”

The case of Crutcher v. Kentucky ( 141 U. S. 47 ) has a very strong bearing in principle upon the question we are now considering. That case involved the transaction of certain business in the state of Kentucky by the plaintiff as the agent of the United States Express Company. Mr. Justice Bradley (at page 59) said : “We do not think that the difficulty is at all obviated by the fact that the express company, as incidental to its main business (which is to cany goods between different states), does also some local business by ccurryvng goods from one point to another within the State of Kentucky. This is

The case of Maine v. Grand Trunk Railway Co. ( 142 U. S. 217 ) has no application to the case at bar. The defendant operated a portion of its line in the state of Maine and a franchise tax was imposed thereon. The payment was resisted on the ground that it was a tax imposed upon interstate commerce. The Supreme Court of the United States sustained this tax on the ground that the defendant enjoyed a franchise granted by the state of Maine, and it was competent for the legislature to require the payment of taxes as a condition to isshing the grant. These facts clearly distinguish the case from the one now under consideration. It may be, however, remarked that the Supreme Court decided this case on a vote of five to four, and the opinion of the dissenting justices contains cogent reasoning in support of the proposition that the ' tax is imposed on the business of interstate commerce.

The case of Coe v. Errol ( 116 U. S. 517 ), cited by the respondent, has no application to the case at bar. That case involved the taxation of a raft of logs which had been cut in the state of Hew Hampshire, and were destined for shipment to the state of Maine. Prior to the time when they were to be started on their interstate journey, a tax was imposed by the state of Hew Hampshire, which was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States, on the ground that until the transportation was actually begun these logs were like all other personal property in the state of Hew Hampshire and liable to taxation; that the mere intention of the

The case of People ex rel. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. v. Morgan, Comptroller ( 168 N. Y. 1 ) has no bearing upon this controversy. In that case the comptroller sought to collect from the relator a tax under section 184 of the Tax Law, for the transportation of domestic mail matter within this state. It appeared, however, that it was impossible to ascertain the proportion of mail which originated and terminated within tliis state, as distinguished from interstate and foreign mail matter, for the reason that "the mail bags could not be inspected for any such purpose. It was held that this state of affairs prevented ■ the assessment of any tax for the transportation of domestic mail matter.

I am of opinion that the taxes imposed upon the relator by the state comptroller are an interference with interstate commerce, and were unconstitutionally levied and void.

The determination of the Comptroller and the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs.

Parker, Ch. J., Gray, O’Brien, Haight and Werner, JJ., concur with Cullen, J; Bartlett, J., dissents.

Order affirmed.