Majority
Headnote
1. Libel — Defamatory Publication Referring to Class or Group of Persons — When One of Such Persons May Maintain Action for Libel. Where statements contained in an article published by a newspaper, which described and censured the acts of a number of medical graduates, who were employed upon the house staff of a public hospital, in hanging an effigy of the medical superintendent of the hospital, although true in part, were erroneous and defamatory in some respects one of the medical graduates referred to in such article may maintain an action for libel against the newspaper, since the legal effect of the publication is the same as if he had been the only physician referred to, and, where the answer mentioned him by name, as if reference had been made to him eo nomine.The legal effect of the publication complained of is the same as if the plaintiff had been the only physician referred to and, in view of the answer which mentions him by name, as if reference had been made to him eo nomine.
The article described the plaintiff as a physician and said, in substance, that he was a jackass in the guise of a doctor. It further charged that the medical school which gave him his diploma as a doctor of medicine graduated him, a brute, “ to care for us in sickness,” and a ghoul, “ to mutilate us when dead.” It criticized, by suggestion, the educational system which permitted such a savage to retain his diploma and urged the public authorities to arrest him as a degenerate graduate and to give him at least an installment of his deserts. It spoke of him as one of the doctors employed to care for the patients in a charity hospital, who hauled from his coffin, while still in the hospital awaiting burial, the dead body of a patient, “ white-headed and withered and worn with life’s battles,” and strung him up by the neck in front of Dr. Stewart’s residence, “ a grisly object swinging in the wind,” and danced around it and thus insulted both the living and the dead.
Too much of the article was true, but all was not, yet the plaintiff was besmirched by it all, not as an individual, but as
It is not the individual, but the doctor, the savage with a diploma, the brutish, ghoulish, degenerate graduate, who is held up to public scorn by the strong language of the article. The plaintiff was attacked in his professional capacity, because he was denounced as a physician, with a diploma, but unworthy of it, a graduate guilty of an atrocious wrong, a doctor, but nevertheless a jackass, a savage, a brute, a ghoul and a degenerate. While on duty as a doctor at the hospital he is said to have invaded its dead house and inflicted a monstrous indignity upon the body of a gray-haired old man who had been his patient but a short time before. His calling as a physician permeates the editorial and appears in nearly every sentence. As I read the entire publication, a degenerate graduate means a degenerate doctor, and an institution that graduates brutes and ghouls means one that turns out doctors who are brutes and ghouls like the plaintiff.
Was it error, under these circumstances, for the trial court to hold, as matter of law and the Appellate Division to unanimously sanction the holding, that the plaintiff was assailed in his professional capacity ?
The article imputed to a physician the ignorance of a jackass, the brutality of a savage and the fiendishness of a ghoul, which presumptively injured his professional reputation. Is a jackass in the guise of a doctor, a savage unfit to retain his diploma as a physician, a graduate of a medical school who .is a brute, a ghoul and a degenerate, fit to properly practice his profession ? Did not such charges necessarily
Dissent
To say of a minister that he is immoral, of a lawyer that he is an ignoramus, a drunkard or a cheat, of an architect or a teller of a bank that he is crazy, of a physician that he is a humbug, or a quack, or a butcher, or a blockhead, or a quack-salver, or an empiric, or a mountebank, or that he is no scholar, or that his diploma is worthless, has been held actionable per se, as touching the vocation. (Krug v. Pitass, 162 N. Y. 154 ; Moore v. Francis, 121 N. Y. 199 , 204 ; Cruikshank v. Gordon, 118 N. Y. 178 , 183 ; Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 398 , 402 ; White v. Carroll, 42 N. Y. 161 ; Tarleton v. Lagarde, 46 La. Ann. 1368 ; 26 L. R. A. 325 ; Clifford v. Cochrane, 10 Ill. App. 570 ; Cawdry v. Highley, Cro. Car. 270 ; Peard v. Jones, Cro. Car. 382 ; Allen v. Eaton, 1 Roll. Abr. 54 ; Doddart v. Haselfoot, 1 Viner’s Abr. [S. a.] pl. 12 ; Southee v. Denny, 1 Exch. 196 ; Cooke’s Law of Defamation, 18 ; 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. [2d ed.] 961.)
The case before us comes within the principle of the cases cited and others referred to therein. While the plaintiff, in view of his own testimony, deserves little sympathy, he is entitled to his legal rights and to have such character as he had left after his foolish conduct protected from destruction by defamation.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
(dissenting). Upon the trial the court charged the jury that the matter published was an untruthful statement in a substantial ¡particular, and that it was spoken of the plaintiff “ in relation to his profession and assailed him in his
Many statements published of an individual to'some extent affecting his standing and reputation, only become actionable when special damages are alleged and shown ; but when the publication tends to injure him in his profession or business, or to charge him with the commission of a crime, it becomes actionable per se. It will thus be seen that statements published tending to injure a person in his profession or. business are an aggravation of the offense, and are ordinarily more heavily punished than where a statement is published concerning the individual. We incline to the view that both articles were libelous per se. Both charged the plaintiff with offenses under our Penal Code. It was a libel and misdemeanor to hang Dr. Stewart in effigy. (Sec. 243.) . It was a felony to break into the dead house and remove a body therefrom for the purpose of hanging it in effigy. (Sec. 313.) It was also an offense to break into the dead house for the purpose of removing coffins. (Sec. 505.) The plaintiff, therefore, would be entitled to recover some damages unless the charges were true. It now appears that he was, in fact, guilty of a misdemeanor in taking part in the hanging of Dr. Stewart in effigy. It also appears that he was guilty of a misdemeanor, if not of a graver crime, in assisting in the breaking into the dead house and in the taking of the three coffins therefrom. He did not, however, as we have seen, take a dead body from the house. In so far as he has damaged his own character by the offenses'that he has committed, he is without remedy and must suffer the consequences. He can only recover such damages as he has sustained by reason of the additional charge of which he was not guilty. This was the measure of the defendant’s liability; but the jury, as we have seen, was permitted to include another element — that of injury to plaintiff’s profession or business. In determining this question it becomes necessary to carefully review the arti
We conclude that the charge, as made, was erroneous in the particular alluded to, and for that reason the judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.
- Pabkee, Oh. J., Martin and Werner, JJ., concur with Vann, J.; Q-bat and O’Brien, JJ., concur with Haight, J.
Judgment affirmed.
Cases cited
- Stokes v. Morning Journal Ass'n 66 App. Div. 569 p. 216
- Van Vechten v. Hopkins 5 Johns. 211 p. 216
- Weed v. Bibbins 32 Barb. 315 p. 216
- Sanderson v. Caldwell 45 N. Y. 398 at 402 p. 216, p. 219
- Fry v. Bennett 5 Sandf. 54 p. 216
- Cassidy v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle 138 N. Y. 239 p. 216
- Kinney v. Nash 3 N. Y. 177 p. 216
- Moore v. Francis 121 N. Y. 199 at 204 p. 216, p. 219
- Van Ingen v. Mail & Express Publishing Co. 156 N. Y. 376 p. 217
- Griebel v. Rochester Printing Co. 8 App. Div. 450 p. 217
- Mattice v. Wilcox 147 N. Y. 624 p. 217
- Cruikshank v. Gordon 118 N. Y. 178 at 183 p. 217, p. 219
- Krug v. Pitass 162 N. Y. 154 p. 219
- White v. Carroll 42 N. Y. 161 p. 219