Gunnison v. Board of Education

The question in this case is presented by the demurrer to the complaint. The action was to recover an alleged balance of. wages or salary of the plaintiff and other teachers in the public schools of Brooklyn. The defendant demurred to the complaint upon the ground that upon its face it did not state a cause of action, and that the city of New York and not the board of education was the proper party defendant. The only question argued is whether the defendant is liable to be sued on account of the matters and things stated in the complaint.

The complaint contains several causes of action separately stated, but all of the same nature and character. One of the causes of action is to recover a sum of money stated to be due to the plaintiff from the defendant as salary or wages, or a balance thereof, as a teacher in one of the public schools of Brooklyn. The other causes of action are to recover a balance of salary or wages alleged to be due from the defendant to the other teachers named in the complaint, the claims for the same having been assigned to the plaintiff. The plaintiff on all the claims demanded judgment for $1,465.20, with the interest thereon from May 1st, 1899.

The complaint avers and the demurrer admits the following facts: (1) That the defendant is a public municipal corporation. (2) That prior to the month of April, 1899, the plaintiff, being a duly licensed and qualified teacher, was duly appointed by the board a teacher in the public schools, and rendered services in that capacity, performing all the duties of the position. (3) That the salary of the position had been duly fixed by the board at five hundred dollars per month for the month of April, 1899, and but $400 has been paid. (4) That sufficient funds were appropriated to the defendant and apportioned to the Brooklyn schools to pay the plaintiff’s salary. (5) That more than ten days before the commencement of the action the plaintiff presented the claim to. the defendant and its financial officer having power to audit and pay the same, and payment or audit was refused. (6) Precisely the same facts with respect to the employment of the

On the face of the pleadings the facts are, therefore, admitted that the defendant, a public municipal corporation employed the plaintiff and the other teachers named in the complaint to teach in the public schools at the agreed salary or compensation alleged, and as to each teacher that it has refused to pay a part of the compensation, and that the sum specified in the complaint remains unpaid, although the services were fully rendered. It remains to inquire what reasons, if any, exist or can be urged why the defendant cannot be sued on account of the matters and things alleged in the complaint, and why the plaintiff must resort to the city for the recovery of his claims, since that is the contention and the only argument in support of this appeal.

It is admitted on the record that the defendant is a public municipal corporation. It is admitted that it employed the plaintiff and the other teachers at a fixed compensation and that a part of this compensation still remains unpaid. This appeal cannot be sustained unless it is shown that these facts do not constitute a cause of action against the defendant and do constitute a cause of action against the city of New York.

The city charter provides that the defendant, the board of education, shall administer all moneys available for educational purposes, and, on the facts stated in the complaint and admitted in the demurrer, it is clear that the plaintiff cannot maintain any action against the city. The mere fact that the public money for the support and conduct of the schools is deposited in the city treasury does not affect the liability of the board of education to be sued, nor does it, upon the facts stated, create any liability against the city. The city has the custody of the money, but the board must administer and

It was always the law and is the law still, that an action will lie against the board of education to recover a judgment upon a disputed claim which it has refused to audit or allow. (Dannat v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 66 N. Y. 585 -588.) A suit at law against the board is the proper proceeding to compel the adjustment or liquidation of the claim. The procedure for the collection of claims such as this was very clearly laid down by this court in the case last cited, in this language: “ Under the system that is provided, there was but one way for the board of education to discharge the obligations assumed by its contracts, and that was by a draft drawn upon the city chamberlain, and so long as it was willing to give such a draft its creditors could make no further claim upon it. If it was willing to give a draft and had done all the law required of it, it could not be sued.

“ It could not draw the money itself as the draft is required

It is apparent from the general drift of the argument that the learned counsel for the defendant is of the opinion that the employment .of the teachers in the public schools and the general conduct and management of the schools is a city function in the same sense as it is in the case of the care of the streets or the employment of police and the payment of their salaries and compensation; but that view of the relations of the city to public education, if entertained, is an obvious mistake. The city cannot rent, build or buy a schoolhousc; it cannot employ or discharge a teacher, and has no power to contract with teachers with respect to their compensation. There is no contract or official relation, express or implied, between the teachers and the city. All this results from the settled policy of the state from an early date to divorce the business of public education from all other municipal interests

The defendant is by the terms of the new charter given all the powers and subjected to all the obligations and duties of all previous boards of education or school boards. (Sec. 1058.) It is expressly required to administer all moneys raised for educational purposes (Sec. 1060), and, hence, the obligation to

The proposition sought to be established by this appeal is that a corporate body created for the express purpose of conducting a system of public education, exercising such vast powers and charged with such important duties, is not subject to be sued by a school teacher to recover wages or salary, when the only object and purpose of such a suit is to establish the validity of a disputed claim and liquidate the amount. It is quite certain that during the last fifty years, and ever since a board of education existed in the city of Hew York, actions of this character have been brought and maintained against it without any question raised or doubt suggested that it was not the proper party. The board still has every power that it ever possessed, and it is still subject to every duty or obligation that ever was imposed upon it. A brief review of some of the cases in this and other courts will show that there never was and cannot now be any doubt with respect to the liability of the board of education of the city of Hew York to be sued upon any disputed claim or liability arising out of the

Actions and sjiecial proceedings of almost every conceivable character have been so often brought and maintained against the defendant, the board of education, that the present contention would seem to be without any support in reason or authority. Suits have been repeatedly maintained against the defendant on contracts for building or repairing schoolhouses (McGregor v. Board of Education of N. Y., 107 N. Y. 511 ; Van Dolsen v. Bd. of Education of N. Y, 162 N. Y. 446 ; Dwyer v. Bd. of Education of N. Y., 165 N. Y. 613 ); and so mandamus proceedings have been instituted against the board to compel the delivery of papers (People ex rel. Hoffman v. Board of Education of N. Y., 141 N. Y. 86 );-to compel payment of teachers’ salaries (People ex rel. Steinson v. Bd. of Education of N. Y., 158 N. Y. 125 ); or to compel an increase of salary or reinstatement of teachers (People ex rel. Murphy v. Board of Education of N. Y., 173 N. Y. 607 ; People ex rel. Christie v. Bd. of Education of N. Y.,

It is very plain, therefore, that the contention on the part of the defendant, that it is not the proper party to be sued, cannot be sustained unless it is shown that some change has been made in the statute law on the subject by recent legislation. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendant is that a radical change has been effected in this respect, and that the law of fifty years has been superseded by the enactment of the present charter, and it is upon this contention that this appeal must stand or fall. The following statement, taken from the printed argument in support of the appeal, clearly discloses the counsel’s position with respect to the right to bring suits of this character against the board of education under the present charter: “ What we urge in this connection is that the legislature in making the board of education a member of one of the administrative departments of the city of 27ew York have devolved upon the city itself, acting through one of its departments, the state functions which were formerly directly imposed upon the board of education as a separate public corporation. In this respect the board of education is similar to the department of health, the police department, the department of public charities and the fire department. 27o more reason exists for holding that a common-law action should be brought against the board of education than for holding that such actions should be

Surely, if this is a correct statement of the law a great change has been made, which we would naturally expect to find clearly expressed in the new charter, since it' is in that charter that we still find all the statutory provisions quoted above, and notably that provision wherein it is declared that the board of education shall, in its corporate capacity, represent the entire school system. If the state has departed from the settled policy that has prevailed since its organization, of keeping the work of public education and the control and management of its schools separate and distinct from all other municipal interests and business by the selection of its own agents, and clothing them with corporate powers to represent the schools,, such as school districts and boards of education, and has devolved these powers and duties directly upon the city, we would naturally expect to find such a departure and notable change expressed in language so clear that no doubt could arise as to this change of policy. If the board cannot be sued for teachers’ wages and the teacher must resort to a suit against the city, then surely the board must have sunk into a mere city agency, and it no longer has any use for independent corporate powers. Public education then becomes a city function, exposed to the taint of current municipal politics, and to any and every general mismanagement that may prevail in city departments.

But we still have the very plain provisions of the charter declaring that the board is the representative of the entire school system, and has the power to administer all school funds, and is vested with the right to manage and control all school property, followed by the provision that “ suits in relation to such property shall be brought in the name of the board of education.” But the learned counsel for the defendant explains away all these provisions in his printed brief in the followdng words: “ There is no express legislation as to the relation of the board of education to law suits except that, under the provisions of this section, suits affecting school

The meaning of this proposition is that under the present charter the board of education may bring suits as plaintiff, but cannot be sued as a defendant, and when applied to this case it means that the board may sue teachers and others for breach of their contracts, but the teachers and others cannot sue the board for salary, wages or compensation. No argument is necessary to refute this proposition. The bare statement that a corporate body exercising full control and management of the schools and representing the school system in its entirety may brwig suits in all matters relating to the schools, but cannot be sued upon claims or demands arising out of the management and conduct of the corporate business, is such an extreme and unreasonable view of the legal relations between the board and the teachers, that the proposition refutes itself.

We have seen that the policy of this state for more than half a century has been to separate public education from all other municipal functions and intrust it to independent corporate agencies of its own creation, such as school districts and boards of education, with capacity to sue and be sued in all matters involved in the exercise of their corporate powers. We have seen that during this long period of time this court and all the courts of this state have accepted this rule and acted upon it, and not until now, and in this case, has any question been raised with respect to the right of a teacher to bring suit against the board of education to recover salary or wages. In no part of the state have suits of this character so frequently arisen as in the city of New York, under the charter of

The first provision relied upon as a foundation for the radical change suggested is to be found in section 1644 and reads as follows : “ All future suits by or against the city of Hew York as hereby constituted, or against any of the municipal and public corporations in this act united and consolidated, shall be in the corporate name of the city of Hew York.” This section, has not the slightest reference to the board of education, but simply points out how suits against the city of Hew York must be brought. It has no application whatever to this case, since this is not a suit against the city nor against any of the political divisions united and consolidated with it, but against another and independent corporation, namely, the board of education. The meaning and purpose of this provision is very obvious. Prior to the enactment of the present charter the corporate name and style of the city was “ The Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of Hew York,” and all suits had to be brought against it in that name. (Cons. Act, sec. 26.) In the enactment of the new charter this provision of course had to be changed, and by the first section, the old city, with certain other cities, towns, counties and other political divisions united and consolidated with it are to

The other provision of the present charter, which it is said is new and makes a radical change with respect to the proper party defendant in such actions as this, is to be found in section 96, where the administrative departments of the city, fifteen in number, are enumerated. The board of. education is there called the “ Department of Education,” and the head of the department is to be called the board of education, and shall consist of forty-six members. (Sec. 108.) It is difficult to see how the mere listing of the board of education among the city departments makes any change in its corporate powers, duties or liabilities. It possesses every power now that it ever had, and much more. The legal capacity to sue or be sued that was always inherent in it as a corporate body, and in terms conferred by express statute has not been affected or taken away by calling it “ The Department of Edu

But it is said, and this is the reasoning process in support of the argument, that since an individual head of a department cannot be sued for his official acts, it must follow that the head of a department .being a corporate body is likewise exempt from such suits. That argument rests entirely upon a non sequiiur. The head of a city department who is a natural person, is a mere agent of the city; Ms aots are the acts of the city and the city alone is responsible for them, but the board of education is an independent corporate body created for the particular purpose of exercising specific statutory powers as the sole representative of the school system, and its acts are in no sense the acts of the city,, and the city is not responsible for them, as this court has often held. The board is the lineal successor of the old school districts, with powers much enlarged, and it might just as well be argued that these districts in the rural part of the state could not be sued, but that -the action must be brought against the village, the town or the county. If a great corporate body, exercising such vast powers as are conferred upon this defendant, cannot be sued for the wages of teachers that it employs, .it would be difficult to justify such actions against the school districts in other parts of the state. But the argument that the defend

Parker, Oh. J., Gray, Bartlett, Haight, Cullen and Werner, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.