Hutchins v. Pennsylvania Railroad

In May, 1900, the plaintiff applied to an agent of the defendant for through transportation from Brooklyn, New York, to Carlsbad, New Mexico, “ over the Pennsylvania Railroad.” The agent handed her what is called “ a continuous passage, through ticket,” and she paid him the

At the head of the ticket was printed in' someAvhat conspicuous type “ Pennsylvania Bailroad Company. Hood for one first class passage to” Fort Worth, Texas. Beneath and in smaller letters were the Avords'“ Subject to the following contract,” Avliich Avere directly folloAved by a “Notice” to the effect that it was “ a penal offense for the purchaser or holder of this ticket to sell, barter or transfer the same for a consideration in the State of Texas, and tiffs ticket or any unused part thereof is redeemable at any ticket office in Texas, of a raihvay company over which this ticket or any unused ]Dart thereof reads, if presented Avithin ten days after the right to use the same has expired by limitation of time as stipulated thereon.” Next below in very fine print were eight paragraphs, numbered consecutively, of which the first and last were as follows : “ 1st. That in selling this ticket and checking baggage this company acts as agent only and is not responsible beyond its own line. * * *.

“ 8tli. That baggage liability is limited to Avearing apparel not exceeding $i00 in value.” At the bottom of the ticket Avas.tlie following: “ I hereby agree to all the conditions of the above contract” and beneath were two blanks, one headed “ Signature,” and the other, “ Witness.” Attached to the ticket were five coupons, each headed in conspicuous type “ Issued by Pennsylvania Bailroad Co.,” which in all except the last Avas followed by the Avords, in much smaller type, “ on account of,” some other railroad named.

Another ticket with two coupons attached for a passage from Fort Worth to Carlsbad was delivered to the plaintiff with the one already described. The second ticket was in all other respects a substantial duplicate of the first and the coupons accompanying Avere in the same form as the others, except that each named, in fine print, a different railroad.

Neither ticket Avas signed by the plaintiff and she was not

During her journey she changed cars at St. Louis, where she took the train pointed out to her by the conductor, which, as she thought when she testified as a witness, was on the Iron Mountain railroad. It did not appear that she was accustomed to traveling or that she knew anything about the nature of coupon tickets or what roads belonged to the defendant’s system. She was somewhat advanced in years and simply asked for a through ticket to Carlsbad, Hew Mexico, over the Pennsylvania railroad, paid the price and took what was given her.

In behalf of the defendant evidence was given by men in its employment tending to show that it accounted to seven independent railroad corporations named in as many coupons attached to the tickets for their share of the entire cost of transportation, and that the plaintiff’s trunk was delivered in good order at St. Louis to the Iron Mountain and Southern Bailway Company, one of such roads. Where her trunk was broken open did not appear.

At the close of all the evidence the defendant moved for the direction of a verdict in its favor, but the court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, neither party having asked to go to the jury upon any question. The effect was the same as if both parties had moved to direct and neither had asked to go to the jury. The exception to this direction is the only one appearing in the record.

* I think the evidence warranted the court in finding, by the direction of a verdict for the plaintiff, that the contract was for through transportation from the point of departure to the place of destination. The defendant failed to conclusively 'establish a limitation by special contract of its common-law liability as a carrier. (Jennings v. Grand Trunk Ry., 127 N. Y. 438 .) The form of the ticket suggests a proposition to make such a contract, for there was appended thereto the sentence, “ I hereby agree to all the conditions of the above contract,” with a blank for the signature of the purchaser and another for the signature of the selling agent as a witness. The proposition was not accepted by the plaintiff for she did not sign the ticket nor have any reason to believe she was expected to. She did not assent to the proposition nor agree to any limitation of liability on the part of the defendant, by merely accepting and using the ticket, for she did not read it, or know its contents, nor was she told -to read it or requested to sign it. She asked for through transportation to Carlsbad, Hew Mexico, over the defendant’s railroad, and when the ticket was delivered to her without request or remark by its agent, she had a right to presume she was getting what she asked for and what she paid for. A railroad ticket may be a contract or a voucher, and which the ticket of the plaintiff was depended upon the inference to be drawn from what was said and done when she bought it, as well as on the form of the ticket and coupons. A ticket is no notice of conditions concealed therein by fine print, unless the attention of the holder is in some way directed to them. There is no presumption that a

The situation of the plaintiff was quite unlike that of Mr. Cullom, the purchaser of a ticket in the Talcott case, as he was an old traveler and familiar with all the facts. He “ knew what a coupon ticket meant, and he intended to purchase a ticket that would take him over the West Shore and another connecting line.” He knew that the Wabash, railroad, from which he bought the ticket, did not extend to Hew York, his place of destination, and that its eastern terminus was at Detroit. In addition to knowing that he would have to use other lines, he “ knew that besides the coupons for the different portions of the journey there was a printed contract at the head of the ticket, but he did not read it until after the accident.” Even in that case we held that the nature and extent of the contract was a question of fact, but as the evidence was conflicting and the referee had found for the defendant we affirmed as to the second cause of action. As to the first cause of' action, however, we reversed, because a nonsuit was granted by the referee, while we held that he should have passed upon the question in relation to an alleged contract for through transportation as one of fact. (Talcott v. Wabash Railroad Co., 159 N. Y. 461 .)

While that case was decided by a divided vote and no opinion in its entirety received the assent of a majority of -the judges, the judgment pronounced shows that it was necessarily held as is stated above. The leading authorities were cited and reviewed, so that further effort in that direction is unnecessary. We regard the Talcott case as controlling, and, without further discussion, affirm the judgment appealed from, with costs.

(dissenting). This appeal presents a question of law concerning the defendant’s liability for loss or injury to the plaintiff’s baggage at some point beyond the terminus of the defendant’s road and where it was being transported to

There does not seem to be any dispute whatever about the facts. On or about the 31st of May, 1900, the plaintiff purchased a through ticket from Brooklyn, in this state, to Carlsbad, Hew Mexico. The plaintiff procured this ticket from a clerk in the office of the Erie Bailroad Company, where she called for a through ticket to Carlsbad and paid the fare to that place.' The ticket sold and delivered to the plaintiff was for passage over the defendant’s railroad to Pittsburg and from thence to the point of destination over five other independent and connecting roads. The plaintiff’s ticket thus purchased contained on its face the following statement: “ That in selling this ticket and checking baggage this company acts as agent only and is not responsible beyond its own line. * * * That baggage liability is limited to wearing apparel not exceeding one hundred dollars in value.” The plaintiff started upon her journey over the defendant’s railroad, taking with her a trunk containing her b'aggagé, which was delivered to the defendant and checked through to the place of destination. It appears that when the plaintiff arrived in Carlsbad, Hew Mexico, her trunk arrived on the same train, but it was found that the lock was broken and several articles of the value of one hundred and sixty dollars were missing, and the verdict directed by the court in the plaintiff’s favor was for this amount. The plaintiff was given two separate tickets, containing separate coupons, for transportation over the road of each separate carrier, and these tickets contained the provisions already quoted; and it was shown that the defendant accounted to the other five independent railroad

The question, therefore, is whether upon these facts the defendant can be held liable for the loss or abstraction of the plaintiff’s baggage. It was shown, and the fact is not disputed, that when the trunk left the custody and control of the defendant it was in good order, and it seems to me that under such circumstances it is the settled law in this state that the defendant is not liable either for any accident happening to the passenger or any loss or injury to her baggage beyond the terminus of its own line. (Milnor v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 363 ; Condict v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 54 N. Y. 500 ; Kessler v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 61 N. Y. 538 ; Auerbach v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 89 N. Y. 281 ; Talcott v. Wabash R. R. Co., 159 N. Y. 461 .) In the case of Condict v. Grand Trunk Railway Co. (supra) the principle of liability is stated as follows: “ In England it is held that a railroad company receiving. goods marked for a particular place beyond its terminus, without expressly limiting its responsibility, undertakes prima facie to carry them to their, destination, and is to be regarded as a carrrier throughout the entire route. But in this and other States of the Union a different rule prevails. It is here held that the receipt of goods marked for a place beyond the terminus of the carrier’s route does not import a contract to carry them to their final destination. Such a contract will not be inferred from the simple

The principle of liability in such cases was thus stated by the Supreme Court of the United States: “ The general doctrine, then, as to transportation by connecting lines, approved by this court, and also by a majority of the state courts, amounts to this: that each road, confining itself to its common-law liability, is only bound, in the absence of a special contract, to safely carry over its own route and safely deliver to the next connecting carrier, but that any one of the companies may agree that over the whole route its liability shall extend. In the absence of a special agreement to that effect, such liability will not attach, and the agreement will not be inferred from doubtful expressions or loose language, but only from clear and satisfactory evidence.” (Myrick v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 107 U. S. 102 , 107.) In a subsequent case that court, reviewing the earlier decisions, stated the law in these words: “ It is the duty of the carrier, in the absence of any special contract, to carry safely to the end of its line and deliver to the next carrier in the route beyond. This rule of liability is adopted generally by the courts in this country, and is in itself so just and reasonable that we do not hesitate to give it our sanction.” (Pennsylvannia R. R. Co. v. Jones, 155 U. S. 333 .) It was held in the same case that in the absence of a special agreement on the part of a carrier to extend its liability beyond its own line, such liability will not attach; and such agreement will not be inferred from doubtful expressions or loose language, but it must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence. In the case at bar the plaintiff purchased through a clerk in the Erie Railroad Company, at a general passenger office in Brooklyn, two tickets from the defendant, she paying the entire charge for transportation and receiving a check for her trunk to be delivered at destination. It is quite true that a railroad

There is no opinion or anything to be found in the record to indicate the theory upon which judgment was directed against the defendant in this case. It cannot, I think, be asserted that there was any special contract in this case on the part of the defendant to carry the plaintiff and her baggage safely from Brooklyn to Carlsbad. There is no special contract alleged and no special contract was shown at the trial. The fact that the plaintiff called for a through ticket and received the ticket described in the record, with the baggage check, does not show or tend to show the existence of any special contract. The clerk, in response to her request for a through ticket, gave to her the only form of ticket that he had, and it would seem to be a very strained construction of the transaction to say that there was a meeting of minds and an actual contract made between the plaintiff and the defendant, to the effect that the latter should transport the plaintiff and her baggage safely from Brooklyn to Carlsbad, or that there was á stipulation on the part of the defendant to become responsible for any loss of baggage upon any of the various roads over which it was necessary for the

Cullen, Ch. J., Bartlett and Haight, JJ., concur with Vann, J.; Werner, J., concurs with O’Brien, J.; Gray, J., absent.

Judgment affirmed.