Majority
Headnote
1. Elections—Meaning of Words “Any Citizen’ in Section 56 of Election Law. In construing the provision of section 56 of the Election Law (L. 1896, ch. 909, as amd. by L. 1898, eh. 385, and L. 1901, ch. 654), that where a dispute as to the political party or other name designated in a certificate of nomination, filed pursuant to that section, or section 57 of the Election Law, has been determined by the officer with whom the certificate is filed, the Supreme Court, or any justice thereof within the judicial district, or any county judge within his county, shall have summary.jurisdiction upon the complaint of “any citizen” to review the determination and acts of such officer, and to make such order in the premises as justice may require, the term “any citizen” must be understood as referring to any citizen who has instituted the proceeding by filing objections to the certificate.On the 5th day of October, 1904, there wás filed in the office of the secretary of state a certificate of nomination by the Social Democratic party, so called, of candidates for presidential electors, for governor and for other state officers, to be voted for at the general election to be held November 8th, 1904. On the same day John S. McEwan, a citizen of the United States and of the state of New York, residing in the city of Albany and a duly qualified elector, filed objections to said certificate with the secretary of state, in which he objected to the use of the word “ Democratic ” as part of the party name in such certificate. Thereupon a hearing was had by the secretary of-state and the objection of McEwan was overruled. Immediately thereafter and upon the same day McEwan applied to Mr. Justice Betts for an order to show cause why the proceedings before the secretary of state should not be reviewed, and thereupon an order to show cause was made by such justice, returnable before him on the 22d day of October, 1904. Meanwhile one James O’Neil, who had filed no objection whatever to the certificate of nomination before the .secretary of state, obtained from Justice Cochrane an order to show cause why the proceedings before the secretary of state should not be reviewed, returnable before Justice Howard on the 20th day of October, 1904. Upon the return of such order to show cause Justice Howard made an order sustaining the decision of the secretary of state and overruling the objections of McEwan, bearing date the 21st day of October, which order was produced before Justice Betts on the following day when the order to show cause procured by McEwan was returnable before him, and thereupon he denied the motion to review the determination of the secretary of state “ solely on the ground that there has been a decision by a justice of this court on said determination of the secretary of state on the complaint of James O’Neil.”
Inasmuch as the election of 1904 has passed, the questions involved in these proceedings have become academic. But in view of their public,importance and their liability to arise again upon the filing of certificates of nominations for other elections, we have thought best to entertain the appeal and to consider the questions. The first question pertains to the practice adopted by the justice before whom the proceedings were reviewed. Upon this subject the statute is exceedingly meager. While the draftsman thereof may be an expert practitioner, we are unable to escape the conviction that the simple remedy of review by certiorari would have been more easily understood by the bench and bar. It provides that, “ If there be a division within a party, and two or more factions claim the same, or substantially the same device or name, the officer aforesaid shall decide between such conflicting claims, giving preference of device and name to the convention or primary, or committee thereof, recognized by the regularly constituted party authorities. Any question arising with reference to any device, or to the political party or other name designated in any certificate of nomination filed pursuant to the provisions of this section, or of section 57 of this article, or with reference to the construction, validity or legality of any such certificate, shall be determined in the first instance by the officer with whom such certificate ’ of nomination is filed. Such decision sliall be in writing, and a copy thereof shall be sent forthwith by mail by such officer to the committee, if any, named upon the face of such certificate and also to each candidate nominated by any certificate, and also to each candidate nominated by any certificate of nomination affected by such decision. The supreme court, or any justice thereof, within the judicial district, or any county
By other provisions of the statute the certificate of nominations, for presidential electors, governor and other state officers, is required to be filed with the secretary of state. That officer was, therefore, required to determine in the first "instance any question 'arising with reference to any party name designated in any certificate of nomination. The proceeding authorized by the statute is, under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, a special proceeding. In order to institute such proceeding before the secretary of state a question must arise calling for his determination, and such question arises only by some objection filed with him raising a question with reference to the validity of the certificate. In the case under consideration the objection was filed by McEwan, and that act we must regard as a commencement of the special proceeding. Upon the hearing that followed, the secretary of state, as we have seen, overruled the objection and held the certificate valid. Then under the provisions of the statute a right of review was given by the Supreme Court or any justice thereof within the judicial district or by any county judge upon the complaint of any citizen. It is quite possible that the word “ citizen ” should be limited to that of a qualified elector residing within the state or county or district for which the officer was to be chosen, and that the same qualifications were intended to relate also to the person filing the objection. But McEwan, as we have seen, was both
Section 56 of the Election Law, to which we have already referred, contains provisions for party nominations of candidates for public office, to be made by a convention or a duly authorized committee of such convention of a political party which at the last preceding general election at which a governor was elected had cast ten thousand votes or upwards. It contains provisions for the making ■ of party certificates of nominations, of filing the same with the secretary of state, and provides that it shall also designate, in not more than five words, the name of the political party which the convention or committee making the nomination represents; and they also shall select some simple device or emblem to distinguish or designate the candidates of the party, which device shall in no case be used by any other party or independent body. If the certificate of nomination of two or more different political parties or independent bodies shall designate the same, or substantially the same, device or emblem or party name, the officer with whom the certificates of nomination are filed shall decide which of said political parties or' independent bodies is entitled to the use of such device or emblem or party name, being governed so far as may be in his decision by priority of designation in the case of the device or emblem, and, of use in the case of party name. Then follow provisions with reference to the review of the determination of the secretary of state, to which we have already alluded. Section 57 of the law contains provisions for the making of independent nominations of candidates for public office for the state, upon the «subscribing of the certificate provided for by six thousand or more voters, which certificate must designate in not more than five words the political party or other name which the signers shall, select, “which name shall not include the name of any organized political party.” They also are required to select an emblem. It will thus be observed that the provisions of section 56 pertain to nominations by the conventions of existing political
In the case' before us, as we have seen, the name “Social Democratic Party ” was adopted in national convention in the city of Chicago in 1900, at which the nominations for president and vice-president were made. But at the national convention of the same party in 1904" the word “ Democratic ” was eliminated from the name of the party and the nomination was made under the name “ The Socialist Party.” The local branch of the party in this state, however, refused to adopt the name by which the party was known throughout the United States and which had been adopted by its national convention and insisted on making its nomination under the name “ The Social Democratic Party.” The political speeches and discussions in the .press, with the banners, signs and transparencies which might be made and displayed throughout the campaign on behalf of the Socialist party would not serve to identify the Social Democratic party with the candidates for presi-. dent and vice-president among the illiterate voters with the same force and effect as if the national party and the local party maintained the same name. The reasons, therefore, for our decision of the case in Matter of Greene (supra) do not apply to this case. In 1900 the Socialist party in this state made its nominations pursuant to the provisions of section 57 of the Election Law. By that statute it ivas prohibited from including in its name the name of the Democratic party. Had it made its nominations in 1904 under the provisions of that section, clearly the name adopted would have been unauthorized. It, however, made its nominations in that year under section 56, which prohibited it from adopting a name substantially the same as that of the Democratic party. It added thereto the word “Social” only, and in view of the purpose and intent of the statute and in the absence of a national
The order and determination should, therefore, be reversed and the objection interposed "by the appellant'should be sustained, with costs in all courts.
Cullen, Ch. J"., Gray, O’Brien, Bartlett and Werner, JJ., concur; Vann, J., not voting.
Order reversed, etc.
Cases cited
- In re Objections to Certificates of Nomination as Member of Assembly for the Second Assembly District of Westchester County 150 N. Y. 538 p. 444
- Freethy v. Freethy 42 Barb. 641 p. 444
- Abbe v. Abbe 22 App. Div. 483 p. 444
- People v. Butler 3 Cow. 347 p. 444
- United States v. Palmer 3 Wheat. 610 p. 444
- In re Smith 41 Misc. Rep. 501 p. 444
- Crawford v. Lans 29 Misc. Rep. 248 p. 444
- W. A. Gaines & Co. v. Leslie 25 Misc. Rep. 20 p. 444
- McLoughlin v. Singer 33 App. Div. 185 p. 444
- De Youngs v. Jung 7 Misc. Rep. 56 p. 444
- Taendsticksfabriks Akticbolagat Vulcan v. Myers 139 N. Y. 364 p. 444
- In re Greene 9 App. Div. 223 p. 444