Majority
Headnote
Pleading — Improper Amendment as to Parties — Code Ciy. Pro. § 723. Where it appears upon the trial of an action brought by plaintiff as administrator to recover the value of services rendered by his deceased daughter, that she was a minor at the time the services were rendered, an amendment of the complaint, virtually allowing him to prosecute the action also in his individual capacity, is not authorized by section 723 of the Code of Civil Procedure, since such amendment “ changes substantially ” the cause of action by bringing in another party having a different cause of action.Plaintiff brought this action, as the administrator of the estate of Mary T. Doyle, to recover from the defendant the value of services rendered by her to the defendant’s testatrix. Upon the trial, it appeared by plaintiff’s testimony that Mary was his daughter and was a minor at the time the services were rendered. She became of age in the month that the defendant’s testatrix died. Before Mary’s death, she caused to be presented a claim to the defendant for the services in question, which was rejected. At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant moved the court to direct a verdict in his favor, upon the ground that Mary having rendered the services while under twenty-one years of age, they could not be recovered for by plaintiff as the administrator of her estate, inasmuch as they would “ belong to him personally.” Whereupon, the court granted a motion by the plaintiff to be allowed to amend his complaint “ to conform to the proof.” The defendant objected to the granting of the motion, upon the ground that “it changes the character of the action and cannot legally be done.” The trial judge ruled that he would deny the defendant’s motion for the direction of a verdict and “ lét the case go to the jury upon the proofs and allow the complaint to be amended to conform to the proofs.” Defendant excepted. The jury “ rendered a verdict for the plaintiff.” A judgment was subsequently entered in favor of the plaintiff, “individually and as administrator,” etc., for the amount of the verdict and, also, for costs, upon the judge’s certifícate, as to the latter, that the payment of the claim had been unreasonably resisted. Before the entry of the judgment, an order was formally entered amending the pleading and the complaint
I think no such power existed. Section 723 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the court upon the trial, in furtherance of justice, to amend a pleading by adding, or striking out, the name of a party; or “ where the amendment does not change substantially the claim, or defense, by conforming the pleading, or other proceeding, to the facts proved.” The amendment in question brought in another party, having a different cause of action ; for the right of the father of Mary to recover for her services rested upon quite another basis, than would that of the administrator of her estate. A parent has a right to the services and earnings of a minor child, which is founded upon the theory of compensation to him for the child’s maintenance. If, therefore, there existed any claim' against the estate of the defendant’s testatrix for the services rendered by Mary, it, presumptively, belonged to her parent and that, manifestly, presented a different cause of action. Had the plaintiff brought the action in his individual capacity and, also, as the administrator, the defendant could have demurred for a misjoinder of parties, or have taken that objection by answer. The proofs, which would have been called for in defense of a suit by the plaintiff, individually, would be quite other than such as would be required to meet his claim as the administrator. It might have been shown in defense that he, as parent, had failed to give the notice of claim under the statute (Dom. Relations Law, sec. 42), or had relinquished any claim, expressly, or impliedly. If the original plaintiff could not sustain the action, the statute does not authorize an amendment of the pleading, which adds the name of a person, who was, as to the original cause of action, a stranger in the eye of the law. (See Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45 , 57, and Davis v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 14 ib. 506, 526.) As a test, it may be seen
I advise the reversal of the judgment and that a new trial should be ordered; the costs to abide the event.
Cullen, Ch. J., Edwakd T. Baetlett, Haight, Webneb, Willabd Baetlett and Hiscook, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed, etc.
Cases cited
- Davis v. New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad 110 N. Y. 646 p. 386
- Bockes v. Lansing 74 N. Y. 437 p. 386
- Union Bank v. Mott 10 Abb. Pr. 372 p. 386
- Bildersee v. Aden 10 Abb. Pr. 163 p. 386
- Davis v. Mayor 14 N. Y. 506 p. 386
- Dauchy v. Tyler 15 How. Pr. 399 p. 386
- Thomas v. Nelson 69 N. Y. 118 p. 387
- Knickerbocker Life Insurance v. Nelson 78 N. Y. 137 p. 387
- Howard v. Johnston 82 N. Y. 271 p. 387
- Martin v. Home Bank 160 N. Y. 190 p. 387
- Reeder v. Sayre 70 N. Y. 180 p. 387
- Cott v. Prentice 104 N. Y. 45 at 57 p. 388