Majority
Headnote
1. Practice on Appeal. It is not the practice of the Court of Appeals to search the complaint on a motion apparently not involving the merits with the care used on demurrer, but where an order for the publication of a summons has been reversed upon the ground that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action the court will determine that question.This action was brought by the plaintiffs, as stockholders of the defendant, the Cobre Grande Copper Company, an Arizona corporation, in behalf of themselves and all other stockholders of the corporation similarly situated, to have the defendant, the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, a Mexican corporation, of which William C. Greene is the president, adjudged to be the holder in trust for the benefit of the Cobre Grande Copper Company of certain mines and mining properties situated in the republic of Mexico, and to compel such corporation and William C. Greene, its president, together with the Greene Consolidated Copper Company, a West Virginia corporation organized as a holding company, of which Greene is also president, to account to the Cobre Grande Copper Company and to the plaintiffs for income and proceeds arising from the work, use and occupation of such mines and mining properties.
The plaintiffs, upon affidavits showing facts in compliance with the provisions of sections 438 and 439 of the Code of Civil Procedure, procured an order directing the service of the summons upon the defendant Cobre Grande Copper Company by publication. A motion was made at the Special Term to set aside the order. The motion was denied, but upon appeal the Appellate Division reversed the order and
“1. Had the court jurisdiction upon the papers presented to grant an order .directing the service of the summons in this action upon the defendant the Cobre Grande Copper Company by publication.
“2. Was the court justified in vacating an order duly granted directing the service of a summons by publication upon the papers presented.”
Section 1780 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “ An action against a foreign corporation may be maintained by a resident of the state, or by a domestic corporation, for any cause of action.” Section 438, so far as now material, provides, “ An order directing the service of a summons upon a defendant, without the state, or by publication, may be made in either of the following cases: 1. Where the defendant to be served is a foreign corporation.” Section 439 provides that “ The order must be founded upon a verified complaint, showing a sufficient cause of action against the defendant to be served, and proof by affidavit of the additional facts required by the last section.” The reversal of the Appellate Division appears to have been based upon the latter provision of the Code and upon the ground that the complaint filed in this action does not state a sufficient cause of action against the Cobre Grande Copper Company. It is not our practice upon motions of this character to search the complaint with the care we would upon a demurrer; but inasmuch as the Appellate Division has held that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, it becomes our duty to now finally determine that question as to the point upon which that court based its decision.
The complaint, in substance, alleges that on or about the 26th day of November, 1898, the defendant William C. Greene contracted to convey to one George Mitchell certain mines and mining properties located in the Cananea mountains, in the republic of Mexico, in consideration of the sum of $12,500 in cash, and the further sums of $37,500 to be paid on the 26th day of November, 1899 ; $100,000 to be paid
It further appears from the allegations of the complaint that one John II. Costello had become the president of the Cobre Grande Copper Company, J. Henry Wood, the secretary and treasurer, and Cornelius O’Keefe, its manager at the works and mines in Mexico; that Greene, Mitchell and one Treadwell, who were also directors in the corporation, had become dissatisfied with the management of the other officers, and that thereupon they had a conference with one J. Edward Addieks, of Delaware, and one Thomas W. Lawson, of Boston, for the purpose of securing the necessary funds to pay the debts and protect and preserve the properties of the Cobre Grande Copper Company, and that at such conference it was arranged to oust Costello, the president, Wood, the secretary and treasurer, and O’Keefe, the manager, and to organize a Mexican corporation to take over the titles to the mining properties and to operate the mines, and to organize a holding company to take over the stock of the other companies, and that the necessary funds to carry out this arrangement should be advanced by Addieks and Lawson. Thereupon Greene, Mitchell and Treadwell proceeded to Arizona and on the 23rd day of September, 1899, they as directors of
It is also alleged that, pursuant to the agreement with Lawson and Addicks, Greene, Mitchell, Treadwell, Barnes and Walter S. Logan, Greene’s attorney, organized the Greene Consolidated Copper Company of West Virginia as a holding company, with Greene, Mitchell, Treadwell and Logan as its directors and officers ; that the main purpose and object of its organization was to take over and hold a majority in interest of the capital stock of the defendant Cobre Grande Copper Company and all the capital stock of the defendant Cananea Consolidated Copper Company except such shares as were necessary to be held by individuals to qualify them to act as directors. The capital stock of the Greene Consolidated Company was fixed at $5,000,000 and divided into five hundred thousand shares of the par value of $10 each. Upon the organization of the Greene Consolidated Company all the stock of the Cananea Company, except seven shares which were necessary to qualify directors, was turned over by Greene to the treasury of the Greene Consolidated Company, which enabled the Greene Company to exercise control and dominion over the Cananea Company and over all its assets, properties, income, profits and advantages arising from the operation of its mines, and from which it has been enabled to distribute upwards of four millions of dollars in dividends.
It is also alleged, in substance, that upon the organization of the Greene Consolidated Copper Company, Greene on behalf of the company offered and agreed that all stockholders of the Cobre Grande Copper Company should have the right to exchange their stock in that company for the stock in the Greene Consolidated Company, share for share; that
It is further alleged that the $37,500 payable on November 26th, 1899, as part of the purchase price of the mines and mining properties conveyed by the defendant Greene to the defendant Cobre Grande Copper Company by the agreement on July 22d, 1899, and all other payments therein specified and provided to be made and paid and all agreements and covenants to be carried out and performed by the defendant Cobre Grande Copper Company under that agreement, including the payment of the notes given as the purchase price of the Elisa mine, “ were paid, made, done and performed at the time and in the manner provided in said agreement and by or for the account of the defendant Cobre Grande Copper Company, or the payments and conditions thereof were waived, or settled in time and in manner agreed upon and accepted by all parties in interest, and the funds to make said payments and to carry out, do and perform the agreements, covenants and things to be carried out, done and performed by or on account of the defendant Cobre Grande Company, as aforesaid, were raised and provided and obtained and secured upon the faith, credit and pledge of the said mines and mining properties of the defendant Cobre Grande Copper Company and from the income and profits of the said mines and
We have already stated the relief sought to be obtained by the plaintiffs. The complaint contains many other allegations in much detail, to some of which we shall hereafter have occasion to refer. We have only given a brief summary of the allegations which we deem necessary to properly understand the questions presented for our determination. The determination of the Appellate Division that the complaint failed to state a cause of action was based upon the allegations of the complaint, to which we last referred. The prevailing opinion says with reference thereto that, “ if the cause of action is one to establish a trust of real estate and incidentally to obtain an accounting with reference to the income or as an action for an accounting as to the income of an alleged trust and incidentally for a declaration of trusts, the alleged rights of the Cobre Grande Copper Company, which the plaintiffs are attempting to assert, depend upon the continued existence of the option right to purchase the properties in question and the right to hold possession thereto under the agreements collateral to the option. As the escrow agreements were mere option contracts entitling the Cobre Grande Copper Company, upon making certain payments, to receive conveyances of the property, it is necessary that the complaint should show either- that the payments required to be made in order to entitle the Cobre Grande Company to a delivery of the deeds were made or that facts should be alleged showing a modification or waiver of these conditions so that it may appear that such rights have actually accrued to the Cobre Grande Company. Since it appears that all the contract rights of the Cobre Grande Copper Company, independently of the escrow agreements, were to cease at Greene’s election upon its failure to perform any of the covenants contained in the license agreement of Wovember 26th, 1898, as modified by the agreement of July 22d, 1899, and as it expressly appears that Greene claimed default had occurred and attempted to exercise his election to terminate the rights
It must be conceded that the allegations of performance, on the part of the Cobre Grande Copper Company of the requirements of the optional contracts, so called, as above quoted, are in the alternative, and that the effect is to allege payment or waiver or settlement. But passing the question as to whether the complaint would be demurrable for this reason, under our modern practice, or whether the parties should move to make the complaint more definite and certain, we shall proceed to the consideration of another phase of the question. It must be borne in mind that this is an equitable action brought to compel an accounting; that it is not an action at law in which allegations of payment, of waiver and of settlement are treated as separate and distinct matters of performance or defense. The allegations of the complaint under review are general in form and are in effect a summary of the conclusion reached from the allegations of fact preceding those under review. The Appellate Division, we think, erred in its statement that the allegations referred to were the only allegations of the complaint concerning performance. Under the modified contract of July 22d, 1899, the terms of payment provided for .under the contract of November 26th, 1898, were to be made in installments, $37,500 November 26tli, 1899, $50,000 November 26th, 1900, $50,000
It further appears from the allegations of the complaint, as we have seen, that the operation of these mines by the Cananea Company has been extremely profitable, and at least four millions of dollars has been divided among the stockholders of the Greene Consolidated Company, which was organized as
Again, as we have seen from the allegations of the' complaint, the conveyance of the Elisa mine, so called, to the Cobre Grande Copper Company, was absolute and not conditional Greene accepted in payment therefor four promissory notes of $25,000 each. It was, therefore, a completed transaction, and no option remained to be exercised, or act to be performed, as a condition for the passing of the title. This mine was also transferred to the Cananea Company, and that company has had the benefit of the proceeds therefrom. We consequently conclude that the complaint states a good cause of action, at least in so far as the questions discussed are concerned.
Our attention has been called to other questions pertaining to jurisdiction, etc., some of which were considered when this case was here before. ( 189 N. Y. 241 -252.) Further discussion at this time is not deemed necessary.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and that of the Special Term affirmed, with costs in all courts, and the questions certified answered, the first in the affirmative and the second in the negative.
Cullen, Oh. J., Edward T. Bartlett, Yann, Werner, TIiscoob: and Chase, JJ., concur.
Order reversed, etc.
Cases cited
- Zimmerman v. Kinkle 108 N. Y. 282 p. 307
- Wetmore v. Porter 92 N. Y. 76 p. 307
- Briggs v. Davis 20 N. Y. 15 p. 307
- Smith v. Ayer 101 U. S. 320 p. 307
- Wright v. Wright 54 N. Y. 437 p. 307
- Mitchell v. Thorne 134 N. Y. 536 p. 307
- Montgomery v. Boyd 63 App. Div. 190 p. 307
- Bryan v. University Publishing Co. 112 N. Y. 382 p. 307, p. 308
- Paget v. Stevens 143 N. Y. 172 p. 307, p. 308
- Hallenberg v. Greene 66 App. Div. 590 p. 307
- Chase v. Knickerbocker Phosphate Co. 32 App. Div. 400 p. 307
- Union Trust Co. v. Olmsted 102 N. Y. 729 p. 307
- Williams v. Fitzhugh 37 N. Y. 444 p. 307
- Gardner v. Ogden 22 N. Y. 327 p. 307
- Grant v. Cananea Consolidated Copper Co. 189 N. Y. 241 p. 307, p. 318
- Niles v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad 176 N. Y. 119 p. 307
- Flynn v. Brooklyn City Railroad 158 N. Y. 493 p. 307
- Alexander v. Donohoe 143 N. Y. 203 p. 307
- Clemens v. American Fire Insurance of Philadelphia, PA. 70 App. Div. 435 p. 308
- Bonnell v. Griswold 68 N. Y. 294 p. 308
- Bogardus v. New York Life Insurance 101 N. Y. 328 p. 308
- Chesley v. Morton 9 App. Div. 461 p. 308
- Montgomery v. Boyd 60 App. Div. 133 p. 308
- Hart v. Sansom 110 U. S. 151 p. 308
- Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co. 181 N. Y. 121 p. 308
- Dewing v. Perdicaries 96 U. S. 193 p. 308