Majority
Headnote
Tax — recording tax on trust mortgages — tax on deferred issue of bonds secured by trust mortgage — when trust company liable for payment thereof.Since the. former decision of this court herein (People v. Trust Company of America, 205 N. Y. 74 ) the complaint has been amended by adding thereto the following paragraphs, viz.:
“That after July 1st, 1906, and on or about February 15th, 1901, the defendant herein, duly certified other bonds in addition to those theretofore issued as aforesaid, serially numbered from thirty-two hundred and one to thirty-six hundred, of the total aggregate of four hundred thousand ($400,000) dollars; and the defendant herein duly delivered such bonds so certified, to the mortgagor, the Union Bag and Paper Company, for issue.”
By the addition of such paragraphs there are (as it was suggested by the chief judge in the opinion on the former appeal there would be in such case) different questions presented on this appeal than were before the court when the complaint was then considered.
The legislation commencing in 1905 relating to the taxation of mortgages shows a general intention to treat a trust mortgagee as a party to the trust instrument having an active duty to perform in behalf of the holders of bonds secured by the trust mortgage.
The sections of the Tax Law added by chapter 129 of the Laws of 1905 prescribing a property tax on mortgages were wholly remodelled by chapter 532 of the Laws of 1906, and a different scheme of mortgage taxation was provided to take effect July 1st of that year. The tax as provided by the act of 1906 is called a recording tax. The statute provides for the payment of a tax “of fifty cents for each one hundred dollars and each remaining major fraction thereof of principal debt or obligation which is, or under any contingency may be secured by mortgage of real property situated within the state recorded on or after ” July 1, 1906. The tax so imposed is payable ‘ ‘ on the recording of each mortgage of real property subject to taxes thereunder, ” and it is further provided that such tax shall be paid “ to the recording officer of any county in which the real property or any part thereof is situated,” and it is made the duty of the recording officer to indorse upon each mortgage a receipt for
A different provision is made in the act in case of trust mortgages (section 296). That section provides for the payment at the time of the recording of the mortgage of a tax upon the amount advanced, and it is also provided that “the tax for such sums of principal indebtedness as may be advanced, accrue or become secured after the execution and delivery of any such mortgage shall be payable at or before the time when such sums are advanced, accrue or become secured. Such additional tax shall be paid to the recording officer where such mortgage has been or is first recorded and a receipt therefor shall be indorsed upon the mortgage and payment therefor shall be noted in the margin of the record of such mortgage * *
The payment of such tax is made certain and secure by the necessity of obtaining a receipt therefor indorsed upon the mortgage and noted in the margin of the record thereof.
There is a further and independent imposition of a tax upon mortgages recorded prior to July 1st, 1906, when any part of the amount of principal indebtedness is advanced after July 1st, 1906. Such tax is imposed by section 301, which is as follows:
“ A tax is imposed hereby on each mortgage of real property recorded prior to the first day of July, nineteen hundred and six, when any part of the amount of principal indebtedness which is or under any contingency may be secured by any such mortgage is advanced, after first day of July, nineteen hundred and six-. The tax imposed by this section shall be at the rate of fifty cents for each one hundred dollars, and each remaining major fraction thereof which is, or under any contingency maybe secured by any mortgage taxed under this section, deducting
Whether it is termed a property tax or a tax upon the benefit derived from the previous record of the mortgage it is due and payable as therein specified.
Such a tax is not made payable by any named person or corporation, neither is its payment made certain or secure by any special provision of the statute. The legislature intended that the tax therein provided should be paid, and it may be inferred that it intended that the persons or corporations actively engaged in the transaction which results in the tax becoming payable be charged with its payment.
After July 1,1906, and on February 15, 1907, the defendant as trust mortgagee certified $400,000 of bonds and delivered them so certified to the mortgagor for issue and they were so issued on the same day. It is upon such $400,000 of bonds that the People seek to compel the defendant as the trust mortgagee to pay the tax. It was necessary that the bonds be so certified by the defendant before they could be issued. They were certified by the defendant with knowledge of the purpose for which they were certified and the defendant is presumed to have had knowledge of the statute relating to the tax on the mortgage held by it payable at the time of the advance to be made upon the bonds so certified.
It is provided in the trust mortgage that “ after delivery of $3,000 of said bonds, further bonds shall be certified and delivered by the trustee only upon receipt of a certificate signed by the president or first vice-president and two-thirds of the directors of the mortgagor and that
The defendant as the trustee named in the mortgage is not only a party thereto but to some extent the representative of all parties interested in the instrument. It is particularly the representative of the- persons who own the bonds for which the trust instrument is collateral. As such trustee it has the legal title to the trust property to the extent of the lien thereon provided in the instrument. It cannot be said that there is no duty resting upon the trustee to record the mortgage or to see that it is recorded or to pay the tax on the mortgage required to be paid when a deferred part of the mortgage indebtedness is advanced as provided by the statute quoted.
Whatever may be the general-practice as to recording a trust mortgage or in paying the recording tax therefor, or the tax upon the mortgage upon an advancement of any part of the principal indebtedness secured by the mortgage, it is the trustee named as the mortgagee therein who represents the bondholders for whose benefit and security the mortgage is recorded. Any agreement relating to recording the mortgage as between the parties to the instrument affecting the responsibility of the trustee as between the parties to the instrument cannot affect the determination of the questions involved on this appeal. The defendant is not a gratuitous trustee. Its assumption of the duties
Dissent
This action by the sovereign authority should, therefore, be sustained. Section 301 of the statute should be construed to impose a tax to be paid to the recording officer of. the county in which the mortgage is first recorded at any and every time when an amount of the principal indebtedness is advanced after the first day of July, 1906, and upon the .amount so advanced from time to time at the rate prescribed by the-statute.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
(dissenting). This action was brought to recover from defendant as mortgage trustee under a corporate mortgage taxes on account of the certification and issue of $400,000 of bonds out of an issue of $5,000,000 of bonds secured by said mortgage and for which taxes defendant is supposed by the People to be liable under the provisions of section 301, chapter 532, Laws of 1906, relating to mortgage taxation.
Plaintiff’s original complaint in connection with other
Defendant’s demurrer to this complaint on the ground that it did not disclose any liability on its part was finally sustained by this court in an opinion written by the chief judge. (People v. Trust Co. of America, 205 N. Y. 74 .) Under permission granted to it the plaintiff has served the present amended complaint wherein, in addition to previous allegations, the mortgage in question is referred to and made a part of the complaint, and also it is alleged that after July 1, 1906, defendant, as such trustee as aforesaid, duly certified $400,000 of bonds in addition to those theretofore issued under said mortgage, and “ duly delivered such bonds so certified to ■ the mortgagor, the Union Bag and Paper Company, for issue,” it not being alleged that the moneys realized on the new loan in any manner passed into its possession. Thus the inquiry becomes whether by grouping these additional facts with those before presented we yet have the statement of a good canse of action under the statute.
Said act took effect July 1, 1906. Prior to that date, chapter 729 of the Laws of 1905 provided for an annual tax “ upon each and every debt and obligation and upon the mortgage securing the same,” in the case of mortgages recorded after July 1, 1905. Chapter 532 of the Laws of 1906 provided for a new scheme of mortgage
The general rule is that the right of the government to recover a personal judgment for a tax, whether it be regarded strictly as a debt or not, is dependent upon the existence of a duty to pay. (U. S. v. Chamberlin, 219 U. S. 250 , 262; City of Dubuque v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 39 Iowa, 56 .)
When we attempt to find somewhere an obligation or a duty on the part of this defendant to pay these taxes we search in vain in spite of the additional facts now alleged,
Concededly the statute by its terms imposes upon it no such obligation either in specific or general terms. It does not directly tax certification and it does not, as it might have done and as later statutes do, make the trustee indirectly responsible for the payment of the tax as A condition of its right to certify the bonds.
The mortgage itself under which the defendant is acting contains no provision which has been called to our attention which permits or, much less, requires it to pay this tax in behalf of the mortgagor or bondholders with the
And finally there is, in my opinion, no fact outside of the statute or the mortgage which makes a basis for such an obligation or duty. The duty to pay taxes on a transaction must rest on some privilege or benefit derived from the transaction. Whatever we may regard as the technical subject of the present tax, there can be no doubt that the thing that serves as its substantial foundation is the loan of $400,000 on bonds issued under the mortgage after the statute was passed. The real parties to and beneficiaries under that transaction were the mortgagor who secured the loan and the bond purchasers who advanced it. The defendant was not a principal in the transaction or in a direct sense interested therein or benefited thereby. It had no property right whatever in the mortgage which secured the loan, the money not even passing through its possession as trustee. It was of no direct concern to it whether the loan was made, and will be of no consequence to it whether it be paid when due. As a matter of convenience it was selected as the trustee and agent of the bondholders and intrusted with the discharge of certain duties for their protection and for the performance of which presumably it will receive compensation as its only interest in the entire matter. Amongst these duties was that of certification of bonds, hut this like others was one of protection to bondholders by authentication of securities. Certification possesses no peculiar efficacy as a means of casting liability on the trustee. It was not an integral element .in the substantial transaction, for bonds might conceivably be certified without consummation of any loan and a loan might he made on bonds which were not certified. In short, unless this tax is to be regarded as one upon the right to act as trustee, which, I suppose, will hardly be claimed, I see
It is a well-settled principle that taxing statutes are to be construed strictly in favor of the taxpayer. The statute which we are now considering might easily have been so framed and worded as to require payment of the taxes thereby sought to be imposed at the time when the bonds were issued and protection given to the trustee for the recovery of any sums which it might pay or advance for that purpose. But this was not done, and so far as appears there is now no ready or secure method by which it may recover Over from the mortgagor or bondholders, if it shall pay the taxes in question. While the amount involved in this action is not a large one, it may easily happen that establishment of a liability such as is now urged, will throw on some other mortgage trustee an unexpected burden of no light proportions, and it does not occur to us that we should by construction so enlarge the provisions of an obscure and incomplete statute as to impose upon a party a liability which could not have been reasonably anticipated, and for which there is no equitable basis.
We are not called upon to indicate any opinion concerning the liability of the mortgagor, or of the bondholders, for the payment of these taxes, and we are all agreed that there is nothing in the opinion on the former appeal in this case which is controlling of the question now being decided.
The judgment should be reversed, and judgment given for the defendant on demurrer, with costs in all courts.
Cullen, Oh. J., Willard Bartlett and Hogan, JJ., concur with Chase, J.; Werner and Collin, JJ., concur with Hiscook, J.
Judgment affirmed.
Cases cited
- City of Rochester v. Gleichauf 40 Misc. Rep. 446 at 447 p. 464
- City of Rochester v. Bloss 185 N. Y. 42 at 49 p. 464
- In re the Transfer Tax upon the Estate of Pell 171 N. Y. 48 p. 464
- In re the Appraisal, under the Transfer Tax Act, of the Estate of Lansing 182 N. Y. 238 p. 464
- In re Compelling Payment of Tax Upon Property Given by the Will of Enston 113 N. Y. 174 p. 464
- In re the Last Will & Testament of Vassar 127 N. Y. 1 p. 464
- In re the Appraisal under the Collateral Inheritance Tax Act of the Property of Fayerweather 143 N. Y. 114 p. 464
- In re the Appraisal under the Transfer Tax Act of a Certain Trust Fund held by Harbeck 161 N. Y. 211 p. 464
- People ex rel. Mutual Trust Co. v. Miller 177 N. Y. 51 p. 464
- People ex rel. Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science & Art v. Gass 190 N. Y. 323 p. 464
- People ex rel. Eisman v. Ronner 185 N. Y. 285 p. 464
- League v. Texas 184 U. S. 156 p. 464
- Litchfield v. McComber 42 Barb. 288 p. 464
- Railroad Co. v. Jackson 7 Wall. 262 p. 464
- Bell's Gap Railroad v. Pennsylvania 134 U. S. 232 p. 464
- United States v. Railroad Co. 84 U. S. 322 p. 464
- National Bank v. Commonwealth 9 Wall. 353 p. 464
- People v. Trust Co. of America 205 N. Y. 74 p. 464, p. 470
- United States v. Chamberlin 219 U. S. 250 at 262 p. 472