Majority
Headnote
Stock corporations — stockholder’s action — when action brought by stockholder to compel estate of a former president of the corporation to repay advances, alleged to have been made to decedent and a deceased treasurer of the corporation with decedent’s knowledge, cannot be maintained.Besson & Co. was a corporation created in March, 1897, to carry on a coal and lumber business at Dobbs Ferry, N. Y. The capital stock was $25,000, consisting of 250 shares of the par value- of $100 a share, of which Millard F. Smith owned 205 shares, James Murray, the plaintiff, 40 shares, and John G. Disosway, 5 shares. The three stockholders were also the directors and officers of the company, Smith being the president, Disosway the secretary and treasurer, and Murray the vice-president and manager.
The corporation was organized to take over the business of Besson & Co., a partnership composed of Elbridge V. S. Besson and the plaintiff, James Murray. The partnership had become hopelessly insolvent although assisted
Millard F. Smith died November 21,1911, and John G. Disosway on the 1st day of April, 1912, since which time the directors of Besson & Co. have been Edward S. Smith, Nellie B. Moore and the plaintiff, James Murray.
During the time that Smith and Disosway were connected with the corporation certain personal advances or loans were made to them by Besson & Co. which remained unpaid at their decease. Thereafter this plaintiff, upon due demand, commenced this action in behalf of himself and other stockholders against the executors of the last will and testament of Millard F. Smith, deceased, to recover certain amounts alleged to have been lost and wasted through Smith’s neglect and failure to perform his duty as president and director, specifying, among other losses, the personal loans above mentioned.
As to the amount due from Smith for advances made to
It is claimed, however, that the Smith estate is liable for' the loans made to Disosway, the treasurer, under section 29 of the Stock Corporation Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 59). The Special Term found against the plaintiff and dismissed the complaint upon the merits. The Appellate Division, making new findings of fact, modified the judgment by holding the executors of Millard F. Smith liable for the loan of $3,637.47 made to John G. Disosway. The modification made by the Appellate Division cannot be sustained.
The liability, if any, of Millard F. Smith for the advances made to Disosway is dependent entirely upon section 29 of the Stock Corporation Law. It is as follows:
“ Liability of Directors for Loans to Stockholders. No loan of moneys shall be made by any stock corporation, except a moneyed corporation, or by any officer thereof out of its funds to any stockholder therein, nor shall any such corporation or officer discount any note or other evidence of debt, or receive the same in payment of any installment or any part thereof due or to become due on any stock in such corporation, or receive or discount any note, or other evidence of debt, to enable any stockholder to withdraw any part of the money paid in by him on his stock. In case of the violation of any provision of this section, the officers or directors making such loan, or assenting thereto, or receiving or discounting such notes or other evidences of debt, shall, jointly and severally, be personally liable to the extent of such loan and interest, for all the debts of the corporation contracted before the repayment of the sum loaned, and to the full amount of the notes or other evidences of debt so received or discounted, with interest from the time such liability accrued.”
The officer or director sought to be held for an advance
“ That the balance due to said company upon the accounts of the said John ,G. Disosway was not shown to be uncollectible, but, if it is, it was a loss which occurred in the usual course of business, and the said Millard F. Smith was not a party to or responsible for said loss.”
As this finding of fact was not reversed by the Appellate Division, we must, under' section 1338 of the Code of Civil Procedure, assume that it has been affirmed, and it is, therefore, binding upon us. (Levy v. Louvre Realty Co., 222 N. Y. 14 .)
Smith could not have consented to the Disosway loans without being a party thereto and responsible for their loss. This finding by the trial court above quoted is, therefore, to the effect that Smith did not consent to the loans. The Appellate Division, in making new findings of fact, states nothing about Smith’s consent. In fact, it has found to the contrary, for it has stated in its 4th finding of fact that the loans to Smith and Disosway were not acquiesced in or ratified.
Passing this point, however, and assuming that the Appellate Division has found, in effect, that Smith con- . sented to the Disosway loans, we would still be obliged to reverse as there is no evidence to sustain such a finding.
The by-laws gave Disosway, as secretary and treasurer, the power to draw checks upon the funds of the corporation without the signature of any other officer. He was engaged in the grocery business in Dobbs Ferry, and also ran a hotel known as the Livingston Inn. The yearly statements of the profit and loss account of Besson & Co. for the various years from 1897 until 1911 show a liability, in 1897, to John Disosway of $3,061. In 1898 the liabilities of the corporation include $368.38
These views render it unnecessary for us at this time to determine whether section 29 of the Stock Corporation Law gives relief solely to creditors to the exclusion of stockholders.
The plaintiff also sought to hold the Smith estate hable for the salary paid to Smith and Disosway from 1903. Upon this branch of the case, the Appellate Division has affirmed the trial court in deciding against him. By a cross-appeal, the plaintiff has brought up for review his claims in this particular, but we think the holding of the lower courts was correct.
The judgment of the Appellate Division should be reversed in so far as it directs that the defendant executors
pay $3,637.47, the amount of the Disosway loans and interest and in all other respects the judgment is affirmed, with costs to appellant executors.
His cock, Ch. J.,. Collin, Cuddeback, Cardozo, Pound and Andrews, JJ., concur.
Judgment accordingly.
Cases cited
- Murray v. Smith 166 App. Div. 528 p. 40
- Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont 206 N. Y. 7 p. 41, p. 42
- Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co. 78 N. Y. 159 p. 41
- Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning Railroad 103 N. Y. 58 p. 41
- Wardell v. Railroad Co. 103 U. S. 651 p. 41
- Kreitner v. Burgweger 174 App. Div. 48 p. 41
- Jacobson v. Brooklyn Lumber Co. 184 N. Y. 152 p. 41
- Pollitz v. Wabash Railroad 207 N. Y. 113 p. 41, p. 42
- Hoyle v. Plattsburgh & Montreal Railroad 54 N. Y. 314 p. 41
- Edwards v. Davis 16 Johns. 281 p. 41
- Almy v. Harris 5 Johns. 175 p. 41
- Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co. 181 N. Y. 121 p. 41
- Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick 88 N. Y. 52 p. 41
- Bosworth v. Allen 168 N. Y. 157 p. 41
- Skinner v. Smith 134 N. Y. 240 p. 42
- Continental Insurance v. New York & Harlem Railroad 187 N. Y. 225 p. 42
- Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co. 212 N. Y. 121 p. 42
- Burden v. Burden 8 App. Div. 160 p. 42
- I. Townsend Burden v. Burden 159 N. Y. 287 p. 42
- Duncomb v. New York, Housatonic & Northern Railroad 84 N. Y. 190 p. 42
- Leslie v. Lorillard 110 N. Y. 519 p. 42
- Sage v. Culver 147 N. Y. 241 p. 42
- Carr v. Kimball 153 App. Div. 825 p. 42
- Carr v. Kimball 215 N. Y. 634 p. 42
- Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co. 153 App. Div. 697 p. 42
- Levy v. Louvre Realty Co. 222 N. Y. 14 p. 45