Majority
John M. Moody purchased the premises known as 640 Broadway at a foreclosure sale. Under the terms of sale signed by the purchaser, the premises were sold “ subject to any state of facts which an accurate survey would show.” The survey made after the sale showed that certain stone piers projected one foot eight inches on Broadway and that the portico extended about two feet six inches on Broadway, These encroachments
The purchaser, who agreed to take title subject to- a state of facts which an accurate survey would show, now. asks to be relieved of his purchase because an accurate survey shows that the building encroaches on the street. The contract contemplated that a survey might show encroachments which would ordinarily constitute an objection to the title, and the purchaser agreed to waive such objections. (McCarter v. Crawford, 245 N. Y. 43 .) Refusal to accept title tendered in accordance with the terms of sale constitutes a breach by the purchaser of Ms contract to purchase. The bargain made by the purchaser may result in hardsMp to Mm, but it is Ms own bargain, and only the other contracting party can reheve him of Ms bargain.
Here the sale was made by the referee as an officer of the court. The court may direct its officer to act in accordance with fairness and equity. In effect the contract is made with the court, and a purchaser upon a judicial sale will not be compelled to perform his contract “ where it would not be perfectly just and conscientious in an individual to rnsist upon the performance of the contract against the purchaser, if the sale had been made by such mdividual or Ms agent.” (Veeder v. Fonda, 3 Paige Ch. 94 .) Perhaps, in tiffs case, an individual seller
Doubtless the referee in this case had no more information about encroachments than the purchaser. Nothing known was concealed, yet the fact remains that the buyer has entered into a contract which he would not have made if all the facts had been known. Conscience cannot always be guided by general rule. Each case must depend upon its own facts. Where there is room for difference of opinion there is room for the exercise of discretion. Though we might doubt whether good conscience demands that the purchaser be relieved of his contract, we cannot say that in the circumstances of this case the court might not in the exercise of its discretion grant such relief.
Discretionary power to reheve the purchaser of his obligation does not include authority to compel the plaintiff to pay the expenses of examination of title. The purchaser asks a favor of the court; he is not entitled to any relief as of right. There has been no breach of contract or other wrong by the referee, certainly none by the plaintiffs. Expenses incurred might be allowed as damages for breach of contract; such expenses cannot be imposed on the plaintiffs where there has been no wrong. (People v. N. Y. Building Loan Banking Co., 189 N. Y. 233 .)
The orders of the Appellate Division and those of the Special Term should be modified by striking out the
Cardozo, Ch. J., Pound, Crane, Kellogg and O'Brien, JJ., concur; Hubbs, J., not sitting.
Ordered accordingly.
Cases cited
- McCarter v. Crawford 245 N. Y. 43 p. 436, p. 437
- Veeder v. Fonda 3 Paige Ch. 94 p. 436, p. 437
- Sohns v. Beavis 200 N. Y. 268 p. 436
- People v. New York Building-Loan Banking Co. 189 N. Y. 233 p. 436, p. 438
- Batchelar v. Batchelar 244 N. Y. 274 p. 436
- Haberman v. Baker 128 N. Y. 253 p. 436