Majority
An automobile in which the plaintiffs were riding on Main street in the defendant city of Mechanicville left the roadway and collided with a nearby pole. There was evidence adequate to sanction a conclusion that the collision was caused by the skidding of or.e of the rear wheels of the vehicle over ice that had formed on the rails of a trolley track of the Hudson Valley Railway Company laid in the center of the street. No use had been made of the track for five years before the accident occurred on December 17, 1933. The city has been held to liability for the respective damages of the plaintiffs as for the results of unreasonable failure to abate an unnecessary and dangerous obstruction of the highway.
We are asked to affirm the judgments upon the broad ground that the mere existence in a highway of street
It is said that the Appellate Division has here read our decision in Village of Stillwater v. Hudson Valley Ry. Co. ( 255 N. Y. 144 , 151) as such a precedent. In that case it was held that, since a municipal license to the railway company had for sufficient cause been withdrawn, the tracks were thereafter in the street without authority, and, therefore, a public nuisance which the village could compel the company to remove. In that disposition of that case there was no element of novelty. (Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611 ; Fanning v. Osborne, 102 N. Y. 441 ; Village of Hempstead v. Ball Electric Co., 9 App. Div. 48 .)
Here the municipal consent to the railway company had not been recalled. The grant was the act of the Board of Trustees of the village of Mechanicville, the corporate predecessor of the defendant city. It is thereby provided: “And in case said [railway] company shall fail to complete said road * * * or to operate the same at the time or times, and in the manner, herein provided; * * * then said Board of Trustees may, by resolution, annul and vacate this permit, consent and authority; and thereupon and thereafter all rights, privileges and authority granted herein and hereby shall cease and determine; * * * and thereupon said company, its successor and assigns shall forthwith remove all poles, wires, rails, tracks, ties and other appurtenances, and restore the surface of the street to its original condition.” To us the plain import of this provision is “ that the nonuser of the franchise is the breach of a condition subsequent, with the result that the privilege survives
Concededly the track structure was not in fact a nuisance in itself. The street had been repaved in 1927, As part of that improvement, the railway company had then been required wholly to restore its way. This was done in accordance with approved modern methods,— the steel rails (supported by steel plates fixed upon steel ties) being geared flush with the surface of the new concrete and brick pavement. That construction was not without more a nuisance (See Reining v. N. Y.,L. & W. Ry. Co., 128 N. Y. 157 ; Hentz v. Long Island R. R. Co., 13 Barb. 646 ; Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546 , 551; cf. Brown v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 60 App. Div. 184 ; 171 N. Y. 699 ), and no claim was made of subsequent deterioration or displacement of any part of the trackage or of the roadway wherein it was embedded. (Cf. Wooley v. Grand St. & Newtown R. R. Co., 83 N. Y. 121 ; Schild v. C. P., N. & E. R. R. R. Co., 133 N.Y. 446 .)
The city was not to answer for the accident on an argument that it would have been better judgment to have passed a resolution extinguishing the local rights of the railway company so as in any case to get its equipment out of the street. An error in the discharge of such a governmental or discretionary power does not subject a municipal corporation to liability at common law. (Wilson v. Mayor, 1 Den. 595 ; Rogers v. City of Binghamton, 101 App. Div. 352 ; 186 N. Y. 595 ; Edson v. City of Olathe, 81 Kan. 328 , 331.) On the other hand, the city owed to the public the corporate duty of maintaining the street in a condition reasonably safe for the ordinary uses of
On the day of the accident, and on occasion theretofore, rain froze on the unused rails in a greater degree than on the contiguous pavement. A chief reason for this was that steel is a more efficient conductor of heat than is brick or concrete. The trial judge told the jury that such a situation in the street was evidence on which the city could be found to have been negligent. We are unable to assent to that ruling.
It was not pretended that any unusually dangerous tendency of the rails, under the conditions at the time the plaintiffs were hurt, was manifest in the light of common experience. Indeed the proof of the plaintiffs was that the particular danger came from a combination of events to be interpreted only by an expert. The interpretation was supplied in these words: “ I assume that some rain fell that day. The report shows eighteen one-hundredths of an inch. It wasn’t cold enough to freeze. * * • * Coming in contact with the brick pavement, on which some ice had already formed, due to the fact that the brick was cold, a thin layer formed and there was not heat enough taken away from the water to freeze it immediately, and traffic, going by, probably splashed the water. * * * If it struck the bare rail, it would freeze * * * and ridges of ice would form over the rails * * * from half an inch to two inches, depending on how rapidly the water was thrown up onto the ridges and other factors that I cannot be absolutely certain about.” It is not urged that the city authorities were bound to know what could thus have been foreseen only by a specialist, but the contention is that, since much the same consequence had previously been observed from time to time when the rails were unused, enough was known to raise a duty to inquire as to the cause, or that so the jury could say. We cannot adopt that position.
In each case, the judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term should be reversed and the complaint dismissed, with costs in all courts.
Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs and Finch, JJ., concur; Crouch, J., not sitting.
Judgments reversed, etc.
Cases cited
- Hayes v. Brooklyn Heights Railroad 200 N. Y. 183 p. 118
- Hollis v. Brooklyn Heights Railroad 128 App. Div. 821 p. 118
- Brownell v. Town of Greenwich 114 N. Y. 518 p. 118
- Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank 253 N. Y. 23 p. 118
- People ex rel. City of New York v. New York Railways Co. 217 N. Y. 310 p. 118, p. 119
- People ex rel. Village of Chateaugay v. Public Service Commission 255 N. Y. 232 at 242 p. 118, p. 122
- City of New York v. Dry Dock, East Broadway & Battery Railroad 251 N. Y. 583 p. 118
- Davis v. Mayor 14 N. Y. 506 p. 118, p. 120
- Lambert v. Westchester Electric Railroad 191 N. Y. 248 p. 118
- People ex rel. Harlem River & Port Chester Railroad v. State Board of Tax Commissioners 215 N. Y. 507 p. 118, p. 119
- Paige v. Schenectady Railway Co. 178 N. Y. 102 p. 118
- City of New York v. Hudson & Manhattan Railroad 229 N. Y. 141 p. 118
- People ex rel. City of Olean v. Western New York & Pennsylvania Traction Co. 214 N. Y. 526 p. 118
- City of New York v. Bryan 196 N. Y. 158 p. 119
- Binninger v. City of New York 177 N. Y. 199 p. 119
- City of Troy v. United Traction Co. 202 N. Y. 333 p. 119
- McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls 247 N. Y. 340 p. 119
- Lyman v. Village of Potsdam 228 N. Y. 398 p. 119
- Taylor v. City of Yonkers 105 N. Y. 202 p. 119
- Harrington v. City of Buffalo 121 N. Y. 147 p. 119
- Cohen v. City of New York 204 N. Y. 424 p. 119
- Moran v. City of New York 98 App. Div. 301 p. 119
- Dupont v. Village of Port Chester 204 N. Y. 351 p. 119, p. 124
- Mayor of New York v. Sands 105 N. Y. 210 p. 119
- Lichtenstein v. Mayor of New York 159 N. Y. 500 p. 119
- Kaveny v. City of Troy 108 N. Y. 571 p. 119
- Kinney v. City of Troy 108 N. Y. 567 p. 119
- Ehrgott v. Mayor 96 N. Y. 264 p. 119
- Ring v. City of Cohoes 77 N. Y. 83 p. 119
- Hogle v. H. H. Franklin Manufacturing Co. 199 N. Y. 388 p. 119
- Village of Stillwater v. Hudson Valley Railway Co. 255 N. Y. 144 at 151 p. 119, p. 121
- Turnbull v. Longacre Bank 249 N. Y. 159 p. 119
- Osgood v. Toole 60 N. Y. 475 p. 119
- Callanan v. Gilman 107 N. Y. 360 p. 120
- People ex rel. Stranahan v. Thompson 98 N. Y. 6 p. 120
- Village of Hempstead v. Ball Electric Light Co. 9 App. Div. 48 p. 120, p. 121
- Koehler v. City of New York 262 N. Y. 74 p. 120
- Metzroth v. City of New York 241 N. Y. 470 p. 120
- Stern v. International Railway Co. 220 N. Y. 284 p. 120
- Corcoran v. City of New York 188 N. Y. 131 p. 120
- City of Rochester v. Campbell 123 N. Y. 405 p. 120
- McCoy v. Apgar 241 N. Y. 71 p. 120
- Village of Oxford v. Willoughby 181 N. Y. 155 p. 120
- Wakeman v. Wilbur 147 N. Y. 657 p. 120
- People ex rel. Hofeller v. Buck 230 N. Y. 608 p. 120
- Powers v. Village of Mechanicville 163 App. Div. 138 p. 120
- Rehberg v. Mayor of New York 91 N. Y. 137 p. 120
- Gillrie v. City of Lockport 122 N. Y. 403 p. 120
- Pomfrey v. Village of Saratoga Springs 104 N. Y. 459 p. 120
- Todd v. City of Troy 61 N. Y. 506 p. 120
- Taylor v. City of Albany 264 N. Y. 539 p. 120
- Khoury v. County of Saratoga 267 N. Y. 384 p. 120, p. 124
- Milhau v. Sharp 27 N. Y. 611 p. 121
- Fanning v. Osborne 102 N. Y. 441 p. 121
- Brooklyn, Queens County & Suburban Railroad v. Littleton 185 N. Y. 171 p. 122
- Manton v. South Shore Traction Co. 121 App. Div. 410 p. 122
- Reining v. New York, Lackawanna & Western Railway Co. 128 N. Y. 157 p. 122
- Hentz v. Long Island Railroad 13 Barb. 646 p. 122
- Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. 233 U. S. 546 at 551 p. 122
- Brown v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co. 60 App. Div. 184 p. 122
- Raegener v. Medicus 171 N. Y. 699 p. 122
- Wooley v. Grand Street & Newtown Railroad 83 N. Y. 121 p. 122
- Schild v. Central Park, North & East River Railroad 133 N.Y. 446 p. 122
- Rogers v. City of Binghamton 101 App. Div. 352 p. 122
- Reinheimer v. Cunningham 186 N. Y. 595 p. 122
- Hunt v. Mayor of New York 109 N. Y. 134 p. 124
- Beltz v. City of Yonkers 148 N. Y. 67 p. 124
- Moore v. Cooley 156 N. Y. 700 p. 124