Majority
In this certiorari proceeding appellant seeks a declaration condemning as unconstitutional those parts of sections 258 and 258-c of the Agriculture and Markets Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 69) which relate to the legislative grant of power to the Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets to limit licenses to conduct the milk business to certain localities and his assumed power in respect to the extension of an existing business.
Appellant is a corporation licensed to conduct the business of distributing milk at wholesale and retail. April I, 1935, in compliance with the provisions of section 258, it applied for a renewal of its license. This section provides: “Application for license. An applicant for a license to operate as a milk dealer shall file an application upon a blank prepared under authority of the commissioner. An applicant shall state such facts concerning his circumstances and the nature of the business to
The license application blank prepared by the Commissioner and filled in by appellant in conformity with section 258 is not in this record, but from a partial quotation in respondents’ brief and in the minutes of a hearing conducted by a departmental official, the fact appears that it included this requirement: “ Give below the name of each city and village wherein you sell milk and wherein you hold an unrevoked Health Permit.” Appellant thus filled in this part of the blank: “ Binghamton, Johnson City, Endicott, Newburgh and others.” There is no evidence that appellant applied for a license to conduct its business in any specified territory. The license issued to and accepted by appellant authorized it “to buy milk from producers at the place or places named in the licensee’s application, to buy milk from other milk dealers, and to sell or distribute milk in the place or places named in the licensee’s application.” Although the city of Beacon is not a place named in the application nor in the license, appellant proceeded to distribute milk in that city, where for part of the time during some of the previous years it had operated as a retail dealer, and asserts that it has a license to distribute its product without limitation. Without making application to operate in Beacon or any other definite locality and without obtaining a license to operate anywhere except in certain specified cities, late in May, 1935, it resumed its interrupted retail distribution in Beacon and, thereupon, after such resumption, the Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets
Appellant’s representatives appeared at the hearing and its counsel thus stated its position: “ I would like to have it appear on the record that Crowley has not made any application for an extension of their license to do any business in Beacon, it being Crowley’s contention that their license already issued permits of such activities as they are engaged in and have been for many years, in the City of Beacon.” After the close of the hearing the Commissioner issued an order “ that the license heretofore issued to Crowley’s Milk Co., Inc., be and the same is hereby extended to permit the delivery of milk by the licensee at
The license is not in terms sufficiently broad to authorize appellant to operate elsewhere than in Binghamton, Johnson City, Endicott and Newburgh. The alleged absence of the Commissioner’s right to limit appellant’s license to those localities cannot be determined on this record. An applicant, without applying for a license in a more extensive territory, who accepts a license which by its terms is limited to a restricted territory, disregards the limitations in that license and places upon it an interpretation which its language does not warrant, has not laid the proper ground work for an attack upon the Commissioner’s constitutional power under section 258 to limit the license to particular cities or villages. Certainly appellant’s contention that its license, as issued, allowed it to distribute milk in Beacon is wholly untenable. Appellant made no demand for an unlimited license or for one less limited in its scope. It merely disobeyed the provisions of the license which it accepted and incorrectly interpreted it.
The order should be affirmed, with costs.
Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, Hubbs, Crouch, Loughran and Finch, JJ., concur.
Order affirmed.
Cases cited
- People ex rel. New York Central & H. R. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission for Second District 159 App. Div. 546 p. 329
- Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz 253 U. S. 421 p. 329
- People ex rel. Dawley v. Wilson 232 N. Y. 12 p. 329
- Andes Co-operative Dairy Co. v. Baldwin 263 N. Y. 578 p. 329
- People ex rel. Chas. Kohlman & Co. v. Law 239 N. Y. 346 p. 329