Majority
In 1934 the Governor sent to the Legislature a special message declaring the necessity for further regulation of the medical treatment and care of employees in the administration of the Workmen’s Compensation Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 67). The subject had been investigated by a committee appointed by the Governor from the memberships of accredited local medical societies. A proposed bill embodying the joint recommendations of that committee and of the State Industrial Commissioner was commended to the consideration of the Legislature. The response was chapters 258 and 930 of the Laws of 1935, amending section 13 of the statute and adding thereto sections 13-a to 13-j. This case presents questions relating to the constitutional soundness of that legislation.
The mischief which the people of the State sought to eradicate was described by the Governor’s message in these words: “ In recent years, another evil, detrimental alike to worker and employer, has developed. It relates largely to the question of medical care and treatment of the injured claimants. In many instances, this treatment and care had degraded into a mere commercialized venture. Unscrupulous physicians and so-called medical clinics have operated in a way to exploit worker, employer and insurance carriers through prolonged treatment, padded bills and inferior professional service. Rebating,
So much of the remedy adopted by the Legislature as is now attacked may be sufficiently outlined as follows: No person shall render medical care under the law without authorization by the State Industrial Commissioner, except emergency (first aid) care; or care of a patient in a hospital by a member of its constituted staff. A duly licensed physician may be authorized by the Commissioner only upon the recommendation of the medical society of his county or of a medical board representing other duly licensed physicians or designated by the Commissioner. (§ 13-b, subd. 1.) Any duly licensed physician may to that end apply to the appropriate medical society or board and in the event he fail of recommendation may appeal to the Industrial Council of the Department of Labor (§ 13-b, subd. 2) which is empowered to recommend his authorization. (See Labor Law [Cons. Laws, ch. 31], § 10-a, subd. 4 [g].) In general an injured employee may select to treat him any physician authorized by the Commissioner. (§ 13-a [1].) The employer shall be hable for the payment of the expenses of the treatment. Fees for medical services shall be limited to such charges as prevail in the same community for similar treatment of injured persons of a like standard of hying. Recourse to the employer for payment shall be had only under the statute. Payments shall in no case be less than the amounts fixed by a schedule of minimum charges and fees to be established by the Commissioner after inquiry and shall be made only to a physician or other lawfully qualified person permitted under the statute to render medical care. (§§ 13 [a], 13-f [1].) If the parties shall fail to agree as to the value of medical services, the value thereof "shall be decided by an arbitration committee of physicians whose composition is defined and whose decision is made conclusive. (§ 13-g, subd. 2.) In the case of persons injured outside the State the requirements respecting
When these provisions were in effect, the plaintiff, a duly licensed physician, at the request of the defendant, an employer, rendered medical care in a case within the statute. He sues for the alleged fair and reasonable value of his services. The complaint does not show him, to be a person authorized or otherwise entitled to receive payment in accordance with the law. For that reason, the pleading was dismissed by the Special Term as insufficient on its face. Affirmance followed in the Appellate Division. The case is here on an appeal permitted to the plaintiff by that court.
Plaintiff asserts that it is utterly inconsistent and, therefore, unreasonable for the State to declare a man to be a competent physician by licensing him to practice medicine and then to impose the additional requirement of a special authorization if the patient happen to be a workman victimized by accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. This amounts to saying that as among licensed doctors one must be taken to be in all cases as good a practitioner as another. We think the assertion is without support in the ordinary data of human experience, but if we are not supposed to know this to be so, then the presumption is that the Legislature inquired and found the need of special training or fitness for the treatment of compensable industrial injury and occupational disease.
An appropriate medical society or board may recommend authorization by the Commissioner if it deems the applicant “ duly qualified.” Plaintiff objects that the judgment thus committed is unlimited with the result that due process is denied, and that legislative power has been unlawfully delegated to non-governmental agencies. This criticism ignores other words of the statute which refute it. In an application for authorization, a duly licensed physician “ shall state bis training and qualifications ” and shall agree to limit bis professional activities under the law “ to
The provisions designed to control the amounts to be awarded for medical services are assailed as wholly unrelated to any legitimate end of the exercise of State power. We think these are warranted as police regulations. (See New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 , 207.) The medical care which the employer must furnish is part of the statutory compensation of the workman. It may well have been conceived that the minimum fee requirement would effectively put a stop to unwholesome competition for opportunity to treat employees and that it also would attract the more skillful and experienced doctors into that field. Power exists to assure full delivery of workmen’s compensation to be awarded in money. (Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U. S. 219 .) Power to say that compensation in the form of medical care shall be adequate in quality is not essentially different. In the same view, there was warrant for the requirement of compulsory arbitration of the value of medical services. Settlement of that fact by the varying and uneven result of ordinary litigation would perhaps in the long run impair the grade of the medical care secured to those on whose lives and
The exception for hospital patients and that for persons injured outside the State are denounced as arbitrary discriminations resulting in class legislation. But in one case the sufficiency of the treatment has the guaranty of quasi-official responsibility, and the other case is not fully within the control of the authorities of this State. Nor was the Legislature, acting within its proper field, bound to extend its regulation to all cases which it might properly reach. (West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 .)
Other objections of the plaintiff go to the validity of the amended statute under narrower commands of the Constitution of the State. It is urged that voluntary medical societies are in effect made new departments of the State government in violation of sections 2 and 3 of article 5, and that compulsory arbitration of the value of medical services runs against the right of jury trial guaranteed by section 2 of article 1. On these points it is enough to add that further discussion is foreclosed by the same fundamental law. Section 19 of article 1 thereof provides:
“ Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be construed to limit the power of the Legislature to enact laws for the protection of the lives, health, or safety of employees; or for the payment * * * by employers * * * either directly or through a State or other system of insurance or otherwise, of compensation for injuries to employees * * *; or for the adjustment, determination and settlement, with or without trial by jury, of issues which may arise under such legistion * *
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Pinch and Rippey, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Cases cited
- Fox v. Mohawk & Hudson River Humane Society 165 N. Y. 517 p. 273
- Brown v. University of New York 266 N. Y. 598 p. 273
- Dr. Bloom Dentist, Inc. v. Cruise 259 N. Y. 358 p. 273
- People ex rel. Greenberg v. Reid 151 App. Div. 324 p. 273
- Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118 U. S. 356 p. 273
- A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States 295 U. S. 495 p. 273
- Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 293 U. S. 388 p. 273
- People v. Tremaine 252 N. Y. 27 p. 273
- Claim of Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co. 215 N. Y. 514 p. 273, p. 275
- Claim of Yume v. Knickerbocker Portland Cement Co. 216 N. Y. 653 p. 273
- New York Central Railroad Co. v. White 243 U. S. 188 at 207 p. 273, p. 274, p. 275, p. 279
- Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc. 230 N. Y. 261 p. 273
- People ex rel. Baldwin & Jaycox v. Haws 37 Barb. 440 p. 273
- Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations 262 U. S. 522 p. 274
- Lochner v. New York 198 U. S. 45 p. 274
- Ribnik v. McBride 277 U. S. 350 p. 274
- Tyson & Brother v. Banton 273 U. S. 418 p. 274
- Nebbia v. New York 291 U. S. 502 p. 274, p. 275, p. 276
- People v. Nebbia 262 N. Y. 259 p. 274
- Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck 297 U. S. 251 p. 274
- People v. Gillson 109 N. Y. 389 p. 274
- Shanahan v. Monarch Engineering Co. 219 N. Y. 469 p. 274
- Sweeting v. American Knife Co. 226 N. Y. 199 p. 274
- State Industrial Commission v. Newman 222 N. Y. 363 p. 274, p. 275
- In re the Claims of Petrie 215 N. Y. 335 p. 274, p. 275
- Claim of Costello v. Taylor 217 N. Y. 179 p. 274
- Claim of Winfield v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad 216 N. Y. 284 p. 274
- Moore v. Lehigh Valley Railroad 217 N. Y. 627 p. 274
- Watson v. Maryland 218 U. S. 173 p. 274, p. 276
- People v. Ellis 162 App. Div. 288 p. 274, p. 276
- Brown v. Shyne 242 N. Y. 176 p. 274
- Roman v. Lobe 243 N. Y. 51 p. 274, p. 275
- Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co. 201 N. Y. 271 p. 275
- Gant v. Oklahoma City 284 U. S. 594 p. 275
- Dent v. West Virginia 129 U. S. 114 p. 275
- Trustees of the Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric Light & Power Co. 191 N. Y. 123 p. 275
- Snyder v. Massachusetts 291 U. S. 97 p. 275
- Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co. 266 N. Y. 139 p. 275
- Repka v. Fedders Manufacturing Co. 264 N. Y. 538 p. 275
- People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden of the City Prison 144 N. Y. 529 p. 276, p. 279
- McLean v. Arkansas 211 U. S. 539 p. 276
- Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. 242 U. S. 539 p. 279
- Elite Dairy Products, Inc. v. Ten Eyck 271 N. Y. 488 p. 279
- Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington 243 U. S. 219 p. 279
- West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 300 U. S. 379 p. 280