Majority
Whether the surety of a subcontractor is liable on its bond to the general contractor for an unpaid bill for materials incorporated in the work under the subcontract made with a general contractor doing building work for the United States government where the subcontractor has failed to complete the work or pay for the material furnished, is the question of law presented.
A motion by defendant for judgment on the pleadings was granted, and the Appellate Division has affirmed.
The relevant allegations of the complaint are as follows: One Lundberg entered into a contract with the United States of America to remodel a postoffice and courthouse in
Lundberg was unable to carry the work to completion and the plaintiff undertook and did complete the work in accordance with the contract. After the plaintiff undertook performance, the Interstate agreed to continue the performance of its subcontract under the direction of the plaintiff as general contractor, and the defendant, as surety for the Interstate, acknowledged the right of subrogation of the plaintiff in the bond, and acknowledged it as successor obligee thereunder. Interstate failed to complete the work under its subcontract. At the time there were unpaid material bills which had been incurred by Interstate amounting to approximately $6,700, and the plaintiff had in its hands moneys owing to Interstate under the subcontract totaling approximately $7,700. The cost of completion of the subcontract after the default by Interstate was approximately $5,500. Thus the net loss to the plaintiff was approximately $4,500.
The plaintiff was bound to pay all unpaid claims for labor and material supplied to its contractor, the Interstate Company. Not only had it undertaken by its bond to pay all such claims, but it had stepped into the shoes of the general contractor; and, as noted above, a general contractor is bound to pay such claims. Therefore, when the Interstate defaulted on its contract, and the unpaid bills for materials were paid by the plaintiff, these bills were paid not as a voluntary act but by compulsion of law. The defendant, by the express terms of its bond, undertook to indemnify the plaintiff “ against loss or damage directly caused by the failure of the principal to faithfully perform said contract * * When the principal, the Interstate Company, defaulted on the contract, the breach caused loss to the plaintiff arising out of the necessity for completing the work and the necessity for paying for the materials already incorporated in the work, for which the Interstate had failed to make payment.
The failure to pay for material incorporated in the work after the subcontractor had undertaken to “ provide all the materials ” constituted a breach of the contract with the
A different situation exists where the person in whose favor the bond runs is under no obligation to pay the materialmen and they cannot obtain a lien on his property. That was the case in Schwartz & Co. v. Aimwell Co. ( 227 N. Y. 184 , 187) where this court said: “ It has not paid any of them and is not personally liable for their payment. As, indicated, no mechanics’ liens have been filed, nor are any threatened. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff could not voluntarily pay such claims and then recover the amount paid from the principal or surety on the bond.” To enable it to do that, as stated in Village of Argyle v. Plunkett ( 226 N. Y. 306 ), there must “be involved somewhere, as an essential element of its right to recover, damages which have been or may be suffered by it by reason of the failure to pay these debts, and such an element is in our opinion utterly lacking ” (p. 312). In the case at bar that element is present. The plaintiff was under legal obligation to pay these materialmen.
We have, then, a contract which obligates the subcontractor to provide materials. The general contractor is obligated by law to pay such materialmen if .the subcontractor fails to make payment. The surety of the subcontractor agrees to indemnify the general contractor for all
Any doubt concerning the construction of the bond is dispelled when it is examined in its entirety. Not only does it provide that the surety will indemnify the general contractor against any losses caused by the failure of the subcontractor to perform its contract, but it also provides that, “ If at any time there comes to the notice * * * of the Obligee information that any claim for labor performed or for materials furnished the principal in or upon the work specified in the contract remains unpaid * * * the Obligee shall withhold from the principal payment of any moneys due or to become due to the principal under the contract until the payment of such claim * * *.” Pursuant to this provision the plaintiff withheld certain payments from the Interstate. The defendant wrote the plaintiff a letter confirming its right to withhold these payments under the above provision of the bond. Unless the bond was intended to cover payments to materialmen by the general contractor, there is no reason why it should contain such a provision obligating the general contractor to withhold payments of money to the subcontractor where it has notice that claims for material are unpaid.
The defendant relies on certain cases in the Federal courts as exonerating the defendant from liability on its bond. (Babcock & Wilcox v. American Surety Co., 236 Fed. Rep. 340 ; United States v. Montgomery H. & V. Co., 255 Fed. Rep. 683 ; United States v. Stewart, 288 Fed. Rep. 187 ; cert. denied, 263 U. S. 699 ; United States v. Starr, 20 Fed. Rep. [2d] 803; Trimount Dredging Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 166 Md. 556 .) None of these cases has bearing on the case at bar, since they were all suits brought either directly by laborers or
Moreover the plaintiff had a right to apply moneys due to the Interstate which were still in its hands toward payment for materials supplied to but not paid for, by the Interstate. The failure of the Interstate to complete its work obligated the plaintiff to pay such unpaid material-men and to expend additional moneys for the completion of the work. For either of these purposes the plaintiff had a right to use the moneys belonging to the Interstate which it had retained. It was under no obligation to apply such moneys first toward the completion of the work. It could just as well apply them toward the payment of unpaid materialmen. It had retained moneys belonging to the Interstate sufficient to cover all these claims of unpaid materialmen and the loss suffered as a result of the breach of the contract by the Interstate must be deemed to have been the result of the cost of completing the work itself. Therefore, even if the construction of the bond contended for by the defendant were accepted, it still would be obligated to pay the plaintiff for the loss suffered which was incurred by reason of the cost of completion.
It follows that the judgments should be reversed and the motion by the defendant for judgment on the pleadings denied, with costs in all courts to the plaintiff.
Crane, Ch. J., O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran and Rippey, JJ., concur; Lehman, J., dissents.
Judgments reversed, etc.
Cases cited
- United States ex rel. Hill v. American Surety Co. 200 U. S. 197 p. 431, p. 433
- Mankin v. United States ex rel. Ludowici-Celadon Co. 215 U. S. 533 p. 431, p. 433
- Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co. 244 U. S. 376 at 380 p. 431, p. 433
- Pacific States Electric Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 109 Cal. App. 691 p. 431, p. 434
- Strong v. American Fence Construction Co. 245 N. Y. 48 p. 431, p. 433
- Schwartz & Co. v. Aimwell Co. 227 N. Y. 184 at 187 p. 434
- Village of Argyle v. Plunkett 226 N. Y. 306 p. 434