Rosenthal v. McGoldrick

The question whether, under the Constitution, the Legislature may confer upon an administrative board or officer plenary authority to fix the compensation of its employees, or to fix other expenses incurred in carrying on public work has been authoritatively decided by this court many years ago. Authority so conferred is not a legislative power to appropriate. The Legislature, exercising the control which, under the_Constitution, it retains over the moneys of the State and of the cities of the State, merely adds “ one more mandatory appropriation to the list ” of such appropriations. It confers upon the administrative officer or board power only to determine the amount which, in the opinion of the officer or board, is required to carry out in proper manner a specified public purpose. (Matter of McAneny v. Bd. of Estimate & Apportionment, 232 N. Y. 377 , 387; People ex rel. Simon v. Bradley, 207 N. Y. 592 ; Matter of McKinney v. McGoldrick, 243 App. Div. 210 ; affd., 266 N. Y. 632 .) The field within which the board

The Legislature might, if it chose, limit the field further by providing that compensation paid by the board may not exceed a specified sum, but it is not bound to do so. Where the Legislature concludes that the public interest will be best served by conferring upon a board or officer, intrusted with a public duty, authority to determine the amount to be paid to the employees required in the proper performance of such duty, the Constitution does not prohibit the Legislature from conferring such authority. The question to be determined is narrow and clearly defined. Implicit in that question are the criteria which must govern, though the weight to be given to varying factors rests with the board or officer. Here, under the decisions of this court and the rules laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan ( 293 U. S. 388 ), there is no delegation of a legislative power, but only the conferring of an enlarged administrative power.

The rule of separation of governmental powers cannot always be rigidly applied. “ The exigencies of government have made it necessary to relax a merely doctrinaire adherence to a principle so flexible and practical, so largely a matter of sensible approximation, as that of the separation of powers.” The rule that the judiciary may not be charged with administrative functions does not apply when such functions are “ reasonably incidental to the performance of judicial duties.” (Matter of Richardson, 247 N. Y. 401 , 410, 418, opinion by Cardozo, Ch. J.) Supervision of the courts, appointment of court officers and employees, and determination of their compensation, are, it is plain, administrative functions “ incidental to the performance of judicial duties ” and may be intrusted to judicial officers. That has never been doubted and statutes conferring such power have never been challenged.

Motion for reargument denied.