Majority
The defendant City of Plattsburgh, desiring to avail itself of the opportunity of securing funds from the Federal government, in March, 1936, started proceedings to authorize the construction of a municipal electric power plant. The Common Council adopted a local law authorizing its construction. On May 15, 1936, the local law was
The local law provided that the project should be constructed substantially in accordance with plans approved by the Common Council and on file and subject to inspection. It also provided that the Common Council should pass the necessary resolutions to authorize the issuance, sale and execution of the bonds, which should constitute a general obligation of the city. In short, the city took the necessary-legal proceedings. The city has not advertised for bids for the construction of the project, made any contracts therefor or sold any of the bonds.
This action, brought by the plaintiff company, is to restrain the city from issuing and selling the bonds. The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff and enjoined the city from proceeding with the undertaking. The Appellate Division modified the judgment of the trial court and decided that the city might proceed with the project, but directed that it could not issue bonds for an amount in excess of $82,320.54, plus $24,000, if and when outstanding bonds in that amount are retired in accordance with provisions already made therefor.
The trial court found that the issue of bonds to the amount of $286,000, the amount necessary under the estimated minimum cost of construction, would result in an indebtedness of the city in excess of ten per cent of the assessed valuation of its real property and, therefore, that the proposed bond issue was in violation of article VIII, section 10, of the State Constitution as it existed in 1938. (See now art. VIII, § 4.)
If we assume that the Appellate Division was right in holding that the sewer bonds hereafter referred to constituted an indebtedness and that the city possessed capacity to borrow only $82,320.54, we might not be willing to agree with the statement that as a matter of law this action was prematurely brought.
If, on the other hand, the city possessed borrowing capacity of $269,000 over and above its present indebtedness, an entirely different factual situation would be presented. In determining the amount of the city’s borrowing capacity over its present indebtedness it is necessary to decide whether certain sewer bonds to the amount of $187,000 constitute an indebtedness of the city.
In 1938 the city, acting under the provisions of the General Municipal Law, article 14-C, sold to the Federal government sanitary sewer revenue bonds to the amount of $187,000. The city had a sewer system which was used without charge by property owners. Desiring to extend and improve its sewer system it procured from the Federal government a gift and issued and delivered to the Federal government for additional funds advanced, the sewer bonds in question. The bonds provided that they should be paid wholly from the revenue received thereafter from the sewer system.
It is conceded that all proceedings growing out of the issuance of those bonds and the construction of the sewerage system were in strict accordance with law. It is urged by
An entirely different situation exists in relation to the proposed issue of bonds to the amount of $286,000, the proceeds from which are to be used in constructing the proposed new electric system. Those bonds are to be paid, not solely from the revenue to be derived from the electric system, but from the general taxes levied upon all the taxable property within the city. They will, therefore, constitute an indebtedness of the city and must be included in ascertaining the total amount of indebtedness which the city may lawfully contract under the provisions of the Constitution. When so considered, after excluding the sewer bonds amounting to $187,000, it appears that the city has a leeway of
The judgment of the Appellate Division should be modified by providing that the present debt limit of the city is $269,000 instead of $82,320.54 and as so modified affirmed, without costs.
Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ., concur; O’Brien, J., taking no part.
Judgment accordingly.
Cases cited
- Robertson v. Zimmermann 268 N. Y. 52 p. 456
- City of Rochester v. Union Free School District Number Four 280 N. Y. 531 p. 456