Majority
This is an action to recover damages sustained as a result of malpractice. Defendant’s assistant, while injecting with a hypodermic needle in the tonsillar area of the plaintiff, broke the needle and the end of it became embedded in plaintiff’s throat. Plaintiff does not claim that there was negligence in the breaking of the needle. The needle is still embedded in plaintiff’s throat and several operations to remove it have been unsuccessful.
The defendant is a specialist in ear, nose and throat diseases and had practiced twenty-one years at the time of the trial; he had interned at Manhattan Eye and Ear Hospital, studied in Vienna, was full attending physician at the Beth Moses Hospital of Brooklyn, assistant surgeon at the Brooklyn Eye and Ear Hospital, and attending physician at the Wyckoff Heights Hospital. Plaintiff went to defendant to have his tonsils removed. Defendant’s
The trial court found a verdict for the plaintiff of $6,000. The Appellate Division reversed on the law. The question here is whether there was evidence which justified sending the case to the jury. While the reversal was on the law, it seems clear from the decision of the Appellate Division that it was the weight of the evidence that the court passed on rather than the law.
The specific malpractice relied on was the failure to take X-rays immediately to see where the needle was and in probing for the needle when it would be likely that the probing would push the needle in further. There was evidence both ways on whether the method followed by the defendant was proper practice. Plaintiff relies on the testimony of Dr. Harry.
Dr. Goldman’s testimony was direct and unequivocal. He said it was not good and proper practice under the circumstances to proceed with the tonsilectomy; that it was not good practice to attempt to take out the needle without first having taken an X-ray; that it was not good practice to let the patient go home and be without medical attention for ten or twelve days after the breaking of the needle; that a needle, when it breaks, is immediately sucked into the muscles; that it cannot be said that a superficial probing would do no harm because “ there is nothing to seize superficially; ” and that it is not possible to take hold of the needle after you take out the tonsil. He would not say that there was no possibility of success in the method employed by the defendant “ because coincidence plays a big part.” He testified that the only way to approach the needle point would be to get it from the outside by an incision; that “ if needles break off in the mouth or that region, the only way to approach it is from the outside; ” that the possibility of getting it from the inside is “ very very slim; ” that before any attempt was made to take out the needle X-rays should have been taken; that the only way to get the needle was externally through the neck; that “ Absolutely. There is no other way ; ” that he would have attempted to get the needle out in only one way, and
This testimony was not merely to the effect that the witness would have done the work differently, but rather that the method adopted was not proper and approved practice. The Appellate Division thought that the witness’ testimony was nullified by his admission that probing might have been successful. The witness merely allowed for coincidence. His testimony was that the defendant might have gotten hold of the needle but that the “ proper and approved practice ” was to get it from the outside.
While the evidence in favor of the defendant is strong and on the weight of the evidence the result reached by the Appellate Division may be correct, it cannot be said that there is no evidence to support the finding of the jury. There is, in fact, strong evidence to support its finding. The testimony of the witness was logical and credible. Certainly it cannot be held as a matter of law that there was no evidence which justified the submission of the case to the jury.
As the Appellate Division erroneously reversed upon the law and dismissed the complaint we are required to reinstate the verdict. (The Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, by Cohen, p. 442; Woicianowicz v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 232 N. Y. 256 .)
The judgment of the Appellate Division should be reversed and that of the Trial Term affirmed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division.
Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, Lotjghran, Finch and Rippey, JJ., concur; O’Brien, J., taking no part.
Judgment accordingly.
Cases cited
- Pike v. Honsinger 155 N. Y. 201 at 209, 210 p. 80
- Woicianowicz v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. 232 N. Y. 256 p. 81