Majority
In a proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act we review an order of the Appellate Division confirming a determination by the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York which suspended for two years the petitioner’s license to practice medicine.
At the threshold of our inquiry a question of procedure arises which controls our decision.
Then follows prescribed procedure which, in one vital requirement, was not followed in the proceeding before us: “ * * * the said committee shall determine said charges upon their merits (the vote of each member of said committee to be recorded as part of the committee’s findings). If by unanimous vote the practitioner is found guilty of such charges or any of them, said committee shall transmit to the
We are convinced by the record that the Committee on Grievances and its subcommittee before which the charges were heard, were constituted according to statutory requirements and that the appellant’s challenge in that regard is ■without merit.
We, therefore, pass to a consideration of the vote by the Committee on Grievances upon the resolution offered at its meeting of December 1, 1938, which purports to have determined on the merits that the appellant was guilty of fraud and deceit in the practice of medicine as charged. The record shows that the entire Grievance Committee — comprising ten members — were present at that meeting. However, it appears from the minutes of the meeting, that only nine members voted for the resolution. One member is recorded as “ not voting.”
It is suggested by counsel for the respondent that although adopted by a non-unanimous vote of the committee members the resolution of December 1, 1938, which determined on the merits that appellant was “ guilty of the charges of fraud and deceit in the practice of medicine ” was made legally sufficient by the fact that, at a subsequent meeting of the same committee held January 5, 1939, the member who had been recorded as “ not voting ” for the resolution of December 1, 1938, was recorded as voting for a resolution which fixed the form of disciplinary action to which appellant should be subjected and which the committee recommended to the Department of Education. We regard the suggestion as without merit. The vote recorded at the meeting of
In an effort to protect the public against the diagnosis and treatment of disease and physical disorders by those unlearned in medical science and untrained in its practical application, the Legislature requires of a medical practitioner that he be licensed. Rigid qualifications must be met before a license may be granted (Education Law, §§ 1251, 1256); rigid statutes define the duties thereafter to be obeyed by the licensee. (Id. § 1264.) Such a license is a valuable right which has been given statutory protection. As the Legislature has protected the public against the quack and the charlatan, so it gives protection to the physician whose license is threatened by charges of professional misconduct. He is to be personally served with any charges and is afforded a hearing before a statutory tribunal; he is given the right to counsel and definite procedure is prescribed by which a determination of the charges may be reached. “ The mode or way in which the act shall be done or the determination reached * * * must be strictly pursued, otherwise the act or the determination will be void.” (People ex rel. Lawton v. Snell, 216 N. Y. 527 , 534. See, also, 2 Lewis’ Sutherland Statutory Construction [2d ed.], § 627, p. 1135; Crawford on Statutory Construction, § 246, p. 482.)
Lgughran, Finch, Rippey, Sears and Conway, JJ., concur; Lehman, Ch. J., taking no part.
Order reversed, etc.
Cases cited
- Wuesthoff v. Germania Life Insurance 107 N. Y. 580 p. 305
- People ex rel. Barnes v. Gardner 24 N. Y. 583 p. 305
- People ex rel. Greenberg v. Reid 151 App. Div. 324 p. 305
- Bradley v. Buffalo, New York & Erie Railroad 34 N. Y. 427 p. 305
- Salducco v. Etkin 268 N. Y. 606 p. 305