Majority
Headnote
A creditor of a railroad corporation recovered judgment at law, issued execution, had it returned unsatisfied, and filed his bill in chancery under section thirty-six of the statute relating to “ proceedings against corporations in equity,” (2 R. S. 463,) for a sequestration of the effects of the corporation and the appointment of a receiver. The receiver appointed in that suit then instituted a suit in equity against a stockholder to recover the unpaid balance of his subscription. The stockholder sued had paid all the calls made by the corporation, pursuant to the terms of his subscription, and other stockholders who had not paid their subscriptions were not made parties. Held, that the bill could not be sustained.The first and most important question in this case is that which relates to the construction of the forty-second section of the article of the revised statutes entitled “ Of proceedings against corporations in equity.” (2 R. S. 464.) If that section applies to receivers appointed under the thirty-sixth section of the same article, it was conceded by counsel upon both sides that the bill in this suit could be sustained. Without admitting or denying the correctness of this assumption, upon a careful examination of the different sections of the statute in
First. The learned vice chancellor assumed that the necessary effect of proceedings under the thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh sections would be to dissolve the corporations against which such proceedings were had, and to wind up their affairs. I do not so construe the objects which the legislature had in view. It is true that such proceedings might in many cases eventually have that effect; but in other cases no such effect might be produced. The property and effects of many kinds of corporations are so indispensable to their power to do business, that a sequestration of such property would necessarily suspend the exercise of their corporate powers, and prevent them from going on with their ordinary business, and yet there are other corporations upon which it might have no such disastrous effect. A judgment might be obtained against a manufacturing corporation and an execution be returned nulla bona, and yet the assets of the company be ample to pay all the debts. In such case a sequestration of such assets would not necessarily affect the corporate franchises, although it might interrupt or suspend its ordinary business. It is, therefore, my opinion that the object of the legislature by the thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh sections was simply to provide a summary mode of compelling the application of the property of a corporation which had allowed an execution to be returned against it unsatisfied, to the payment of all its debts; from the fact that the property of the corporation was the only security for its debts, and a sequestration of such property might eventually result in a dissolution of the corporation ; and as there was no individual responsibility against the corporators for the security of creditors, the statute provided for an equal distribution of the property among all the creditors, instead of applying it to the payment of the particular creditor whose execution had been returned unsatisfied. If a surplus should be left after satisfying all the debts, it is quite clear that it should be paid over to the corporation by the receiver. But if the construction of the court below be correct, the surplus, if any, should be distributed among the members
But with the 39th section commence provisions which apply to proceedings against a particular class of corporations. These provisions are continued down to and including section 50. They apply to moneyed corporations, a class of corporations whose entire power and capacity to do business depend upon their solvency. There are therefore obvious reasons why the legislature should provide for winding them up the moment they should become insolvent. Section 39 therefore provides, among" other things, that when one of this class of corporations shall become insolvent or unable to pay its debts, the court of chancery may restrain it by injunction from exercising its corporate rights, privileges or franchises. Section 40 directs upon whose application and upon what proof such injunction may issue,- and section 41 provides for the appointment, in any stage of the proceedings, of a receiver to take charge of the property and effects and to sue for and collect the debts and demands. Section 42 refers to a subsequent article for a full definition of the powers of such receiver. Its language is, “ such receiver shall possess all the powers and authority conferred and be subject to all the obligations and duties imposed in article third of this title upon receivers appointed in case of the voluntary dissolution of a corporation.” The remaining sections down to and including section 50 appfy to proceedings against the same class
This was the interpretation, which the late chancellor put upon these sections in the case of Verplank v. The Mercantile Ins. Co. (2 Paige, 438,) and there is nothing in the case of Nathan, receiver, v. Whitlock, (9 id. 152,) which conflicts with the opinion expressed by him in the former case. The latter was the case .of a moneyed corporation admitted on all sides to be insolvent. Besides, the chancellor held the contract by which Whitlock claimed to be discharged from his indebtedness void, its against the company. It was therefore simply the case of a receiver commencing a suit to enforce the collection of a debt due to the company.
In the Matter of the Franklin Bank, (1 Paige, 85,) and Attorney General v. Bank of Commerce, (id. 511,) were also cases of moneyed corporations, but in those cases no other powers were exercised than simply to take charge of the property and effects of the corporations and distribute them among their creditors. They acted under the act of 1825, and there is nothing in that act which required a dissolution and entire winding up of a corporation upon the return of an execution unsatisfied against it. (Sess. Laws of 1825, p. 450.) I am therefore, satisfied that if this bill can be sustained, it must be by virtue of some power which the receiver possesses independent of section 42.
It does not follow, however, that the creditors have no remedy against stockholders who have not paid up their subscription. The capital stock of a corporation is a trust fund for the security of its creditors. (Case v. Grant, 15 Mass. 505 ; Spear v. Grant, 16 id. 92 ; Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308; Nathan v. Whitlock, 9 Paige, 152.) In these cases the corporations had attempted to distribute their stock among their stockholders, leaving debts against the corporations unpaid, and it was held that creditors in proper suits might compel such stockholders to refund sufficient to pay those debts. Upon the same principle, when the stock has not all been paid in, the delinquent stockholders should be compelled to contribute from the unpaid subscriptions sufficient to pay such debts. Such unpaid balance should be deemed for this purpose a portion of the capital stock. It is therefore in accordance with this obvious principle of equity that our revised statutes have expressly provided, that “ When the whole capital stock of a corporation has not been paid in, and the capital paid shall be insufficient to satisfy the claims of its creditors, each stockholder shall be bound to pay on each share held by him the sum necessary to complete the amount due on such share,' as fixed by the charter of the company, or such proportion of that sum as shall be required to satisfy the debts of the company.” (1 R. S. 600, § 5; Revisers' Notes, 3 id. 531 .) The liability is therefore clear, but how is it to be enforced 1 The statute itself does not define the method to be pursued, but leaves the remedy to be enforced by such practice and in, such form as the- nature of the right to be asserted and
Ordered accordingly.