Majority
Headnote
On a trial of the prisoner for the crime of murder by poisoning, it is competent to prove that he had threatened injury, to the deceased by means of other ■ instruments—as, by a “slung-shot”—as tending to prove the animus of thq prisoner toward the deceased.It is a felony, by statute, to “ administer, or cause and procure to be administered, any poison to any human being, with intent to kill such being, and which shall have been actually taken by such being,” (2 R. S., 666, § 37.) The plaintiff in error was indicted for administering, or causing and procuring to be administered, to one Julius' Denny, a deadly poison, with intent to kill, and was tried and convicted of the offense at the St. Lawrence Oyer and Terminer, in February, 1865. The indictment contained four counts; and the prisoner’s counsel, assuming that different offenses were charged, and that one count was bad for duplicity, moved that the public prosecutor be compelled to elect upon which count or offense charged in the indictment he should proceed to try the prisoner, and that the fourth count be stricken out for duplicity. The motion was denied, and an exception taken, but was not pressed on the argument at bar. The motion, undoubtedly, was properly disposed of. All the counts charged substantially the same statutory offense, and neither was bad for duplicity.
A principal point is now made that obviously we cannot consider, viz.: that the prisoner was convicted of the offense' charged against him upon insufficient evidence. To constitute an administering, within the meaning of .the statute, it is insisted that something must be done or said beyond the single act of mingling poison with food, which may be taken by a human being, and that although there was some evidence tending to the conclusion that the prisoner poisoned the food given to Denny, there was none whatever showdng that he handed the food so poisoned to him, or that he advised, suggested, did or said anything to induce him to partake of it. We cannot entertain any question in
It was proved by Mrs. Denny, that a short time before the administration of the poison, the prisoner was engaged in covering a leaden ball with leather, which he said was a “ slung shot,” and upon her inquiring what he was going to do with it, he replied, “ it was going through Julius’ head.” A leaden ball, covered with leather, was then produced, and identified by the witness as the instrument which she saw in the possession of the prisoner, and which he called a “ slung shot.” It was produced and identified, under objection of his counsel, and this is now claimed to have been error. I think otherwise. The state of the prisoner’s mind toward Denny was a fact of some significance. Evidence tending to show that he was at enmity with Denny, and entertained toward him a malicious intent, and a purpose to do him personal injury, was clearly competent. It cannot be doubted, that if the prisoner had declared that he had a slung shot that he was going to put through Denny’s head, proof of the threat would have been admissible. Here he was shown to have been in possession of an instrument which lie called a “ slung shot,” and which he declared, on being inquired of as to the use he intended to make of it, that “ it was going through Julius’ head.” If this evidence.of a malicious purpose to injure Denny was competent at all (and I do not doubt its competency), the production and identification of the instrument by which the threatened personal injury was intended to be effected, was unobjectionable.
In the course of the cross-examination of Mrs. Denny, she was asked: 1st. Whether she was in the habit of having sexual connection with other men than her husband, before
In the present ease, it cannot be claimed that the prisoner’s counsel was unjustly or illiberally restricted in the cross-examination of the witness. Indeed, the utmost latitude was given for irrelevant crimination. Questions calling for answers disparaging to the character of the witness, were permitted to be put and answered, until it appeared from lier own statement, and admissions on the witness stand, that her moral character was most disreputable and odious. If the questions excluded had been allowed and answered in the affirmative, it would not have given a deeper stain to it, or have affected, in the least degree, the credit to be given to her testimony, whilst it would have needlessly involved the character of the persons named. For the latter reason, if no other, it was a proper exercise of discretion in the court to exclude the question. It would have been manifest injustice to have permitted the character of those persons to be assailed needlessly without the right, on their-part, to speak in their own defense.
I am of the opinion that there was no error committed on the trial, prejudicial to the plaintiff in error, and that the judgment of the Supreme Court should be affirmed.
Three grounds of error are alleged. First. It is insisted that there was no proof to sustain the indictment. The statute made it a felony for any one to administer
The evidence shows that the poison was purchased with prisoner’s money, and at his request. It further shows, not directly, but by circumstances quite as conclusive and satisfactory, that he put the poison on the bread and butter prepared for Denny, acting in concert with Denny’s wife for that purpose. Denny was a brakeman on a railroad, and was in the habit of taking his dinner with him in a pail each night from his house. This practice was well known to the prisoner and Denny’s wife. While both of them were present, this poisoned food was set apart with other food for Denny on a plate, and, on his coming home during the night, was put into his pail as usual by Mrs. Denny. The pail, with the poisoned food, was taken away by Denny, and about noon he partook of it and was poisoned. It is entirely clear, from the evidence, that this was done by the joint arrangement of the prisoner and Mm. Denny. He had had illicit intercourse with her for some two yearn, and their design was to take Denny’s Efe. Therehad been talk of a marriage in that event between the prisoner and Denny’s wife. He was a widower, and she twenty-two yearn old. The prisoner left her room that night about one in the morning, as Denny came in about two, and remaining hut' a few minutes took off with him the poisoned food. Was this an administering or causing and procuring an administering within the statute ? I cannot doubt that it was. The EngEsh statute is the same as ours, except instead of causing and procuring to be administered, it says, “ or shall cause to be taken by any person, any poison,” &c. "Under that statute, it was held that putting the poison into, the coffee pot with coffee, and telling her mistress she had put the coffee there for her breakfast, and the mistress partook of it, was causing it to he taken.
It was certainly never intended to confine this offense to the maniial administering of the poison to a person. So construed, it would he substantially without effect, and would not reach the large class of offenders at whom it was aimed.
The evidence very satisfactorily shows that the prisoner prepared this poisoned bread-, and butter to be taken by Denny. It was laid aside by his paramour, in his presence, with the other food for Denny. Prisoner caused her to put it in his pail, when he arrived to be taken by him, and it was taken accordingly.
The objection as to identifying the slung shot cannot be sustained. It was important to show the intention of the prisoner as to Denny — his murderous purpose. In such case it is not necessarily inadmissible, because it proves an independent crime. This has been repeatedly held.
The question to Mrs. Denny, were you not in the habit of having sexual intercourse with others than your husband before you had connection with the prisoner, was, I think, properly overruled.
This question went back more than two years prior to the commission of this offensé, and could have little or no bearing upon the case. It would have added nothing to the depravity of her moral character as already proved, and would have had no tendency to impeach her credibility before the jury more than it was already impeached. Her loose conduct with other men-two years before, would have thrown no light upon her purpose and conduct on the occasion in .question.
The admissibility of this testimony, and also that offering to show her illicit connection with other named persons, has
It is quite clear that the prisoner has suffered nothing by the rejection of this evidence, and that the discretion of the court at the trial was not abused.
Though I wish to say that, in my opinion, as a general rule, evidence, on cross-examination, tending to impeach the credibility of a witness, should be rejected with very great caution. Its exclusion can rarely be proper.
Judgment affirmed.