Allen v. Sackrider — 37 N.Y. 341

Majority

p. 387

*Allen and another v. Sackrider and another.

Headnote

Common carriers.

It is not enough, to charge one as a common carrier, that he was the owner of a sloop, and was specially employed hy the plaintiffs, to make a trip for a load of grain, for which he was to receive a stipulated compensation.

A special carrier is only hound to the exercise of ordinary care and diligence.^[1]

Appeal from the general term of the Supreme Court, where a judgment entered in favor of the defendants, upon the report of a referee, had been affirmed.

This was an action by Elijah B. Allen and Walter B. Allen against Norman Sackrider and Frank Farnham, to charge the defendants as common carriers, with damage to a quantity of grain, shipped by the plaintiffs in a sloop of the defendants, to be transported from Trenton, in the province of Canada, to Ogdensburgh, in this state, which accrued from the wetting of the grain in a storm.

The case was tried before a referee, who found as follows: “The plaintiffs, in the fall of 1859, were partners, doing business at Ogdensburgh; the defendants were the owners of the sloop Creole, of which Farnham was master. In the fall of 1859, the plain

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tiffs applied to the defendants to bring a load of grain from the bay of Quinte to Ogdensburgh; the master stated, that he was a stranger to the bay, and did not know whether his sloop had capacity to go there; being assured by the plaintiffs that she had, he engaged her for. the trip, at three cents per bushel, and performed it with safety. In November 1859, plaintiffs again applied to defendants, to make another similar trip for grain, and it was agreed at $100 for the trip. The vessel proceeded to the bay, took in a load of grain, and, on her return, was driven on shore, and the cargo injured to the amount of $1346.34; that the injury did not result from the want of ordinary care, skill or foresight, nor was it the result of inevitable accident, *°r ^aw’ *s ^ermed the act of God. From these facts, my conclusions of law are, that the defendants were special carriers, and only liable as such, and not as common carriers, and that the proof does not establish such facts as would make the defendants liable' as special carriers; and, therefore, the plaintiffs have no cause of action against them.”

Judgment was, accordingly, entered .upon the report, in favor of the defendants; and the same having been affirmed at general term, the plaintiffs appealed to this court.

Brown, for the appellants.

(after stating the case.)—The only question in the case is, were the defendants common carriers? The facts found by the referee do not, I think, make the defendants common carriers. They owned a sloop; but it does not appear that it was offered to the public, or to individuals, for use, or ever put to any use, except in the two .trips which it made

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for the plaintiffs, at their special request. Nor does it appear that the defendants were engaged in the business of carrying goods, or that they held themselves out to the world as carriers, or had ever offered their services as such. This casual use of their sloop in transporting plaintiffs’ property, falls short of proof sufficient to show them common carriers.

A common carrier was defined, in Gisburn, v. Hurst 1 Salk. 249), to be, any man undertaking, for hire, to carry the goods of all persons indifferently;” and in Dwight v. Brewster ( 1 Pick. 50 ), to be, “ one who undertakes, for hire, to transport the goods of such as choose to employ him, from place to ■ place.” In Orange Bank v Brown ( 3 Wend. 161 ), Chief Justice Savage said: “ Every person who undertakes to carry, for h compensation, the goods of all persons, indifferently, is, as to the liability imposed, to be considered a common carrier. The distinction between a common carrier and a private or special carrier is, that the former holds himself out in common, that is to all persons who choose to employ him, as ready to carry for hire ; while the latter agrees, in some special case, with some private individual, to carry for hire.” (Story on Contracts, § 752 a.) The employment of a common carrier is a public one, and he assumes a public duty, and is bound to receive and carry the goods of any one who offers. “ On the whole,” says Prof. Parsons, “ it seems to be clear, that no one can be considered as a common carrier, unless he has, in some way, held himself out to the -public **as a carrier, in such manner as to render him liable to an action, if he should refuse to carry for any one who wished to employ him.” (2 Pars, on Cont., 5th ed., 166, note.)

The learned counsel for the appellant, in effect, recognises the necessity of the carrier holding himself out to the world as such, in order to invest him with the character and responsibilities of a common carrier;

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and, to meet that necessity, says, “ the Creole was a freight vessel, rigged and manned suitably for carrying freight from port to port; her appearance in the harbor of Ogdensburgh, waiting for business, was an emphatic advertisement that she sought employment.” These facts do not appear in the findings of the referee, and, therefore, cannot, if they existed, help the appellants upon this appeal.

It is not claimed that the defendants are liable, unless as common carriers. Very clearly, they were not common carriers; and the judgment should, therefore, be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.