Majority
Headnote
The giving a check by the drawee, on presentation of a draft and its delivery to him, is not of itself payment, in the absence of an agreement that the check should be received as payment; and, upon such check being dishonored, the holder of the draft may disregard the transaction, reclaim the draft, present the same anew and protest it for non-payment, so as to charge the drawer, if done within a reasonable time after it was ■ originally received by him.The plaintiffs were bound to demand payment of the first draft on the day they received it (March 26) or the next day (March 27), and they had the right to hold it until the 27th. The draft being payable on demand, they were bound to use reasonable diligence in demanding payment, and a demand on the same day, or the next day, is, in the law, a demand within a reasonable time. (Chitty on Bills 377; Spring’fd ed. of 1842; Harker v. Anderson, 21 Wend., 372 ; Smith v. Jones, 20 Wend., 192 ; Benton v. Martin, 31 N. Y., 385 ; Merchants’ Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend., 443 ; Hazleton v. Colburn, 2 Abb. N. S., 199.)
It was sufficient to give the notice of demand and refusal on the next day, the 28th of March. (Farmers’ Bank of Bridgeport v. Vail, 21 N. Y., 485 ; Howard v. Ives, 1 Hill, 263 .)
Therefore, in demanding payment of this draft on the 27th and mailing notices of non-payment on the 28th, the plain tiffs did all that the law required of them, and the defendant was charged as drawer of the draft, unless it was discharged by what took place on the 26th. On that day the draft was neither paid nor refused to be paid. Culver, Penn & Co. gave their check for it, and the check was in due time, the next day, in the ordinary course of business, through the clearing-house, presented for payment and payment refused. There was no agreement to receive the check in payment. It was taken by the plaintiffs in the usual course of business, they believing that it would be paid. They, then, on the 27th, returned the check and reclaimed the draft, and demanded payment upon it. The check did not for a moment operate as a payment of the draft, and the whole transaction does not show the absence of any diligence, which
For affirmance, Earl, Ch. J., Grover, Hunt, Ingalls, and Smith, J J. For reversal, Foster and Lott, JJ.
Judgment affirmed.
Cases cited
- Ellis v. McCormick 1 Hilt. 313 p. 540