p. 171that had been received for labor employed, rent of the shopy and the tools and stock purchased, and his own expenses.
It also appeared on the part of the plaintiff, that the entire earnings did not exceed the amount of her liabilities.
■ The recovery of the judgment, the issuing of the execution, and the levy thereunder were admitted. It was also admitted that the defendant Davis was deputy sheriff, and acted under the said execution, and that Van Olinda was the plaintiff therein and directed the said levy.
The defendants then offered to prove that the plaintiff gave James H. Smith the right to carry on the business of wagon making and blacksmithing, in her name, and on her credit, for his sole benefit, and claimed that its effect was to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of said Smith. The court sustained an objection thereto by the plaintiff, and the defendants excepted.
The defendants asked to have the question submitted to the jury, whether the arrangement between the plaintiff and James H. Smith was not fraudulent and void as against his creditors. The court denied this request, and the defendants excepted.
The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff for $125, for which sum, with costs, judgment was entered against the defendants.
H. B. Cushney for the appellants.
The arrangement between plaintiff and James M. Smith was a mere cover, and fraudulent and void as to creditors. (Booth v. Bunce, 24 N. Y., 592 , 595.) The question of fraud is for the jury. (Bishop v. Cook, 13 Barb., 326 ; Wakeman v. Dalley, 44 Barb., 498 , 503; Thompson v. Blanchard, 4 N. Y. R., 303; Ford v. Williams, 24 N. Y. R., 359.)J. M. Ca/rroll for the respondent.
The arrangement was not fraudulent. (Buckley v. Wells, 33 N. Y., 518 .)I am unable to perceive any error in this case. The case of Booth v. Bunce ( 24 N. Y., 592 ) is much
p. 172relied on by the defendants’ counsel. There the execution creditor, who had levied on and purchased the property in question, offered to prove that the corporation, from whose possession it was taken, was organized to defraud the creditors of the debtor in the execution. The Court of Appeals held that it was error to exclude such evidence.
The question in this case is not at all the same. Here the offer was to prove that the plaintiff allowed the execution debtor to use her name and credit to carry on business for his sole benefit. There is no fraud in such facts, nor can any be deduced from them. She might have allowed the use of her name and capital, giving the whole profits to her step-son, without any injury to his creditors. If he acquired any property thereby, it would belong to his creditors, but clearly not her property which the step-son or debtor was allowed to use. It is the same with property acquired on her credit. The property so acquired belongs to her.
If there is any evidence showing fraud or a fraudulent intent, the case must go to the jury; but I am entirely unable to discover any facts in this case that would support any such conclusion. It is not in question by any fact in the case that the wagon levied on was made with materials and labor procured on her credit. She was the owner of the wagon, and there was nothing in the evidence on which the jury could find her title to be fraudulent. The judgment should be affirmed with costs.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.