Majority
Headnote
Plaintiffs earned, on board, their vessel, a cargo of wheat, from M. to 0. By the bill of lading it was to be delivered “ as addressed on the margin, • or his or their assignees or consignees, on paying the freight and charges noted; ” on the margin was written “ Acct. T. L. Baker, to Oity Bank ” (defendant). On arrival, defendant’s cashier directed the wheat to be delivered at an elevator, subject to its order, saying, also, that the proprietors would pay freight. The proprietors of the elevator paid a portion of the freight, and gave a check on New York for the balance) which was sent forward, presented, payment refused, and the drawers duly notified. Defendant acted in the matter as agent of the M. Bank, but this fact did not appear on the bill of lading, and was unknown toThat the consignee, who receives the cargo consigned under such a bill of lading as the one in question, is liable to the carrier for the freight is not questioned. (Merian v. Funck, 4 Denio, 110 ; Hinsdell v. Weed, 5 id., 172 ; Davis v. Pattison, 24 N. Y., 317 ; Morse v. Pesant, 2 Keyes, 16; Merrick v. Gordon, 20 N. Y., 93 .) It matters not under such a bill of lading, whether the consignee be the owner or not; the law implies a promise on his part to pay the freight. But in this case, the fact that the defendant was merely the agent of the Milwaukee bank was not disclosed upon the shipping bill, and was unknown to the plaintiffs. It was found by the General Term, that “ neither the master, nor owners of the schooner, had any knowledge or notice of the manner in which the wheat was purchased, or of the drawing, or the non-payment of the draft, or of • the instructions given by the Milwaukee 27ational Bank to the defendant.” The defendant cannot therefore claim exemption from liability to the plaintiffs on the ground that it was merely the agent of another party. The form of the bill of lading addressed i£ Account T. L. Baker, to the City Bank, Oswego, N. Y.,” is such as to show that the defendant was the consignee. It has been so held in a number of similiar cases. (Dows v. Greene, 16 Barb., 77 ; S. C., 32 id., 490; Gilson v. Madden, 1 Lans., 172 ; Hinsdell v. Weed, 5 Denio, 172 ; Canfield v. The Northern Railroad Co., 18 Barb., 586 ; Dart v. Ensign, 47 N. Y., 619 .)
It, therefore, only remains to be examined, whether anything was done at the time of the delivery of the wheat, or subsequently thereto, by which the defendant was discharged from
At the time the order was given, the cashier of defendant also said to the master of the vessel that “ they (meaning the proprietors of the elevator), will pay your freight.” This was an assurance that they would pay the freight, which the defendant had by its acceptance of the wheat, become liable to pay. The master was not bound to look to them for the payment of his freight. Hé was not directed to collect his freight before he made delivery, or to insist upon payment as a condition of delivery. He had the right to make delivery and then immediately call upon the bank for his freight, and was not bound to make any efforts to collect it elsewhere. The proprietors of the elevator paid a portion of the freight and gave their checks on a Hew York bank for the balance. There was no agreement that these cheeks should be taken as payment, and they did not, therefore, for an instant, operate as payment. The master could, therefore, immediately have tendered them back, and demanded payment of the balance of ■ the freight. They could not operate as payment, unless paid, and there is no claim that after the master received the checks, there was a want of due diligence in presenting them for payment, or in giving notice of non-payment, and there is
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.