Gogorza v. Knickerbocker Life Insurance

The learned judge at the Circuit, among other things, instructed the jury, in substance, that if the act which caused the death of the assured was not a voluntary act, not the 'act of his own will, but an involuntary act when he was in a mental condition which rendered him incapable of exercising his will, then the defendant was liable. A verdict for the plaintiff having been rendered under this direction, I shall assume that the jury found that when the hand of the assured delivered the fatal shot he was wholly bereft of reason. This view of the result of the verdict is the most favorable that can be taken in aid of the plaintiff’s claim, unless the death was purely accidental, which is scarcely pretended, and to which some reference will be hereafter made.

It is now to be regarded as the settled law of this country, and of England, that a clause in a policy of life insurance exempting the insurer from liability if the assured “ die by his own hand,” has reference to an intelligent or voluntary act, and not to a suicide committed by a party in a state of mental derangement so great that the act of self-destruction is to be regarded as wholly involuntary. (Van Zandt v. The Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co., 55 N. Y., 169 ; Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 M. &. G., 639; Clift v. Schwabe, 3 C. B., 437 ; Eastdbrook v. The Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 54 Maine, 224; Dean, v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 4 Allen, 96 ; Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall., 580 .)

In the present ease, the provision which avoids the policy is, that if the assured “ shall die by his own hand or act, sane or insane,” the insurer shall not be liable. The question therefore is, whether the addition of the words “ sane or

In all the cases heretofore considered by the courts, so far as we are advised, save in those to be hereafter referred to, the words “ sane or insane ” were not written in the policy. Such were the leading English cases of Borradaile v. Hunter (5 M. & G., 639); Clift v. Schwabe ( 3 C. B., 437 ), and aE the cases in this State, and in some other of our sister States; and in aE these cases it is to be observed that the courts considered that the words “ dying by his own hand” could not have a Eteral appEcation; for if so, a voluntary death by drowning or by taking poison would not avoid the poEcy any more than a death occasioned by a pistol shot by the hand of a madman, moved by an irresistible insane impulse. But the exceptions which the courts have engrafted upon the meaning of the words employed “ rest upon the ground that the excepted cases could not have been within the meaning of the parties to the poEcy.” ( 55 N. Y., 169 , Rapallo, J.) It is therefore held that a death by drowning or by poison is a death by the hand of the assured, and, also, that a death from a pistol shot deEvered from the hand of the assured is not a death by his own hand, if at the time he was bereft of reason, and the act was involuntary. We have, therefore, only to consider the interpretation to be given to the language of the contract of insurance, for no question is made but that it was fuEy understood and agreed to by both parties.

It can scarcely be doubted that an insurer of the Efe of a person may by apt language guard himself from EabiEty for aE disasters if the exemption does not contravene public poEcy. He may provide that if the assured shaE die of the smaE pox or any other specified disease of the body he will not be Eable, and there appears to be no reason why he may not guard himseE against EabiEty if death results from any disease of the mind. Indeed, it is said by Bapallo, J., in Van Zandt v. The Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company

We are asked to decide that the addition of the words “sane or insane” to the words of a policy, that the insurer shall be excused if the assured “ die by his own hand or act ” means nothing, and it is urged by way of argument that if a madman causes his own death it is no more than a mere accident, and that, therefore, a death caused by mere accident and by one in no way responsible for his acts is in fact the same thing. A death by accident, within the meaning of that term as used in conditions of insurance, is not a death resulting from insanity, and in that connection has no reference to the condition of the mind of the party so dying. It has relation to casualties of a different character by which life is destroyed, and the language of a contract, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, must have a construction according to its common and ordinary meaning, as the majority of mankind would understand it. “ The best construction,” says Gibson, Oh. J., in The Schuylkill Navigation Company v. Moore ( 2 Whart., 491 ), “ is that which is made by viewing the subject of the contract as the mass of mankind would view it, for it may be safely assumed that such was the aspect in which the

It may here also be suggested that the argument by which the legal effect of the words “ sane or insane ” is sought to be nullified proves too much, and in this respect is alike obnoxious to logic as to law. The proposition is that the policy is avoided only if the assured shall die by his own hand, and that he does not die by his own hand if death results from an irresistible insane impulse. This proves, if it proves any thing, that it is impossible for an insurer to contract for exemption from liability in eases of death resulting from insanity where it seems to be agreed that such a contract may be lawfully made. In several of the cases considered by the courts, resulting in the rule before stated as to the effect of suicide upon the liability of the insurer, the effect of the addition of the words “ sane or insane ” has been incidentally referred to.

In Borradaile v. Hunter (supra) it will be remembered that the policy was, by the proviso, to be void in case “ the assured should die by his own hands,” and the insured was held not liable upon the ground that the assured, who was drowned in the river Thames, “voluntarily threw himself into the water, knowing at the time that he should thereby destroy his life and intending thereby to do so, but at the time of committing the act he was not capable of judging between right and wrong.” That the rule in this case has been fully adopted in this country we have already seen, and it may prove something in the present case that a very learned lawyer, Mr. Sergeant Wilde, arguing for the plaintiff in support of a rule nisi against a verdict for the defendant said, at the beginning of his argument, “ It is obvious that the words of the policy are not to be taken in their strictly literal sense, otherwise

who dissented from the judgment of his brethren in that case, in concluding a very able and elaborate opinion, said: “ I therefore found the opinion at which I have arrived in this case upon the consideration that the insurers intended by the proviso to confine their exemption from liability to the case of a felonious suicide only; that if they intended the exception to extend to both the case of felonious self-destruction, and self-destruction not felonious, they ought so to have expressed it clearly in the policy; and that, at all events,' if they have left it doubtful on the face of the policy, whether it is so confined or not, that doubt ought, in my opinion, to be determined against them, for it is incumbent on them to bring themselves within the exception, and if their meaning remains in doubt they have failed so to do.”

"While the propositions quoted are not authority, they serve to indicate the opinions of a very distinguished lawyer, and a very eminent judge, upon the precise question now before us for decision.

In the case of Eastabrook v. The Union Mutual Life Insurance Company (54 Maine, 224), where the proviso in the policy was, that if the assured should die by his own hand, the policy should be void, Appleton, Ch. J., said : “ The different English fife insurance companies (when unwilling to incur the risk of suicidal insanity) have guarded against such risk by language clearly excluding it from the policy. Thus, the Equitable has the condition, ‘ if he shall die by his own hand, being at the time sane or insane; ’ the Eagle, 6 if he shall die by his own act, whether sane or insane; ’ and in the policies of the Solicitors and General Life Assurance the condition is, ‘if he die by his own act, whether felonious or not.’ ”

This extract clearly indicates what the judgment of that court would have been if the condition in the policy before

In the case of Pierce v. The Travelers' Insurance Company ( 3 Ins. L. J., 422 [June, 1814]) a question kindred to that involved in the present case came before the Supreme Oourt of Wisconsin. The condition in the policy was, that if the assured should “ die by suicide, felonious or otherwise, sane or insane,” it should be void. On the trial of the cause, the jury were charged that if the assured “ took his own life while in an insane condition of mind, still the defendants are liable, notwithstanding the attempt to avoid the policy under such circumstances.” Whatever nice criticism may be indulged in in respect to this direction to the jury, I think it presents, in a less artistic form, the precise proposition contended for by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in the case at bar. The jury were, in effect', told that the additional words “ suicide, felonious or otherwise, sane or insane,” did not excuse the insurance company, even if the death of the assured was the result of insanity. On an appeal taken, the Supreme Oourt of Wisconsin held the charge erroneous; and Dixon, Oh. J., in delivering the judgment of the court, says : “ The intention here manifested is so plain as to seem incapable of further explanation, and unless there is something in the policy of the law which forbids such stipulation, we have nothing to do but to give effect to it; for however the word £ suicide,’ which is held by the authorities to mean the same thing as £ death by his own hand’ or ‘take his own life’ might,if standing alone, be construed to imply a felonious self destruction, or self-destruction by a sane man, or one capable of understanding the nature and consequences of his own act, and of judging between right and wrong, it is obvious that it cannot be so received or applied here. Such construction is forbidden by the express words of the condition, which declares that it shall make no difference whether the suicide was felonious or otherwise, or whether the party committing it was sane or insane at

Since the argument of this cause we have been referred, by the counsel for the defendant, to the unreported case of Chapman, v. The Republic Life Insurance Company of Chicago, which recently came before the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, in which a question like the present was involved. The words of the proviso in the policy, in that case, were, that if the death of the assured was, caused “ by his or her own act and i/ntembion, whether sane or insane,” then the insured should not be liable. The insured died from a pistol shot delivered from his own hand while in a completely insane state of'mind and the insurance company were held not to be liable; the court approving the case of Pierce v. The Travelers' Insurance Company, before referred to.

So far, therefore, as we can be aided by judicial decisions, they appear favorable to views which are commended to our judgment. We do not, however, place reliance upon them further than they appear to be fortified by reason. We prefer to place our decision upon the ground that the words of the proviso in the policy before us, by plain rules of interpretation, exempts the defendant from liability. That this language, in view of previous decisions, was inserted for such a purpose, cannot be doubted, and that it was agreed to by both the insured and the insurer is not questioned, and that it is a provision allowed by law, no one denies. We are to say from these words what the parties must have intended, and we cannot properly say that additional words having no meaning were inserted in the contract, and if they mean any thing it is just what the words commonly import, and that is, if death ensues from any physical movement of the hand or body of the assured proceeding from a partial or total eclipse of the mind, the insurer may go free. We are not altogether unmindful of the force of the

If the foregoing views are approved it appears not to he necessary to consider any other question in the case, as the plaintiff can never recover, unless upon the ground that the death of the assured was the result of pure accident. This question was somewhat argued, hut, I think, not specially relied upon hy the counsel for the plaintiff. If it was proper for the jury to consider the question in that aspect upon the evidence, it may be that the verdict of the jury was that the assured came to his death by mere accident, and if so the question already discussed is quite immaterial. But I am of the opinion that it was error to submit such a question to the jury, and to support this view I appeal to the charge of the learned judge given to them. He says: “ I am asked by defendant’s counsel to charge you that there is no evidence authorizing you to come to the conclusion that this act was accidental. There is very little evidence about it. There is no evidence about it.”

The last sentence taken from the learned judge’s charge correctly indicates the state of the case. There was no evidence that the death of Gogorza was what wo consider accidental, and no such question should have been submitted to the jury. The judge tells the jury that there is no evidence that the death was the result of accident, and yet says they may so find if they are thus minded. The proposition is quite at war with all our traditions of the common law of England,

If for no other reason, I should favor a new trial in this case for this very plain error. But for other reasons a new trial must be granted.

(dissenting). I do not think the judge erred in submitting to the jury the question, whether the death of the assured was caused by an accidental discharge of the pistol. No witness was present when the pistol was discharged, and the precise circumstances under which the discharge took place are unknown. We have the mental condition of the deceased; the facts that the pistol was purchased by his son without his knowledge; that he cautioned his son against leaving it about for fear of accident; that he did not know where it was kept, or that it was loaded; that he was wholly unfamiliar with its use, and had never been known to fire or use one; that it was a self-cocking pistol which would go off at a touch; and that the fatal wound was in his mouth. While it is extremely improbable, from all the circumstances, that the discharge was purely accidental, in the ordinary sense of the term, the facts do not exclude such an hypothesis, and it was therefore proper for the judge to submit them to the jury. (Mallory v. The Travelers' Insurance Co., 47 N. Y., 52 .) There was nothing in the complaint or proofs of loss which absolutely precluded the plaintiff from claiming that the death was purely accidental, and there was no claim upon the trial that plaintiff was thus precluded. As it is not claimed that the death of the assured by an accidental discharge of the pistol while in

It is admitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that if the assured intentionally took his own life by his voluntary act, then the policy was avoided, whether he was sane or insane. But it is claimed by him that if his act of self-destruction was involuntary and unintentional, or caused by an irresistible impulse, then the death was not, within the meaning of the policy, “ by his own hand or act.”

It is matter of common observation that some insane persons can be influenced by motives ; that they can form intentions and act upon them, and that they can devise schemes and carry them out with great cunning and skill, and yet such persons may not be able to distinguish between right and wrong, may not be competent to bind themselves by contracts, or be legally responsible for crime. There are other insane persons who cannot form intentions, are unconscious of the physical consequences of their acts, cannot control their actions, and who act from irresistible impulse; such persons can no more be said to act than an automaton. If such a person should commit self-destruction, the event might, with some propriety, be called an accident. It is no more the act of the insane person than if he had been compelled to do.it by some irresistible external force.

The clause inserted in policies, that they should be void in case the assured died by his own hand or act, has been in common use for many years. It is supposed to have been inserted to deprive the assured of any motive to take his own life for the pecuniary benefit of his friends. It presupposes that the assured could be acted upon by motives, and was not intended for a case where motives could not operate, where intentions could not be formed, and where the acts of the assured were not under the control of his will. Such a clause would not invalidate a policy in ease a pistol held in the hands of the assured should explode, or in case he should with his

The construction of this clause, and clauses similar to it, has frequently been" before the courts. The earliest English case in which it received consideration is that of Borradaile v. Hunter (5 Man. & Grang., 639; 44 E. C. L., 335). In that case there was a proviso that the policy should be void “ in case the assured should die by his own hands.” The assured threw himself into the Thames and was drowned. Upon an issue whether the assured died by his own hands, the jury found that he “voluntarily threw himself into the water, knowing at the time that he should thereby destroy his life, and intending thereby to do so; but at the time of committing the act he was not capable of judging between right and wrong,” and it was held, after much discussion, that the policy was avoided. In that case it was claimed, on the part of the plaintiff, that if the assured was, at the time of his self-destruction, in such a state of mind that he was morally and legally irresponsible for his acts, the proviso did not apply; but it was held that whether the assured was sane or insane, if he intended self-destruction and voluntarily threw himself into the river for that purpose, the policy was avoided. Maulé,

This clause first came under consideration in this State, in the case of Breasted v. The Farmers' Loan and Trust Company ( 4 Hill, 73 ). In that case the assured committed suicide by drowning, and this fact the defendant plead as a defence.

This case again appears in 8 Elew York, 299, and both decisions are commented upon and explained in Van Zant v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company ( 55 N. Y., 169 ). In the latter case the law, as announced in the English cases, was followed, and hence in this State, whatever doubt there may have been before, it must now be regarded as settled that when a policy contains a proviso that it shall be void in case the assured shall die by his own hand, a death by the voluntary, intentional act of the insured, whether he was sane or insane, avoids the policy ; but self-destruction by the assured when his mind was so disordered that he did not know that the act committed would cause death, when he could form no intention and be influenced by no motive, or when he was under the influence of some insane impulse which he could not resist, does not avoid the policy. The case of Life Insurance Company v. Terry ( 15 Wall., 580 ) is also commented on in that case, and the judgment therein is shown really not to be in conflict with that decision.

Since this clause first came under consideration in England there has been in England and this country, among judges and text writers, a difference of opinion as to its construction. On the one hand it has been claimed that self-destruction by an insane person who was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong and who would not be responsible for the

But we have here two words superadded, “ sane or insane,” to the other words which were under consideration in the cases to which we have thus far referred, and it is claimed, on the part of the defendant, that these two words make a marked difference. The claim is, that under this policy every case of self-destruction not purely accidental, whether the assured at the time was sane or insane, is within the proviso and avoids the policy. I am of opinion that this claim is not well founded. I am not clear for what particular purpose these two words were added. They can have no application in any case, unless the assured died by his own hand. Here, according to all the authorities, the assured did not die by his own hand, and hence these words can have no.force. There is some force in the claim made on the .part of the defendant that the words “ sane or insane ” which have recently been added to the other words, which have for many years been found in policies, must be given some meaning in the clause under consideration; that meaning must, if- possible, be given to all the language used. It may be that they are used simply to make certain that mere insanity shall not take a case of self-destruction out of the proviso. With the clause as written every case of voluntary intentional self-destruction is within the proviso whether the assured was sane or insane; but the proviso does not apply to a ease where the act of self-destruction was not voluntary or intentional. Such a case would

Upon the argument of this case, our attention was called to the case of Pierce v. Travelers' Insurance Company (decided in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in April, 1874, and reported in 3 Insurance Law Journal, 422), as a case where the main question involved upon this appeal was under consideration. The policy in that case contained a condition that it should be void in case the assured died “ by suicide, felonious or otherwise, sane or insane.” The court, at the trial, charged the jury that if the assured “ took his own life while in an insane condition of mind, still the • defendants are liable,x notwithstanding the attempt to avoid the policy under such circumstances.” The Supreme Court held this charge to be erroneous, and granted a new trial. Dixon, Oh. J., writing the opinion, said “ that the construction and effect of the condition must be the same as that which was given by the majority of the court to the exception in the policy in the leading case of Borradaile v. Hwuter." He classifies the unintentional death of insane persons who commit self-destruction while unconscious of their acts, or unable to control them, among accidents; and he says: “ The condition here relieves the company from liability only where the self-destruction was intentional, or committed by a party who was conscious of the nature of the act he was committing, or about to commit, and conscious of the direct and immediate consequences, and this notwithstanding the act may have been unaccompanied by any criminal or felonious intent or purpose. It does not apply or relieve the company when the death of the assured was accidental, or may be properly said to have been caused by accident, though brought about, it may have been, by his own hands, or by some dangerous or destructive instrument held in them.” That case is not, therefore, in conflict with the views above expressed, but is in entire harmony with them. The

The language which would nullify a life policy in case the brain of the assured became so diseased and his mind so disordered that he should unconsciously or unintentionally, or from an irresistible impulse, take his own life, should be such as clearly to show that such was the intention of the parties. It is at least true that the language used in the policy under consideration does not clearly manifest such an intention.

It is claimed that, under the construction we have given to the words in this policy, no insurance company could use words that would shield it from liability in the case of the self-destruction of a person so insane as to be incapable of forming an intention or controlling his acts. I cannot perceive the difficulty. If it should be provided that the policy should be avoided “ in case of suicide, or death of the assured resulting from insanity,” or “in ease of the self-destruction of the assured while insane, whether he was conscious of or intended the act of self-destruction or not,” or “in case the assured shall consciously, intentionally and voluntarily take his own life, whether he was sane or insane,” I think there could be no dispute as to the meaning. If either of the first two provisos had been in this policy, the defendant would have been exempted from liability; if the last proviso had been in, the construction would have been that which I have given. But it is unnecessary to determine the effect of any supposed language until an actual case is presented for decision.

Our attention has been called, since the argument, to the unreported case of Chapman v. The Republic life Insurance Company of Chicago, decided in the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of Ulinois. In that case the assured shot himself, and the policy contained a proviso exempting the insurance company from liability in case the

The judgment should therefore be affirmed, with costs.

For reversal: Lott, Oh. O., Beymolds and Gray, 00.; for affirmance: Earl and Dwight, 00.

Judgment reversed.