Majority
Headnote
Appraisement of lands taken for railroad.According to the section of the act under which the proceedings in this L case were taken (Laws 1838, p. 199), the corporation, on complying with the terms of the statute, were to "be deemed the owners of the land taken, in fee-simple.”
As the right to apply for the appointment of appraisers is made dependent upon the failure to obtain the land required, by agreement (§ 5), and as the proceedings, if regular, bind married women, infants, lunatics, and idiots (§ 10), the corporation must show, upon the face of the record, a substantial compliance with every requirement of the statute, and, in the act itself, an express authority to the appraisers for every exercise of power affecting the interest of the owner.
The petition of the railroad company is in the usual form, referring to the statute, and " describing the lands required for the purpose of the new road,” without any qualification or condition as to the interest therein to be acquired. They were entitled to a fee, by the 11th sec
This is the power conferred upon the appraisers, and the whole of it. In their certificate, made in accordance with the 9th section, they state, “ the damages awarded to the said owners by the said appraisers are $1800. This award is based on the supposition, and made on *ihe cmditiori, and with the understanding, that J Hill and Aldrich, the owners, are to be at liberty, at any time, to open a street on the north side of their lot, across said road, and to remove any fences or obstructions to such street, and also to drain under said road, provided the grade and security of said road is not affected thereby.”
It is hardly necessary to affirm, that the appraisers had no authority to arbitrate between these parties. Their duties were defined by the 8th section, which I have quoted. In attempting to reserve privileges to the owners, by way of easement in the lands they were to appraise, they transcend their power, and their award was a nullity. It has never been suggested, that, the railroad company would be bound, ipso facto, by the award, without some subsequent act on their part affirmatory of its provisions. They claimed, as we have seen, the fee-simple; and the use to which they were to appropriate the land, involved the right to the exclusive
The award, however, when made, must conclude both, or neither, of the parties. The certificate, it is true, states, that the appraisers have assessed the value of the land, and the damages sustained by the owners, without any deduction on account of any real or supposed benefit which the owners might derive from the construction of the road. But this statement is consistent with the fact, that the appraisers deducted from the damages the full value of the privileges secured to the owners; for these easements were not any part of the real or supposed benefits resulting from the construction. The amount deducted we have no means of ascertaining; entire damages are assessed, without distinguishing by the return those awarded for the land, and the damages, if any, allowed for injuries to buildings, or by the construction of the road.
Cases may be imagined, in which the benefit to the owners, by a privilege of this kind, would exceed the value of the land taken, and where the property was divided by a ravine, or a highway, which the corporation proposed to fill up, or excavate *for the ^ ... ^ track of the road. If the construction in the manner proposed, was a benefit to the owner of the different parcels, he would obtain, under the statute, the value of the land taken, without anything more or .less. If, however, to these advantages should be added the right to open and continue a public highway across the road, the benefit thus derived might exceed the value of the land appropriated. And if this award can be sustained, the appraisers, by making such an easement the “ basis” of the award, would be justified in allowing mere nominal damages to the owner. This would be a mode of improving owners out of their lands, which is opposed to the whole spirit of the law.
It is said, that railroad corporations should be per
Dissent
(Dissenting). — The 8th section -* of the “ act concerning the Mohawk and Hudson Railroad Company,” passed the 16th April 1838, under which the lands were taken for the road, prescribes the duty of the appraisers in these words: “And the said appraisers shall assess the value of the land so proposed to be taken, and the damages the owners may sustain by taking their lands, by injury to buildings, and in the construction of such road, without any deduction on account of any real or supposed benefit which suck owner may derive from the construction of such road.
It is very obvious, that the amount of damages arising from these or other causes, may depend, in' a great degree, on the manner in which the road is to be constructed, and upon the extent to which it deprives the owner of the advantageous use and enjoyment of his adjacent lands. The appraisers cannot *adjust f the amount of compensation to the extent of the *- injury, without first knowing the plan on which the road is to be made, and the rights and privileges which are to be reserved to the owner, to enable him to continue in the beneficial enjoyment of his adjoining property. Whether the road interferes with the owner’s convenient access to his other lands, or to his place of
The railroad company have the right, most undoubtedly, of constructing their road in such a manner as to do the least injury to the land-owner, and to reserve to him such rights and privileges in the land taken, as are consistent with their use of that land, and his use of the adjacent lands. And if the plan of the road is exhibited and submitted to the appraisers, and the appraisement is founded on such plan, the company is bound and may be compelled to construct the road accordingly. The plan of the road, or the description of the mode in which it is to be constructed, and the rights reserved to the land-owner, may very properly be embodied in the award of the appraisers for the security of the landowner. This seems to have been done in the case under consideration, and the privilege of laying out the street across the railroad, of removing obstructions, of draining under the road, are not at all inconsistent with the fact previously stated, that the appraisal of the land and the assessment of the damages were made, without any deduction on *account of any real or supposed -* benefit which the land-owners might derive from the construction of the road.
The return to the certiorari states expressly that the appraisers awarded to the owners the value of the land, and the damages they would sustain by taking the same, and in the construction of the road, “ without any deduction on account of any real or supposed benefit which the said owners might derive from the construction of the road.” The return cannot be contradicted here; it is conclusive, to show that the privileges which the award secures to the land-owners, were not allowed as any part of the compensation for the land, nor as any part of the real or supposed benefit which the owners might derive from the road; nor as a compensation for damages sustained. There is no ground for questioning the truth of the return in this respect, if we were allowed to question it at all. It is evident, that the privileges were allowed for the purpose of preventing the land-owners from sustaining damages, of to diminish their amount; in other words, to secure to the land-owners, after the railroad shall have been made, the enjoyment of part or all the advantages in the use of their adjacent lands which they would have had, if the railroad had not been made. This is entirely cqnsistent with the truth ^ of the return, with the *spirit of the statute, -* with public policy, and with justice and equity.
It has been said, that the corporation cannot compel the land-owner to accept the benefit of' the privileges thus proffered. That is true; and so, if the corporation should construct a safe and convenient passage-way across their road, or an arched way under it, for the land-owner’s use, they could not compel him to accept the' benefit; but it would be a great defect in the judgment of the appraisers, in such case, to award him damages for crossing at a greater distance, or at a more inconvenient place.
The error of the supreme court appears to me to consist in having assumed (contrary to the fact expressly stated in the award) that the full amount of damages was not allowed to the land-owners. The effect of the decision was, to require the company to pay damages for depriving the land-owners of advantages in the use of their adjacent lands, of which they whre not, in fact, deprived by the construction of the road, on conditions which the company had the right to impose and did impose on .themselves; and if the principle on which the judgment is affirmed be carried out, it will require these companies and the people of this state, whenever they have occasion to take private property for public use, to pay damages not sustained, or which may be avoided and prevented by conditions and stipulations annexed to the appropriation.
It is a mistake, to say that it appears from the award, that the value of the easements allowed to the landowners has been deducted from the damages sustained by the construction of the road. It might as well be said, that when • a railroad company have the damages assessed, on condition that they shall construct a culvert or an arched way under the road, for the benefit and convenience of the land-owner, that the value of these
The easements and privileges reserved to the landowners do not affect the seizure of the lands by the corporation, after they have been appraised and paid for. (Whitbeck v. Cook, 15 Johns. 483 .) The statute itself gives to each land-owner the right of passing across the railroad for farming and other necessary purposes (§ 12). This is, of itself, an easement, and is not regarded by the act as a disturbance of the service conferred on the company by the preceding section. The estate which the company acquire is a fee-simple, subject to the easements.
In the opinion delivered in the court below, it is stated, that “the object in reserving an easement to the original owners must have been, to procure its valuation at a reduced sum, and thus to save expense to the corporation.” This appears to me to be erroneous. The object was not to obtain the land taken at a reduced valuation, and the appraisers certify that they have appraised it at
* 1 fit? i ^The appraisers appear to me to have acted -* upon the true construction of the statute, and I have deemed it proper to state my reasons for dissenting from -the decision of my brethren in setting it aside, because it seems to me, to lead to very inconvenient and inequitable practical consequences.
Judgment affirmed.
Cases cited
- Hill v. Mohawk & Hudson Rail-Road 5 Denio 206 p. 152
- Whitbeck v. Cook 15 Johns. 483 p. 161