Majority
Headnote
Defendant, in order to induce people to insure with it, caused advertisements to be published and pamphlets to be issued, stating, ir. substance, that it insured at half the cost in other companies, as one-half of the premiums could be paid in premium notes, and its dividends always had, and would pay the notes. The dividends, as defendant’s managers well knew, never had paid the premium notes, and generally would fall much short of doing so. Plaintiff read some of the advertisements, and received one of the pamphlets from an agent of defendant; and, relying on these and other representations, took an endowment policy for $500, payable at her death, or at the end of five years if she should be then living. During the five years she paid one-half the premiums in cash and gave her notes for the other half; at the end of each year, the note of the previous year was included in the new note. But one small dividend was made during the five years. At the end of the five years she demanded the $500, but defendant would only pay the difference between that sum and the amount of the last note. Held, that an action for fraud was maintainable, as there was a false representation of a specific fact material to the transaction; and that plaintiff was not estopped, by allowing the contract to run to maturity, from asserting the fraud, as there were no means of discovering it prior to that time.Upon the former hearing of this cause, an obscure but very material interlineation in the printed case was overlooked, and we were thus led into error. We have reconsidered the case, and, by reading the evidence as corrected by the interlineation, have reached a different conclusion.
The fraud was really undisputed. The managers of the defendant had made the false representations, and they knew them to be false, as the dividends of the company never had
It is said, on behalf of the defendant, that the plaintiff did not rely upon these representations, and was not induced by them to take the policy. But there Avas sufficient evidence from Avhich the jury could have found that she did thus rely and Avas thus induced; and as she was nonsuited, this branch of her case must be assumed here to have been established.
It cannot be doubted that this Avas an actionable fraud. It.Avas not like the usual commendation of his oxvn Avhich one may make Avith impunity Avhcn engaged in trade or traffic. It was the representation of a specific fact quite material to the transaction.
But the plaintiff was defeated in the Supreme Court, on the ground that she had so far acted upon her contract xvith the defendant and ratified it that she Avas estopped, after the policy .had run to maturity, from' claiming anything on account of the fraud. We cannot agree to this. She did not discover the fraud, and So far as we can perceive, had no means of discovering it, during the five years. She was bound to give the notes, but Avas assured that the dividends Avould pay them. After she gave the notes, she had no occasion to look after them. She could rest upon the representations made to her. The defendant had the Avhole five years to make good the representations ; and the first timé she could expect to learn their falsity was when she went to demand the $500. When she made such demand, and learned that her note had not been paid by the dividends, she asserted the fraud. It is impossible, therefore, to perceive upon what theory it can be said that she Avaived or lost any right to assert this fraud against the defendant.
The judgment must, therefore, be reversed, and a netv trial granted, costs to abide event.
All concur.
Judgment reversed.