Majority
Headnote
The jurisdiction and power of the courts was not affected by the provision of the Code of Procedure (§ 428),[2] abolishing the writ of quo warranta and proceedings by information in the nature thereof; it is only the form of the proceeding that was done away with. The remedies theretofore had in those forms may now be obtained by civil action.Though the ancient writ of quo warranta, and proceedings by information in the nature thereof, are abolished (Code of Proc., § 428), yet the remedies heretofore had in the forms of that writ and that information, may now be obtained by civil action. (Code of Proc., § 428; People ex rel. v. Thatcher, 55 N. Y., 528 , 529.) It is only the form of the proceeding that is done away with. The jurisdiction and power of the courts are not touched by that section, even
In this action, in the nature of a proceeding by quo war ranto, the People of the State of New York ask of George Hall, the defendant, by what right he exercises and claims to hold the office of alderman of the city of New York. The defendant does not set up any primary right by which he claims, but rests alone upon the fact, that the board of aider-men of that city, having acquired jurisdiction so to do, have duly adjudged that he was duly elected a member thereof; and he sets up that as a bar to this action. The position of the defendant, as stated in argument, is, that the board of aldermen has, in the first instance, the sole and exclusive •jurisdiction of such a question, and that a determination by it is final and conclusive, unless there be had a review of its action by a proceeding bringing that action itself into the courts.
Doubtless the board of aldermen has jurisdiction to sit-in judgment upon the right to a place in its body. The charter of the city enacts, that the board “ shall be, the judge of the 6» elections, returns and qualifications of its own members, sub- J L ject, however, to the review of any court of competent juris-p! diction.” (Chap. 335, Laws of 1873, § 6.) This clause gives power to adjudge ; but does it give exclusive power in the first instance ? Are the courts of the State thereby ousted of jurisdiction, and shut out .from originating an inquiry as to the right to that office ? The defendant maintains the affirmative. His claim is put upon the likeness of this clause in the charter, to those in the Constitution of the United States and in that of this State, and the effect that, it is said, is given to them as per se conferring sole and exclusive power upon the houses of Congress and the houses of the State Legislature. The clause in the charter and the clauses in the constitutions are in the same form of words : “ Each house shall be t}le judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members *. * * ' .” (U. S. Const., art 1, § 5,
It is conceded by the text writers, that each of those houses has the sole power to judge thereof, exclusive of every other tribunal: (1 Kent, *235; 1 Story on Const., § 833; Cushing Law & Pr. Leg. Ass., § 1050; Cooley Cons. Lim., *133.) It is doubtful, however, whether they reach that conclusion, alone from the form and inherent force of the words used in the constitution. Kent (swpra) says : “ There is no other body known to the constitution, to Avhich such a power might be safely trusted.” Story (supra) says : “If lodged in any other, than the legislative body itself, its independence, its purity, and even its existence and action may be destroyed or put into imminent danger. * * * Accordingly, the power has always been lodged in the legislative body by the uniform practice of England and America.” Kent (ubi supra) says that the same power is vested in the British House of Commons. There, it “has its original from this one maxim, ‘ that whatever matter arises concerning either house of parliament ought to be examined, discussed and adjudged in that house to which it relates and not elsewhere : (1 Bl. Com., *163, citing 4 Inst., 15.) The power seems to have been established in the House of Commons, after a conflict. It Avas claimed and exercised at one time by the king and council, at another by the House of Lords, and again by the chancellor : (See Cox’s Inst, of Eng. Govt., 117; May’s Larvoí'Parliament,54; Hallam’sCont. Hist. Eng., vol. 1, 273)[1] . In 1624, the Commons declared by resolution, that it belonged exclusively to the house itself, as “ its ancient, natural and undoubted privilege ; ” and since then the claim of thediouse seems to have been acquiesced in on all hands : (Cush. Law & Pr., 54.) The same author says, that the power is so essential to the free election and independent existence of a legislative assembly, that it may be regarded as a necessary inci
a a These citations are furnished by the interesting brief of Mr. Stetson, counsel for the respondent, in McVeany's Case, argued soon after this.—Í1.
It is apparent that there is a wide difference, in the occasions of the use of these phrases, in conferring power upon the highest legislative bodies, and upon the councils of municipalities, or other inferior tribunals. As to the legislatures, they are used when the People, the sovereignty, has come together by its delegates to organize a government; and to* parcel out the three great powers thereof, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, among the three co-ordinote and principal depositories to which they are committed. Though the constitution confers upon specified courts general judicial power, there are certain powers of a judicial nature which, by the express terms of the same instrument, are given to the legislative body, and among them this which we are considering. All powers are then in the hold of the People. They aré about to distribute these powers .among the bodies which they at the same time create. When it is said,, on such occasion, to either house of the Legislature, “You are to be the judge of the election of the members to ; your body,” there is a specific conferment of this particular power; and when it is said, at the same time, to the judicial body, “You are to have general jurisdiction in law and equity,” though the conferment of power is general, there is, by the force of the concurrent action, excepted from the general grant, the specific authority definitely bestowed with the same breath upon another body. In such case it may well be, that a form of words in the instrument, that, clearly
Hone of these things apply to the council of a city. It is 11 the creature of the Legislature. It has not the inherent pow-11 ers of one of the constitutional depositories of authority. It is from the outstart a body inferior to the judiciary, and, as a general rule, answerable unto it. It is not unsafe for it, nor is it inconvenient, that a power to determine of the membership to it should be given to the courts. It is not to be feared that it will be destroyed, or its existence be endangered, by the judicial exertion of that power. It is made by temporary and changeable statute, instead of fundamental and permanent law. The authority that created it, the Legislature, remains, and may interpose to ward it from harm, or may bring it back to life if harmed fatally.
The argument, therefore, may not prevail, that is drawn from the use of the same form of words in the charter that is found in the constitutions.
But it is further urged that the clause in the charter— taken without regard to that likeness—gives exclusive power in the first instance to the board. It does not, unless it takes away jurisdiction from the courts; or, in this case, from the Supreme Court of the State. That court, from its origin, has had general jurisdiction in law and equity : (Canst., art. 6, § 6.) Within that jurisdiction formerly fell the proceed
It is suggested that the phrase, “ subject, however, to the review of any court of competent jurisdiction,” found in the clause in the charter, gives an implication that, in the legis
Sometimes, in opposition to the views we take, a reliance is had upon the rule, that where a new right, or the means of acquiring it, is conferred, and an adequate remedy for its invasion given by the same statute, parties injured are confined to the statutory redress: (Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 Comst., 9.) This rule cannot apply to The People, who are plaintiffs in this case. The right to inquire was not given by this charter, nor is a remedy given to The People by it. Whether the rule will affect the relator need not be determined, as will be seen hereafter. There are decisions in other States which hold in accordance with the views herein expressed: (State v. Fitzgerald, 44 Mo., 425 ; Hummer v. Hummer, 3 Greene [Iowa], 42; Wammack v. Holloway, 2 Ala. [K S.], 31; Murfree v. Leeper, 1 Overton [Tenn.], 1; Burginhofen v. Martin, 3 Teates, 479; 2 Rawle, 369 , infra.) Cases are cited from other States as being opposed. We think that the decisions in them, are put upon the requirements of the constitutions of those States, as in State v. Marlow ( 15 Ohio St., 114 [see pages of opinion 133, 134, 135] ) ; or upon positive and unequivocal expressions in statutes, as in Comm. v. Leach ( 44 Penn., 332 ), the decision in which seems to have gone upon or been influenced by a
But there is another view of this case not to be lost sight of.- Though the provision in the charter does not oust the Supreme Court of jurisdiction, it does give judicial power in the matter to the board of aldermen: (Per Shaw, Ch. J., Hiss v. Bartlett, 3 Gray, 472 .) It appears from the case that the relator has set that power in motion by a direct proceeding, begun by him in his own behalf, before the board ; and that in that proceeding it has been adjudged that the-relator has not, and that, as against the relator, the defendant has the right to the office. This adjudication has never been reversed and is still operative. Is not that adjudication a bar to the relator from proceeding further ? There is no
This leads to a reversal, in favor of the People, of the judgment appealed from ; and an affirmance of it against the j relator.
All concur, except Church, Ch. J., who dissents as to reversal, but agrees as to affirmance.
Judgxnent in accordance with opinion.