People ex rel. Jourdan v. Donohue

The sufficiency of the Executive warrant to justify the detention of the prisoner is the sole question raised by the writ of habeas corpus, and presented on this appeal. The warrant alone is returned, and, of necessity, furnishes the only authority upon which the proceedings for extradition can rest. These proceedings, as between the several States of the Union, expressly commanded by the Federal Constitution, were regulated and given a practical operation by the act of 1793. (Const., art. 4, § 2; U. S. R. S., § 5278.) They provide for the surrender of persons “ charged with treason, felony, or other crimes.” The language chosen is broad, and was plainly intended to embrace every criminal offense, and every act forbidden and made punishable by the law of the State where the crime was committed, and whether such by the common law, or express legislative enactment. (Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. [U. S.] 66.) By the act of 1793, three things are rendered necessary to precede and justify the warrant of extradition. There must be a demand from the governor of the State within which the crime has been committed for the surrender of the fugitive who has fled from its jurisdiction. Such requisition must be accompanied by an indictment, or an affidavit charging the commission of the offense. And such indictment or affidavit must be authenticated by the certificate of the Executive making the requisition. These preliminary conditions are essential. To say they are not would be to disregard the law, and make the Executive an autocrat. If they are essential, their presence or absence in a given case must, of necessity, become the subject of judicial investigation when the judgment of the law is invoked. And hence we have held that where the preliminary papers upon which a warrant of extradition has been granted are produced, and are before us, it is our right and our duty to examine them, and judge and determine, when our process is invoked, whether they aré sufficient, under the 16,w, to justify the warrant of extradition. (People ex rel. Lawrence v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182 .) Our ruling in this respect has not escaped criticism (Leary’s Case, 6 Abb. N.

Where, however, the papers upon which the warrant is founded are not produced, but are withheld by the Executive, in the exercise of official discretion and authority, we can look, only to the warrant itself, and its recitals, for the evidence that the essential conditions of its issue have been fulfilled. (People ex rel. Draper v. Pinkerton, 77 N. Y. 245 .) That is the situation of the present case. The warrant recites a representation by the governor of Connecticut, that “ John Jo urdan stands charged with the crime of theft," committed in the county of Middlesex, in said State; ” that the governor of Connecticut has demanded his arrest and extradition ; that such representation and demand were accompanied “ by affidavits, complaint and warrant, whereby the said John Jourdan is charged with the said crime, and with haying fled from the said State; ” and that such papers are “ certified by the said governor of Connecticut to be duly authenticated.” These recitals cover the essential conditions of the law, and establish their existence, unless there is force in the two objections presented for our consideration, and which were argued at least with earnestness and ability.

It is at first questioned whether “ theft ” is a crime either at common law or under the statutes of Connecticut. The criticism is upon the word. It is claimed not to be the precise equivalent of “ larceny,” and not to be defined as a crime by the statutes of Connecticut. We do not think either suggestion is well founded. •Bouvier defined, “ theft ” as “ a popular term, for larceny.” Blackstone uses the two words synonymously and as descriptive of one and the same offense. He defines “ larceny or theft.” (Vol. 4, p. 229.) He proceeds to “ examine the nature of theft or larceny/7 (Id. 230.) He speaks of a “ prosecution for theft.” (Id. 235.) And while discussing the punishment of larceny relates tlnXt “ our antient Saxon laws punished theft with death if abc\ve the value of

But the force of the argument of the learned counsel for the prisoner was not spent on this merely verbal criticism, and took the graver form that the warrant recited, not the facts constituting the offense, but simply the conclusions of the Executive, which might or might not be well founded and accurate, and that such facts should be stated at least with reasonable certainty and precision. The objection involves, as its ultimate result, a requirement that the Executive warrant shall state with reasonable certainty the facts constituting the alleged .crime, and that, without such facts, a recital that the person . demanded is charged with a crime described simply by its generic name, as murder, larceny or the like, is insufficient. There are several difficulties in the way of such a conclusion. The proceeding is under a specific statute. • Compliance with that is all that is necessary. The question is never whether the prisoner is guilty or innocent, whether a crime has been committed or not. Those are later questions, as to which the party arrested, in due season, will have full opportunity to he heard. The question is simply whether he is “ charged with crime.” The recital in the warrant avers that fact. We must take it as true and cannot require more. If it be said that the state

The order appealed from should be affirmed.

All concur, except Rapallo, J., absent.

Order affirmed.