p. 207and. twenty-four' feet in length, lying wholly within lines in continuation of the lines of South Sixth street, as laid down on the map of the defendant’s grantors, and wholly within lines in direct continuation of the lines of South Sixth street, as actually opened and used; thirty feet of the width of such pier, being between the center and south lines of South Sixth street. From the date of the erection of this pier by the city to the commencement of this action, the city enjoyed the use thereof, expended $7,433.98 in repairing and taking care of the same, and collected wharfage thereon. In December, 1879, the defendant, being then owner of the upland on the southerly side of South Sixth street, and of the southerly side of> said street, subject to the use of the same as a street, obtained from the State a grant of the land under water in front of its premises ; which grant included so much of the land covered by plaintiffs piers as lies south of a line in continuation of the center line of South Sixth street. In July, 1880, the defendant commenced erecting, and since this action was brought has erected, a structure immediately alongside the pier of plaintiff, to the south, widening the said pier about twenty feet; and since the commencement of this action, the defendant has erected at the end of plaintiffs pier, another structure eighty-three feet long, and about fifty feet in width, extending in front of the southerly half of South Sixth street, and of the structure widening said pier, but not projecting beyond the pier line. The court found that neither of said structures interfered with the travel on South Sixth street, but by overlapping an dinclosing said pier, prevented vessels from lying along its south side and end, except a space ten feet wide at the end — i. e., the portion north of the center line of South Sixth street as continued.
William C. De Witt for appellant.
The city had the right to construct the pier to join its street with navigable water, and also derived it from the several clauses of the charter recognizing that right and regulating its exercise. (Snyder v. Rochford, 6 Ind. 237 ; Laws 1854, p. 840, §13, sub. 2; Laws
p. 2081873, chap. 863, tit. 2, § 13, sub. 4;
Wood v. Tonjis,
74 N. Y. 612 ; affirming 9 Hun, 612 .)
Joshua M. Van Cott for respondent.
The State might have abated the pier; as between the city and the State the pier was a purpresture and a nuisance.
(People v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 396 ;
People v.
N. Y. & S. I. F. Co., 68 id. 71.) It might have maintained ejectment for it.
(People v. Mauran, 5 Denio, 389 ;
60 N. Y. 242 ;
Heard v.
Brooklyn, 68 id. 1.) Defendant, as owner of the upland under and adjacent to the street, and as grantee from the State of the land under water, under, beyond and around the pier, is authorized by law to make the commercial improvements the plaintiff sought to restraim
(Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9 ;
Gould v.
H. R. R. R. Co., 2 Seld. 522;
People v.
Canal Appraisers, 33 N. Y. 466 , 467; Laws 1855, chap. 31; Laws 1857, chap. 763.) Even if the addition on the south side of the pier might be deemed to violate the statute requirement of one hundred feet between piers, only the State could take advantage of it. (
Wetmore v.
B'klyn Gas-light Co., 42 N. Y. 384 .) The opening of the street did not make the city owner of the upland. The title remained in the owner, subject to the easement of the street. It, and not the city, was entitled to acquire the land underwater from the State. (Thompson on Highways, 22;
Whitbech v.
Cook, 15 Johns. 483 ;
Gilney v.
Earl, 12 Wend. 98 .) The owner may maintain trespass and ejectment in respect of it.
(Carpenter v.
Oswego R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 635 .)
Upon the facts found by the trial court, the plaintiff has no right of action. The structure now in course of erection by the defendant is upon its own property and within the pier line established by law. It interferes with no right of the plaintiff, and if the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is sound, the city, by the mere extension of its streets, will deprive the owners of the upland' and water front of the enjoyment and improvement of their own premises. A right to do this should be made very plain be
p. 209fore a court of equity can be induced to interfere. There is an absence of any express power given to the plaintiff, and there is nothing in the statutes referred to (Laws of 1854, chap. 384, § 13, sub. 2; Laws of 1873, chap. 863, page 1300, § 13, sub. 4) from which it can be implied.
•The authority there conferred is, “ to regulate wharves and piers owned by the city ” or matters connected therewith, or business thereon. These things are not in question. The object of the action is to exclude the defendant from its own property. No good reason has been shown for such interference, and the court below properly refused its aid.
The judgment should be affirmed.
All concur. *
Judgment affirmed.