p. 33Helen L. Hall, Respondent, v. John P. Brooks, Clark Brooks, Appellant.Headnote
No authority is given by the Code of Civil Procedure to order, on motion of the attaching creditor, a person holding property of one, against whom an attachment has been issued, to deliver it to the sheriff.An action or proceeding to reduce such property to the possession of the sheriff must be instituted by him in his name or in that of the debtor.
Where, however, such an order had been granted “ with costs ” and had been obeyed by the person holding the property, who claimed no interest therein, held, that he was not aggrieved by the order, and could not sustain an appeal therefrom, save so far as it imposed costs upon him.
Hall v. Brooks ( 25 Hun, 577 ), reversed.
(Argued February 28, 1882;Appeal by Clark Brooks from an order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department at the December term, 1881, which reversed an order of Special Term, denying a motion on the part of plaintiff that said Clark Brooks be required to deliver to the sheriff of the city and county of Hew York certain property belonging to the defendant in this action, against whom an attachment had been issued herein. (Reported below, 25 Him, 577.)
The order of the General Term directed the delivery of the property and that said Brooks pay personally plaintiffs costs and disbursements. In compliance with the order of General Term, Brooks delivered up the property.
Henry W. Bookstamer for appellant.
The order appealed from is without authority in law. (Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 649,
p. 35of the remedies thus provided relate to or support a motion or proceeding of this nature. (Skinner v. Stuart, 15 Abb. Pr. 301 ; 24 How. Pr. 489 ; O'Brien v. Mechs. & Trad. F. Ins. Co., 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 314, note; O'Brien v. Glenville Woolen Co., 50 N. Y. 128 ; Thurber v. Blanck, id. 80 ; Mech., etc., B’k v. Dakin, 51 id. 519.) The fact that under compulsion, and under protest, Hr. Brooks complied with the imperative order of the court, does not have the effect of destroying his right of appeal. (Matter of N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. v. Armstrong, 60 N. Y. 116 ; Barker v. White, 58 id. 204 ; Higbie v. Westlake, 14 id. 281.)Henry G. Atwater for respondent.
The order is not appeal-able, because Clark Brooks is not a party aggrieved, under section 1294 of the Code. (Steele v. White, 2 Paige, 478; Cuyler v. Moreland, 6 id. 273; Hone v. VanSchaick, 7 id. 222; Card v. Bird, 10 id. 426; Kelly v. Israel, 11 id. 152; Idley v. Bowen, 11 Wend. 223 ; Allegheny Bank Appeal, 48 Penn. St. 328 ; Arrowsmith v. Rappelye, 19 La. Ann. 327 ; Elcon v. Lancasterian School, etc., 3 Patton, Jr., & Heath [Va.], 69.) The order of the General Term is sustainable under section 655 of the Hew Code of Civil Procedure. (Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill, 215 ; White v. Madison, 26 N. Y. 126 ; U. S. v. Graff, 67 Barb. 304 .)The only authority to make the order appealed from is such as can be found in section 655 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that in executing an attachment, the sheriff may maintain an action or special proceeding in his own name or in the name of the defendant, to reduce to his actual possession an article of personal property capable of manual delivery, but of which he has been unable to obtain possession.
Ho authority is given to order a person holding property of the attached debtor to deliver it to the sheriff, on motion of the attaching creditor. The action or proceeding for that purpose must be instituted by the sheriff, either in his own name or that of the debtor.
p. 36The order appealed from was not made in any action or proceeding instituted by the sheriff, but was made in the action in which the attachment was issued, and on motion of the attorney for the plaintiff in that action. The sheriff does not appear to have been a party to the proceeding. For this reason the order was irregular and unauthorized. The respondent, however, moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground • that the appellant has obeyed the order and delivered the property to the sheriff, and this fact is proved by affidavit and conceded, though it is denied that such obedience was voluntary.
If the appellant had any interest in the property delivered up, which would entitle him to restitution upon a reversal of the order, we should sustain his appeal. But he does not claim any such interest, and, on the contrary, states in his affidavit that he has no personal interest whatever in any of the proceedings. He has not, therefore, been aggrieved by the order except in so far as it adjudges costs against him. That part of the order should be reversed and the appeal as to the residue dismissed, without costs in this court to either party.
All concur, except Tract, J., absent.
Ordered accordingly.