Lord Management Corp. v. Weaver — 11 N.Y.2d 180

Majority

p. 180

In the Matter of Lord Management Corp., Respondent, v. Robert C. Weaver, as State Rent Administrator, Appellant.

Argued February 20, 1962;

decided April 5, 1962.

p. 181

Emory Gardiner, Harold Zucker and Jacob Ward for appellant.

Literal reading of the decontrol proviso should not prevail to thwart the clear legislative intent to grant decontrol only for an increase in the housing stock. (Matter of Capone v. Weaver, 6 N Y 2d 307 ; Woods v. MacNeil Bros. Co., 80 F. Supp. 920 ; Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U. S. 410 ; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 ; Bowles v. Mannie & Co., 155 F. 2d 129 , 329 U. S. 736 ; Matter of Fiesta Realty Corp. v. McGoldrick, 284 App. Div. 551 , 308 N. Y. 869 ; Matter of Chatlos v. McGoldrick, 302 N. Y. 380 ; Matter of Sipal Realty Corp. [Dankers], 8 N Y 2d 319 ; Bohn v. 434 East 59th St., 282 App. Div. 573 ; Matter of Ellison v. Abrams, 2 A D 2d 965 , 3 A D 2d 661 , 2 N Y 2d 710 ; Matter of Ellison v. Weaver, 4 A D 2d 858 ; Billings v. Freewalt Realty Corp., 6 A D 2d 1039 ; Matter of Eckert v. McGoldrick, 284 App. Div. 810 .)

Joseph Greenberg for respondent.

The determination of the Appellate Division is justified by the statute which is clear and unambiguous. (Matter of Capone v. Weaver, 6 N Y 2d 307 ; Matter of Lo Presti v. McGoldrick, 204 Misc. 956 , 284 App. Div. 827 .)

It appears without dispute that prior to February 1, 1947, and for approximately one year and eight months thereafter, the subject premises had been residential and as such were subject to rent control. During the period October 1, 1948 to January 31,1957 when they were leased for a nonhousing use (a physician’s office)—even though done without objection — their status as a housing accommodation was not destroyed, but merely suspended. The change back from nonhousing to housing, at the end of the nonhousing lease period, created no new housing accommodation in the sense contemplated by the statute but merely had the effect of restoring the space to its original status. Such change back added nothing to the numerical level of housing as it existed on February 1,1947. The mere removal and later reinstallation of items of kitchen equipment were not such a substantial structural alteration or remodeling as to constitute a change in character of the space. Under such

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circumstances it may not be said that the subject premises were effectively decontrolled within the meaning of the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law (§ 2, subd: 2, par. [g]) and the State Rent and Eviction Regulations (§ 9, subd. 4).

The order should be reversed and the petition dismissed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division.

Chief Judge Desmond and Judges Fuld, Fboessel, Van Voorhis, Burke and Foster concur.

Order reversed, etc.

Cases cited

Capone v. Weaver 6 N Y 2d 307 N.Y. 1959-07-08 p. 181
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. 325 U. S. 410 SCOTUS 1945-06-04 p. 181
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 323 U. S. 134 SCOTUS 1944-12-04 p. 181
Mannie & Co. v. Bowles 329 U. S. 736 SCOTUS 1946-10-14 p. 181
Fiesta Realty Corp. v. McGoldrick 308 N. Y. 869 N.Y. 1955-03-11 p. 181
Chatlos v. McGoldrick 302 N. Y. 380 N.Y. 1951-04-12 p. 181
In re Sipal Realty Corp. 8 N Y 2d 319 N.Y. 1960-10-21 p. 181
Tex McCrary, Inc. v. Itkin Affrime Becker Design Associates, Inc. 3 A D 2d 661 N.Y. App. Div. 1957-01-29 p. 181
Lo Presti v. McGoldrick 204 Misc. 956 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953-11-23 p. 181