Majority
It is true that the provision of paragraph 15 (a) of the stockholders’ agreement rendering arbitrable “ the justness of a discharge ” of an employee stockholder does not literally encompass the discharge of appellant’s husband, she, and not he, being the stockholder. However, the fact of his employment “ for a period of at least two years ” preceding the death of appellant’s father was necessary to constitute petitioner “ a ‘ qualifying child ’ of a stockholder ”, and thus to enable her to purchase her father’s stock and become a party to the agreement; and her husband’s status seems so inextricably bound up with her status under paragraph 6 (b) (i) as to support her claim of an arbitrable controversy within the four corners of the agreement. This interdependency of status is
In deciding, as we do, that there is here presented an arbitrable issue, we do not mean to suggest the the term “ stockholder ” in paragraph 15 (a) includes a stockholder’s husband so that the appellant may submit to arbitration the issue as to " the justness of [the husband’s] discharge ”. All we are deciding is that such a question of interpretation is for the arbitrator.
The order of the Appellate Division should, to the extent appealed from, be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted
Chief Judge Fuld and Judges Burke, Scileppi, Bergan, Breitel, Jasen and Gibson concur in Per Curiam opinion.
Order reversed, with costs, and matter remitted to Supreme Court, New York County, for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein.
Cases cited
- In re Arbitration between Exercycle Corp. & Maratta 9 N Y 2d 329 p. 38
- Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Griesenbeck 28 A D 2d 99 p. 38
- Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Griesenbeck 21 N Y 2d 688 p. 38