Majority
Memorandum. The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs and disbursements awarded to the appellants. In view of the highly unusual procedural posture in which this appeal comes to us, particularly the fact that the appellants may have been misled by respondent’s failure clearly
With respect to the merits of the appeal, we note that appellants ’ notice of claim was untimely served 92 days after the accident. (General Municipal Law, § 50-e; Pugh v. Board of Educ., 38 A D 2d 619 , affd. 30 N Y 2d 968 .) Belief from late filing is only available where a motion for such relief is made within one year after the happening of the event and prior to commencement of an action on the claim. (General Municipal Law, § 50-e, subd. 5.) Here, neither the one-year limitation nor the requirement that the motion' be made pretrial was observed and, accordingly, relief from late filing was unavailable. Nor may an accident report filed with the respondent by the school principal on the day after the accident or a letter of representation filed by appellants’ attorney with respondent’s insurance carrier one week thereafter, be treated as a defective or irregular notice of claim under the saving provisions of subdivision 6 of section 50-e. That subdivision deals only with inconsequential defects or irregularities, not pertaining to the manner or time of service, in otherwise sound notices of claim. The fact remains that these documents were not intended to be a notice of claim in which curable good faith mistakes or omissions were made. Moreover, it is not at all clear that they were served on the proper parties. (§ 50-e, subd. 3.) Finally, we agree with the Appellate Division that there being no factual basis in the record to find an estoppel, it was an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial on that issue.
In concluding, we cannot but remark that in this case the harshness of section 50-e is once again laid bare. But where the Legislature has decreed that, as a prerequisite to sue, a particular form of notice shall be conveyed with particular details to particular public officers, the courts lack the power to substitute something else. The need for legislative reconsideration of the harsher aspects of section 50-e is apparent (see Matter of Murray v. City of New York, 30 N Y 2d 113 , 120, 121 [Breitbl, J., concurring]) in order that a more equitable balance may be
Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Rabin and Stevens concur in the memorandum.
Order affirmed, etc.
Cases cited
- Soules v. City of Rochester 10 A D 2d 362 p. 141
- Robinson v. Board of Education of Galway Central School District No. 1 1 Misc 2d 634 p. 141
- Greguski v. Town On Oyster Bay 19 Misc 2d 763 p. 141
- Teresta v. City of New York 304 N. Y. 440 p. 141
- Harwood v. City of Hornell 41 Misc 2d 706 p. 141
- Claim of Kaiser v. Town of Salina 20 A D 2d 312 p. 141
- Pugh v. Board of Education Central District No. 1-Fayetteville-Manlius School District 30 N Y 2d 968 p. 141, p. 142
- Young v. Board of Education of Union Free School District Eight 193 Misc. 216 p. 141
- Rosenberg v. City of New York 309 N. Y. 304 p. 141
- Natoli v. Board of Education 303 N. Y. 646 p. 141
- Melisi ex rel. Melisi v. Central School District No. 1 25 A D 2d 54 p. 141
- Brown v. Board of Trustees 303 N. Y. 484 p. 141
- Murray v. City of New York 30 N Y 2d 113 at 120, 121 p. 142