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Riley v. County of Monroe

43 N.Y.2d 144 Court N.Y. Decision date 1977-11-21 English

Delivered by Gabrielli, J.

Contents

Majority

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Donald J. Riley, Individually and on Behalf of All Other People Similarly Situated, et al., Appellants, v County of Monroe et al., Respondents.
Argued October 11, 1977;
decided November 21, 1977
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POINTS OF COUNSEL
J. William Ernstrom and Paul J. Yesawich, III, for appellants.
I. Monroe County Resolution No. 380 of 1974 denies appellants the equal protection of the laws because even if the county can advance a rational basis for the discrimination, less objectionable alternatives were available and not em
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ployed. (Alevy v Downstate Med. Center of State of N. Y., 39 NY2d 326 ; Matter of Malpica-Orsini, 36 NY2d 568 ; Stanton v Stanton, 421 US 7 ; Jimenez v Weinberger, 417 US 628 ; Reed v Reed, 404 US 71 ; Matter of Stoltz v Water Power & Control Comm, of Conservation Dept, of State of N. Y., 258 App Div 440 ; Matter of Town Bd. of Town of Onondaga v County of Onondaga, 82 Misc 2d 163 ; Matter of Long Is. R. R. Co. v Hylan, 240 NY 199 ; Stuart v Palmer, 74 NY 183 .) II. The decision of the court below should be reversed because there are, at the very least, issues of fact as to whether respondents have a county-wide plan for the collection and disposal of solid waste, and whether respondents have acted with reasonable speed in implementing such a plan. (Matter of Long Is. R. R. Co. v Hylan, 240 NY 199 .) III. Appellant Town of Greece has standing to sue in this matter because it has a personal stake in this litigation and has alleged an injury in fact. (Andraka v Town of Pompey, 1 AD2d 427 ; Data Processing Serv. v Camp, 397 US 150 ; Baker v Carr, 369 US 186 .)
John D. Doyle and William J. Stevens for respondents.
I. The court below correctly dismissed appellants’ complaint based upon respondents’ motion for summary judgment. (Talcott v City of Buffalo, 125 NY 280 ; Ziegler v Chapin, 126 NY 342 ; Dunning v County of Orange, 139 App Div 249 ; McBride v Ashley, 91 Misc 585 , 174 App Div 650 ; Kaskel v Impellitteri, 306 NY 73 , 347 US 934 ; Matter of Cruger, 84 NY 619 ; Kittinger v Buffalo Traction Co., 160 NY 377 ; Altschul v Ludwig, 216 NY 459 ; Stahl Soap Corp. v City of New York, 5 NY2d 200 ; Sengelaub v Town of Smithtown, 29 Misc 2d 655 .) II. Resolutions No. 512 of 1970 and No. 380 of 1974 are not inconsistent with article 5-A of the County Law. (Public Serv. Comm, of State of N. Y, Second Dist. v New York Cent. R. R. Co., 193 App Div 615 ; Chamberlain v Chamberlain, 43 NY 424 ; Matter of Schulz v Cermak, 1 Misc 2d 1063 ; Village of Croton-on-Hudson v County of Westchester, 38 AD2d 979 , 30 NY2d 959 ; People v Bouton, 71 Misc 2d 1095 ; Matter of West, 175 Misc 1044 ; Blaine Personnel v Lee Organization, 76 Misc 2d 110 .) III. The Legislature’s action under Resolution No. 380 of 1974 is not an abuse of legislative discretion nor an abridgement of appellants’ constitutional rights. (People v McNair, 46 AD2d 476 , 37 NY2d 100 ; McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420 ; Garcia v Pan Amer. Airways, 183 Misc 258 , 269 App Div 287 , 295 NY 852 , 329 US 741 ; People v Crane, 214 NY 154 , 239 US 195 ; Zorach v Clauson, 303 NY 161 , 343 US 306 ; Matter of
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Malpica-Orsini, 36 NY2d 568 ; Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41 ; Alevy v Downstate Med. Center of State of N. Y, 39 NY2d 326 ; Matter of Taylor v Sise, 33 NY2d 357 ; Nebbia v New York, 291 US 502 .) IV. Appellant, Town of Greece, lacks standing to sue because its property rights are not directly or specifically affected. (Wein v City of New York, 47 AD2d 367 , 36 NY2d 610 ; Matter of Haber v Board of Estimate of City of N. Y, 33 AD2d 571 ; Brechner v Incorporated Vil. of Lake Success, 25 Misc 2d 920 , 14 AD2d 567 ; Marcus v Village of Mamaroneck, 283 NY 325 ; Berkey v Downing, 68 Misc 2d 595 , 39 AD2d 1008 .)

OPINION OF THE COURT

Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Appellate Division which modified an order of Special Term whose order denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint and also denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division modified by granting respondents’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed appellants’ complaint. We affirm on the grounds that the challenged proceedings and steps taken by the county constitute a valid exercise of the governmental authority granted the county by section 226-b of the County Law and do not constitute a violation of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by section 11 of article I of the New York State Constitution, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Appellants commenced this action to challenge respondents’ use of county-wide real property tax revenues to build and operate a sanitary landfill for the exclusive use of the residents of the northeast quadrant of the County of Monroe. Appellants’ complaint alleges three causes of action: the first two, asserted on behalf of appellant Riley and other taxpayers similarly situated pursuant to section 51 of the General Municipal Law, allege that the use of county funds in such a manner and for such a purpose constitutes improper and illegal waste of public funds. The third cause of action, asserted solely on behalf of appellant Town of Greece, alleges that respondents’ use of county funds to support a limited access landfill, while refusing to use county funds to finánce the operations of its own town landfill, is a denial of the equal protection of the law.

Summary judgment was properly granted the respon

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dents with respect to all three causes of action. We hold that the respondents’ actions were authorized by section 226-b of the County Law, and are thus not subject to attack via section 51 of the General Municipal Law (cf. Stahl Soap Corp. v City of New York, 5 NY2d 200 ). Prior to the enactment of section 226-b, the construction and financing of sanitary landfills by counties was permitted only if the project complied with the requirements of article 5-A of the County Law, authorizing the creation and establishment of special districts. A facility authorized under article 5-A could only be funded by the imposition of a special tax on the area which was in fact served by the facility. Under such a provision, the use of general county revenues to finance a limited access landfill would not have been authorized.

In .1970, however, the Legislature enacted section 226-b of the County Law, which authorizes a county to "appropriate and expend such sums as it may deem proper to provide for the collection and disposition of solid wastes in such county”.[1] This section, which was a legislative response to the growing problem of solid waste disposal, does not contain, nor is it confined by, the strictures, restrictions, and limitations imposed upon a project authorized only by article 5-A. Absent these limitations, there is no requirement that the county

1 Section 226-b of the County Law provides as follows: "1. The legislative body of any county may appropriate and expend such sums as it may deem proper to provide for the collection and disposition of solid wastes in such county and for that purpose may acquire, construct, operate and maintain solid waste disposal sites or plants, acquire the necessary lands therefor, and purchase, operate and maintain all necessary appliances appurtenant thereto, including such vehicles as may be required for such purposes. In selecting a location for any solid waste disposal site, plant or facility the county legislative body shall take into consideration the present and any proposed land use character of the area of any proposed location and the zoning requlations, if any, applicable to such area. "2. The legislative body of any county may, by resolution, establish schedules of rates or fees to be charged for any solid waste collection and disposal facilities or services provided pursuant to this section, which rates or fees may be collected and unpaid rates and fees enforced and collected in the same manner as provided in section two hundred sixty-six of this chapter. "3. The term 'solid waste’ shall mean all putrescible and nonputrescible solid wastes, including garbage, rubbish, ashes, incinerator residue, street cleanings, dead animals, demolition and construction debris, automotive bodies, offal and solid commercial and industrial wastes. "4. A county acting within its boundaries pursuant to this section shall be deemed to be acting in its governmental capacity. Nothing herein contained shall prevent a county from entering into a municipal cooperation agreement pursuant to article five-G of the general municipal law.”

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establish the special districts envisioned by article 5-A, and, of course, there is nothing to prevent a county from exercising its police powers to attack the problem of waste disposal, a problem which certainly affects the health and welfare of its citizens, through county-wide financing of solid waste disposal facilities. Indeed, section 226-b was specifically intended to "provide for the collection and disposition of solid wastes as a county function” (Governor’s Memorandum, McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, 1970, p 3123).

Appellants would have us read into section 226-b a proviso that it only authorizes the financing and construction of county-wide facilities. No such limitation is to be found in the language of the statute, and we may not create such a restriction. Had the Legislature wished to impose such a limitation, or to subject section 226-b to article 5-A, it could easily have done so. It has instead chosen not to do so, and this court will not usurp that responsibility and obligation which reposes solely with the Legislature.

The third cause of action, founded on the town’s equal protection arguments, can be easily disposed of. It should first be noted that this challenge goes to the legislative activities of the Monroe County Legislature, and that legislative actions carry with them a strong presumption of validity (see, e.g., Matter of Malpica-Orsini, 36 NY2d 568 , 570). Since neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved herein, a strict scrutiny test is not applicable. Thus, since appellants have not produced any cogent reason for applying such a test or, as advanced by appellants, the middle tier scrutiny we developed in Alevy v Downstate Med. Center of State of N. Y. ( 39 NY2d 326 ), the traditional rational basis test is appropriate. Applying that standard, it is evident that respondents’ activities do not violate the equal protection guarantee. The county has indicated in an unopposed affidavit that it is developing a county-wide plan for waste disposal. Since it faced a near crisis situation in the northeast sector of the county, it determined to take "emergency” action, and constructed a limited capacity, limited access landfill in that part of the county. It appears that it is now planning to construct similar facilities in the rest of the county. To require respondents not to construct any facilities until it can construct them all, would fly in the face of reason. Thus,

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summary judgment was properly granted with respect to the third cause of action.[2]

In view of our holding, we do not reach the respondents’ challenge to the town’s standing to sue. The order appealed from should be affirmed.

Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Cooke concur.

Order affirmed, with costs.

2 It should be noted, of course, that the town does not challenge the constitutionality of any State statute or action, but merely the manner in which the county applies the statute to a claimed "preferred” segment of the county, using general county funds. In such circumstance the town is not confounded by the general rule that, absent certain exceptional situtations, a subdivision of the State may not challenge State activities upon constitutional grounds (cf. Town of Black Brook v State of New York, 41 NY2d 486 , 488; Matter of Jeter v Ellenville Cent. School Disk, 41 NY2d 283 , 287; Black Riv. Regulating Disk v Adirondack League Club, 307 NY 475 , 487-489, app dsmd, 351 US 922 ).

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