Majority
OPINION OF THE COURT
In People v Magri ( 3 NY2d 562 ), we recognized the general reliability of stationary traffic radar as an instrument for measuring the speed of a moving vehicle, and held such radar evidence admissible without the need for expert testimony explaining the underlying scientific principles of traffic radar. Today, we are called upon to decide whether such expert testimony is a prerequisite to the admissibility of radar evidence against defendant, where the evidence was derived from a radar device that was moving at the time it recorded the speed of defendant’s vehicle. Notwithstanding that the accuracy of "moving” radar implicates several variables not relevant to the accuracy of stationary radar, we conclude that such evidence is admissible without the need for expert testimony explaining the scientific principles on which it is founded.
Defendant was charged in a Simplified Traffic Information with operating his vehicle at 71 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (b). The velocity of defendant’s automobile was recorded by a moving radar device mounted on a patrol vehicle that was approaching defendant from the opposite direction on Route 17 in the Town of Randolph. The radar device at issue — a Kustom Signals KR-10 SP — is an advanced traffic radar system capable of operating either from a stationary patrol vehicle or from one that is moving.
The record establishes that on the date in question, the radar was in "moving” mode, and was being operated by J. R. Hall, Chief of Police for the Town of Randolph. After visually estimating defendant’s speed at 70 miles per hour, Chief Hall switched on the radar unit which recorded defendant’s speed at 71 miles per hour, thus confirming Hall’s visual estimate. The trial evidence demonstrates that the radar unit had been laboratory tested for proper calibration and that Hall had tested the unit before and after his tour of duty, using both internal and external calibration methods to ensure that the
Randolph Town Court rejected defendant’s contention, admitted the radar evidence, and convicted defendant of speeding. County Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, and leave to appeal was granted by a Judge of this court. On this appeal, defendant repeats his contention that moving radar evidence is inadmissible at trial unless expert testimony explaining the underlying principles of such radar is received. He argues further that the evidence is, in any event, legally insufficient to sustain his speeding conviction. We disagree and, for the reasons that follow, affirm the conviction.
This court has previously recognized the basic validity of the Doppler Principle — the scientific principle underlying all traffic radar. Thus, in People v Magri ( 3 NY2d 562 , supra), we held that "it will no longer be necessary to require expert testimony in each case as to the nature, function or scientific principles underlying” stationary traffic radar (People v Magri, supra, at 566 ). In so holding, we noted that the use of radar for speed detection was but one of a variety of scientific methods routinely accepted in our courts for their general reliability, including "reproductions by photography * * * X rays, electroencephalograms, electrocardiograms, speedometer readings, time by watches and clocks, identity by fingerprinting, and ballistic evidence” (People v Magri, supra, at 566 ).
Like stationary traffic radar, moving radar is also based upon the Doppler Principle. That principle, as explained in the "Trainee Instructional Manual” prepared by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration as part of its "Basic Training Program in RADAR Speed Measurement”, describes
1 The external calibration method used by Chief Hall involves placing a vibrating tuning fork near the radar unit’s antenna while observing the speed registered by the radar. The tuning fork is calibrated to oscillate at a frequency corresponding to a particular speed, thus permitting verification of the radar unit’s accuracy. The internal calibration method relies on an integral oscillator contained within the radar unit that is preset to display a certain speed when activated (see generally, Note, Radar Speed Detection: Homing in on New Evidentiary Problems, 48 Fordham L Rev 1138 , 1153 [1980]).
In each case, traffic radar units can measure the resulting change in frequency, and convert that frequency change into a speed measurement (see, e.g., People v Magri, 3 NY2d, at 565 , supra [in stationary radar case, radar unit "measures the difference in the frequencies of the transmitted wave and the received wave” which is then "translated into miles per hour”]). In the case of moving radar, two speed measurements are taken — that of the target vehicle in relation to the patrol vehicle and that of the patrol vehicle in relation to the surrounding terrain. The moving radar unit computes the difference between the frequency change produced by the approaching target vehicle and the typically lesser frequency change produced by the lower relative speed of the patrol vehicle, and then translates this differential into a speed measurement for the target vehicle (see, NHTSA Manual, at 3-10; Note, Radar Speed Detection, op. cit., 48 Fordham L Rev, at 1142). We conclude, therefore, that insofar as the underlying scientific principles of moving and stationary radar are the same, evidence derived from either should be admissible without the need for expert testimony. Although moving radar functions somewhat differently in that it must compensate for the speed of the patrol vehicle, it does not rely on any new technical principles that require justification. This being the case, evidence of speeding obtained by means of moving radar generally will be admissible and "may be sufficient in [itself] if there be reasonable proof of [its] accuracy” (People v
It is generally recognized, however, that because moving radar must measure the speed of the patrol vehicle in addition to that of the target vehicle, there is greater opportunity for error when it is used. Such error may result from distortion of the radar signal resulting in an artificially low speed reading for the patrol vehicle which, in turn, may cause an artificially high speed reading for the target vehicle (see, NHTSA Manual, at 3-11, 3-12; Note, Radar Speed Detection, op. cit., 48 Fordham L Rev, at 1142-1143; Goodson, Technical Shortcomings of Doppler Traffic Radar, 30 J Forensic Sciences 1186 [1985]).[2] Moreover, in heavy traffic, moving radar may make it more difficult to correctly identify the target vehicle (see, Radar Speed Detection, op. cit., 48 Fordham L Rev, at 1146). Since the potential for error is greater, the prosecution will bear a greater burden of proof in demonstrating the accuracy of the particular radar unit involved. Thus, in addition to establishing that the moving radar was in proper working condition and that it was operated correctly by one who was qualified and experienced in the operation of traffic radar, the evidence should show that the police officer independently verified the speed of the patrol vehicle (e.g., by comparing the speed registered by the radar unit with the speed indicated by the patrol vehicle speedometer), and that the radar was used in an area posing a minimal risk of misidentification or distortion (i.e., from heavy traffic, large trucks or large roadside objects such as billboards) (see, NHTSA Manual, at 3-11, 3-12; Note, Radar Speed Detection, op. cit., 48 Fordham L Rev, at 1161; see also, State v Hanson, 85 Wis 2d 233 , 245, 270 NW2d 212 [establishing foundation requirements for the admissibility of moving radar evidence in Wisconsin]).
In the instant case, the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction of speeding. The record clearly establishes that the KR-10 SP moving radar unit had been correctly calibrated; that Chief Hall was
2 This type of error can sometimes occur if a large stationary roadside object, such as a billboard or building, distorts the signal received by the radar unit. Similar errors can result if the patrol vehicle passes, or is passed, on the road by other vehicles, or if the patrol vehicle does not maintain a constant velocity (see, Note, Radar Speed Detection: Homing in on New Evidentiary Problems, 48 Fordham L Rev 1138 , 1143; Goodson, Technical Shortcomings of Doppler Traffic Radar, 30 J Forensic Sciences 1186 [1985]).
Accordingly, the order of the County Court should be affirmed.
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur.
Order affirmed.
3 Chief Hall had been on the town’s police force 15 years and was certified as a Doppler Traffic Radar Operator. He had received training on the KR-10 SP radar device and was also expert at estimating the speed of moving vehicles from either a moving or standing patrol vehicle.
Cases cited
- People v. Magri 3 NY2d 562 p. 482, p. 483, p. 484, p. 485, p. 488
- Cowley v. People 83 NY 464 p. 482
- People v. Bellizzi 108 Misc 2d 209 p. 482, p. 483
- People v. Friend 117 Misc 2d 392 p. 482, p. 483
- People v. Conlon 109 Misc 2d 729 p. 482
- People v. Heyser 2 NY2d 390 at 393 p. 482, p. 483, p. 487, p. 488
- People v. Olsen 22 NY2d 230 p. 483, p. 488
- People v. Hines 57 App Div 419 p. 483
- People v. Mason 307 NY 570 p. 483
- People v. White 56 NY2d 110 p. 483
- People v. Saalfield 14 NY2d 915 p. 483
- People v. Eldridge 31 NY2d 820 p. 483
- Bland v. United States 412 US 909 p. 483
- People v. Wilkins 281 NY 224 p. 483
- People v. Giles 152 NY 136 p. 483
- Griffin v. Illinois 351 US 12 p. 483, p. 484
- Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms & Paroles 357 US 214 p. 483
- Draper v. Washington 372 US 487 p. 483
- Evitts v. Lucey 469 US 387 p. 483
- People v. Rivera 39 NY2d 519 p. 483
- People v. Dusing 5 NY2d 126 at 128 p. 483, p. 487, p. 488
- People v. Lynch 61 Misc 2d 117 p. 483
- People v. Stephens 52 Misc 2d 1070 p. 483
- People v. Higley 55 Misc 2d 460 p. 483
- People v. Maniscalco 94 Misc 2d 915 p. 483
- Lahey v. Kelly 71 NY2d 135 p. 483
- People v. Middleton 54 NY2d 42 p. 483
- McKane v. Durston 153 US 684 p. 483
- People v. Cousart 58 NY2d 62 p. 483
- People v. Dimmie 15 NY2d 578 p. 483
- People v. Omans 306 NY 375 p. 483
- Lindsey v. Normet 405 US 56 p. 484
- In re Mitchell 40 NY2d 153 p. 484
- Bearden v. Georgia 461 US 660 p. 484
- People v. Whidden 51 NY2d 457 p. 484
- McGowan v. Maryland 366 US 420 p. 484
- People v. Marsellus 2 NY2d 653 at 655 p. 487