Majority
OPINION OF THE COURT
Claimant obtained a judgment in Nassau County and filed a copy of the judgment with the County Clerk in Bronx County, where the judgment debtor owned real property. The property, however, was subsequently sold free of the judgment because the Clerk had negligently failed to record it. When the claimant discovered the negligence, it applied to the Court of Claims to file a late notice of claim against the State. The motion was granted as was the claimant’s later motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed and we granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal.
The State urges that it should not have been held liable for the Clerk’s negligence because the Clerk was not acting as a State officer when he accepted the judgment for filing.
The State urges that the Clerk was not acting as a clerk of the court when he accepted the judgment for filing. It contends that at this stage the judicial process was complete and the filing of the judgment involved a purely general duty akin to filing a lien or mortgage. This is too narrow a view of the Clerk’s role in the judicial system. The filing of a notice of pendency is part of the judicial process, and the Clerk acts as a State officer in that respect, although the filing may occur before any suit has been commenced (Ashland Equities Co. v Clerk of N. Y County, supra). The Clerk also acts as an officer of the court when expunging a judgment which was previously filed (Haskins v State of New York, 145 AD2d 915 ). Similarly, filing a judgment is part of the continuing judicial process. As the Court of Claims noted in this case: "It is the very culmination of the law suit and the mechanism through which recovery of the judgment may be obtained.” The fact that the judgment was obtained in the Nassau County Supreme Court and filed with the clerk of the court in Bronx County is not significant. Under the Unified Court System they are but separate parts of a single State-wide Supreme Court (Siegel, NY Prac § 12).
Alternatively, the State argues that the Clerk’s status as a State or local officer with respect to liability for a particular act should depend upon the fees allowed in CPLR 8020 ("County clerks as clerks of court”) and CPLR 8021 ("County clerks other than as clerks of court”). Following this approach,
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur in Per Curiam opinion.
Order affirmed, with costs.
Cases cited
- Olmsted v. Meahl 219 NY 270 p. 509
- Durante v. Evans 94 AD2d 141 p. 509
- Durante v. Evans 62 NY2d 719 p. 509
- Ashland Equities Co. v. Clerk 110 AD2d 60 p. 509