Majority
OPINION OF THE COURT
The issue presented is whether charges in a local criminal court may be prosecuted by a sufficient long-form information after a prior simplified information, charging the same offenses, has been dismissed for failure to supply the supporting depositions required by CPL 100.25 (2).
Defendant was charged by simplified traffic information with driving while intoxicated and various other traffic infractions. At arraignment she demanded that the People supply supporting depositions and when they failed to do so, the trial court granted her motion to dismiss the information (see, CPL 100.40 [2]; 170.30 [1] [a]; 170.35 [1] [a]). On the same day the People served and filed a long-form information executed by the arresting officer and charging the same offenses. Defendant orally moved to dismiss the new information, asserting that the charges were barred by the previous dismissal. Her
The simplified information is a statutory creation designed to provide an uncomplicated form for handling the large volume of traffic infractions and petty offenses for which it is principally used. It need not provide on its face reasonable cause to believe defendant has committed the offense (see, People v Key, 45 NY2d 111 , 115-116; see also, People v Boback, 23 NY2d 189 ). For purposes of this appeal, it may be noted that a simplified traffic information is sufficient if it complies with the form required by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 207; 15 NYCRR part 91).
Because a simplified information provides only limited information, a defendant arraigned upon a charge contained in such an instrument may request, and is entitled as of right, to a supporting deposition by the complainant, police officer or public servant. If the defendant makes no request, the right to a supporting deposition is waived and prosecution may proceed on the original instrument. If a timely request for a supporting deposition is made, the failure to supply one renders the simplified information insufficient on its face (CPL 100.40 [2]) and subjects it to dismissal upon motion (CPL 170.35 [1] [a]; 170.30 [1] [a]).
The short answer to whether prosecution can be renewed on a facially sufficient information following such a dismissal is that it may because the Criminal Procedure Law does not prohibit it (see, Bellacosa, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 170.30, at 65; Preiser, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 100.25, 1991 Cum Ann Pocket Part, at 13; Pitler, New York Criminal Practice under the CPL § 8.16, at 411). Moreover, the history on the subject makes it clear that the Legislature did not intend to foreclose reprosecution of nonfelony charges when the information is dismissed for legal insufficiency.
At common law a prosecutor was not barred from resubmitting charges against a defendant; the only limitation on repeated prosecution was the constitutional protection against
The Legislature undoubtedly was aware of prior restraints on reprosecution when it enacted the Criminal Procedure Law because it expressly addressed dismissals based on legal insufficiency with respect to indictments in section 210.20 (4) (see, People v Osgood, 52 NY2d 37 , 45, n 2 [comparing, CPL 210.20 (4), with 170.30 (1) (a)]). Nevertheless, it failed to include a similar bar for informations dismissed on those same grounds pursuant to CPL 170.30 (1) (a). We conclude, therefore, that the different treatment accorded indictments and informations in the statute manifests the Legislature’s intention to permit reprosecution for nonfelony charges when the information' is dismissed for legal insufficiency (see, Pajak v Pajak, 56 NY2d 394 , 397, citing McKinney’s Cons Law of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 74; Pitler, New York Criminal Practice under the CPL § 8.16, at 411).
Nor is double jeopardy a bar to the refiling of the charges against defendant since "reprosecution is permitted whenever a dismissal has been granted on motion by defendant, so long as the dismissal does not constitute an adjudication on the facts going to guilt or innocence.” (See, People v
Accordingly, the order should be reversed and the judgment of the Stockton Town Court reinstated.
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Kaye, Alexander, Ti-tone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur.
Order reversed, etc.
Cases cited
- Pajak v. Pajak 56 NY2d 394 at 397 p. 103, p. 105
- People v. Douglass 60 NY2d 194 at 204 p. 103, p. 105
- Krum v. Hogan 69 Misc 2d 656 p. 103
- People v. Bell 95 Misc 2d 360 p. 103
- People v. Morning 102 Misc 2d 750 p. 103
- People v. Scerbo 91 Misc 2d 97 p. 103
- People v. Key 45 NY2d 111 at 115-116, at 117 p. 103, p. 104, p. 106
- People ex rel. North v. Skinner 305 NY 711 p. 103
- People v. Bock 77 Misc 2d 350 p. 103
- People v. Hust 74 Misc 2d 887 p. 103
- People v. De Feo 77 Misc 2d 523 p. 103
- People v. Zagorsky 73 Misc 2d 420 p. 103
- People v. Origlia 138 Misc 2d 286 p. 103
- People v. Gerloff 145 Misc 2d 683 p. 103
- People v. Boback 23 NY2d 189 p. 104
- People v. Cade 74 NY2d 410 at 414 p. 105
- People v. Wilkins 68 NY2d 269 at 273 p. 105
- People ex rel. Flinn v. Barr 259 NY 104 p. 105
- People v. Osgood 52 NY2d 37 at 45 p. 105