Brothers v. Florence

OPINION OF THE COURT

On September 4, 1996, the Governor signed into law a statute amending CPLR 214 (6) to shorten the limitations period in nonmedical malpractice claims to three years “regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” (CPLR 214 [6], as amended by L 1996, ch 623). The amendment was to “take effect immediately’ (L 1996, ch 623, § 2). In each of these appeals, the malpractice actions were brought

Brothers et al. v Florence involves a legal malpractice claim that accrued on August 24, 1992. The action was commenced on April 23, 1998 — nearly 20 months after the amendment’s effective date and five years and eight months after the cause of action accrued. Easton v Sankel et al., is also a legal malpractice action. Without further specificity, the courts below determined that the plaintiff’s claim accrued as of April of 1993. Plaintiff commenced the action on June 15, 1998, more than 21 months after the effective date of the new limitations period and over five years after the claim accrued. In Rachimi v Robinson Brog Leinwand Greene Genovese & Gluck et al., plaintiff commenced a legal malpractice action against defendants on July 28, 1997, more than 10 months after the amendment’s effective date and over four years after the cause of action accrued. Early v Rossback et al. involves a claim for malpractice in connection with defendants’ performance of real estate appraisals. The courts below found that the cause of action accrued January 19, 1994. Plaintiff did not commence the action until April 2, 1997, nearly seven months after the amendment’s effective date and over three years from accrual.

There is one potentially significant distinction between Early v Rossback et al. and the other three cases. In Early, the shortened limitations period did not immediately render the action time-barred. Rather, because that claim had accrued on January 19, 1994, the plaintiff still had until January 19, 1997— over four months after the amendment’s effective date — in which to commence the action under the shortened limitations period. Conversely, in the remaining three cases, plaintiffs’ causes of action would have been immediately time-barred as of September 4, 1996, under the new, three-year Statute of Limitations.

The first issue to be addressed is that raised by the appellants in Brothers, that the Legislature never intended that the amendment to CPLR 214 (6) should apply to bar claims which accrued prior to, but were not commenced until after, the effective date of the amendment. The key in determining the

Here, the Legislature failed to indicate expressly whether this statute was to apply only to those claims accruing after its enactment or to extend also to prior accrued claims. Several factors, relied upon in our precedents, convince us that it was the intention of the Legislature that the amendment was to apply to claims which had accrued before its effective date and, in that sense, have retroactive effect.

First, the law states that it is to “take effect immediately” (L 1996, ch 623, § 2). While this language is not alone determinative, it does “ ‘evince [ ] a sense of urgency’” (Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., supra, at 583 [quoting Becker v Huss Co., 43 NY2d 527 , 541]). Second, it is clear from the legislative history that the purpose behind the statute was to rewrite a judicial interpretation of the nonmedical malpractice Statute of Limitations and to “reaffirm” the original legislative intent for a universally applied three-year limitations period in all malpractice cases other than those brought against professional health care providers (see, Sponsor’s Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 623, at 6 [“The legislature * * * had originally expressed its intent in enacting the statute of limitations for actions for general malpractice in CPLR Section 214 (6) to be three years * * * (i)t is essential that Section 214 (6) of the CPLR be amended to reaffirm the legislative intent”]). That role of the new legislation suggests an intent that it should apply to claims that accrued before its effective date. “In an analysis of retroactive application, we have found it relevant when the legislative history reveals that the purpose of new legislation is to clarify what the law was always meant to say and do” (Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., supra, at 585 [citing Matter of OnBank & Trust Co., supra, 90 NY2d, at 731 ] [emphasis supplied]).

Third, the legislative history manifestly reveals a determination that six years was an unduly prolonged limitations period and required remediation. In support of the amendment, it was pointed out that the change would have the effect of reduc

Finally, the amendment was seen as necessary to remediate the impact of this Court’s decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assocs. ( 43 NY2d 389 ) and Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh ( 78 NY2d 700 ), where the Court held that nonmedical malpractice claims, when based upon a contract theory, were governed by the six-year limitations period applicable to contract actions (see, Legis Report No. 76-B, op. cit, Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 623, at 13). Thus, here, just as in Matter of OnBank, “[t]he remedial purpose of the amendment would be undermined if it were applied only prospectively” (Matter of OnBank & Trust Co., supra, 90 NY2d, at 731 ).

Therefore, we conclude that the Legislature intended that this amended limitations period should apply not only to causes of action accruing after its effective date but also to previously accrued claims not yet interposed by that date.

Next we address the constitutional challenge by three of the appellants, that application of the shortened limitations period to previously accrued causes of action constitutes a violation of Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. We reserve for later discussion the constitutional challenge raised by appellant in Early v Rossback et al., where four months still remained to bring suit under the new limitations period.

As previously noted, in Brothers, Easton and Rachimi, the application of the shortened limitations period would result in an immediate time bar as of the effective date of the amendment. A potential litigant has no vested interest in, or right to, a specific limitations period (see, Terry v Anderson, 95 US 628 , 633; Gilbert v Ackerman, 159 NY 118 , 124). When, however, a limitations period is statutorily shortened, or created where none existed before, Due Process requires that potential litigants be afforded a “reasonable time * * * for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect” (Terry v

If the Legislature expressly sets a reasonable grace period for suit after the effective date of a reduced or new limitations period, its determination of what constitutes a reasonable time is entitled to deference in the absence of some “palpable error” (Terry v Anderson, supra, 95 US, at 633 ; accord, Gilbert v Ackerman, supra, at 124 ). Where, as here, however, there is no legislatively prescribed grace period, a court may uphold the constitutional validity of the retrospective application of the new statute by interpreting it as authorizing suits upon otherwise time-barred claims within a reasonable time after the statute’s effective date (see, Romano v Romano, 19 NY2d 444 ; United States v Morena, 245 US 392 , supra; see also, Block v North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. & School Lands, supra, 461 US, at 286, n 23 ).

In Romano v Romano, our Court read a statute (which, when applied to a previously accrued cause of action, would have served as an immediate time bar) to provide for a reasonable time in which to commence an action, notwithstanding the Legislature’s failure itself to prescribe a grace period. Gilbert v Ackerman ( 159 NY 118 , supra) is not inconsistent. There the defendant, in seeking application of a new Statute of Limitations to a previously accrued cause of action, urged only that the four-month period between enactment and the statute’s effective date afforded the plaintiff a reasonable time to bring the action. The defendant in Gilbert did not ask this Court to determine a reasonable time to sue after the effective date, as in the instant case. Thus, the Gilbert decision, in rejecting the consideration of any time to sue before the effective date of the shortened Statute of Limitations to uphold the validity of the statute, does not conflict with Romano and the Supreme Court precedents.

As our previous discussion explains, this Court may uphold the validity of the application of the 1996 amendment to CPLR 214 (6) to previously accrued claims by affording otherwise time-barred litigants a reasonable opportunity thereafter in which to bring suit. This may be accomplished in two alternative ways. First, on a case-by-case basis the Court may make

The other approach is for the Court to make a balanced determination of what definite time period would fairly be necessary to afford a reasonable opportunity to interpose the type of claim affected by the new Statute of Limitations, and then apply that period generally to all otherwise time-barred suits on such claims. The Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have uniformly adopted that alternative in cases involving the imposition for the first time of a one-year limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) (Pub L 104-132, 110 US Stat 1214, codified at 28 USC § 2244 [d]; § 2255) for filing habeas corpus and other post-judgment challenges to State and Federal convictions. Those courts opted for a flat one-year grace period after AEDPA’s effective date for commencement of such post-conviction proceedings rather than determining reasonableness on a case-by-case basis (see, e.g., Hyatt v United States, 207 F3d 831 [6th Cir]; Rogers v United States, 180 F3d 349 , 354 [1st Cir]; Nichols v Bowersox, 172 F3d 1068 [8th Cir] [en banc]; Goodman v United States, 151 F3d 1335 , 1337 [11th Cir]; Ross v Artuz, 150 F3d 97 , 101 [2d Cir]; Brown v Angelone, 150 F3d 370 [4th Cir]; United States v Flores, 135 F3d 1000 , 1006 [5th Cir]; Burns v Morton, 134 F3d 109 [3d Cir]; Calderon v United States Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 128 F3d 1283 , 1287 [9th Cir]; Lindh v Murphy, 96 F3d 856 , 866 [7th Cir] [en banc], revd on other grounds 521 US 320 , supra).

The reasoning of the Federal courts in rejecting the ad hoc means of preserving the constitutionality of the new Statute of Limitations in AEDPA is persuasive. Specifically, the shortcomings of a case-by-case approach are that it fails to provide adequate and clear notice and guidance to potential litigants, as well as to lower courts, of what might constitute a reasonable time and all but inevitably results in uneven application (see, Ross v Artuz, supra, at 101 [concluding that a case-by-case standard “should not be followed, given its lack of guidance to prisoners and the district courts”]). Similarly, the decisions of the Appellate Division under CPLR 214 (6) as

Thus, we opt against case-by-case analysis in favor of a rule that will apply generally to all nonmedical malpractice claims which accrued prior to, and would have been extinguished immediately upon, the 1996 amendment’s effective date.

Having concluded that we should adopt a specific single grace period governing all nonmedical malpractice actions time-barred under the amendment to CPLR 214 (6) as of its effective date, we must now determine that period consistent with Procedural Due Process.

In doing so, we must consider the importance of the “subject matter” of the claims being curtailed by the new Statute of Limitations (see, United States v Morena, 245 US 392 , 397, supra). The appropriate period must also “reconcile legislative goals with constitutional restraints and fairness to litigants” (Alexander, 1997 Supp Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C214:6, 2000 Pocket Part, at 197). Therefore, we must balance the State interest here, in substantially accelerating the date of repose from malpractice suits for nonmedical professionals, against the legitimate interests of potential litigants in being afforded a fair opportunity to bring their claims after the effective date of chapter 623 of the Laws of 1996. The Federal courts have suggested that the latter factor requires an examination of potential litigants’ legitimate expectations or anticipation of the permissible time to sue on such claims after the effective date of a new period of limitations (see, Ross v Artuz, 150 F3d 97 , 101-102 [2d Cir], supra; Lindh v Murphy, 96 F3d 856 , 866 [7th Cir], supra).

Applying those criteria in cases where habeas corpus petitions were time-barred by the new one-year limitations period of the AEDPA, Federal appellate courts concluded that a one-year grace period should be left open following the effective date of that act (see, Ross v Artuz, supra, at 100-101 ). Similarly, in determining a reasonable time to sue with respect to the

Pointing to the three-year period of limitations fixed by the amendment to CPLR 214 (6), plaintiffs urge adoption of the recommendation of a leading commentator on the CPLR giving an otherwise immediately time-barred plaintiff “the shorter of either six years from the date of accrual (based on then-existing law) or three years from the effective date of the amendment” (Alexander, 1997 Supp Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C214:6, 2000 Pocket Part, at 196-197). We think a three-year grace period from the effective date of the amendment does not reflect the appropriate balance between the legislative objective and fairness to litigants.

The goal of the Legislature in amending CPLR 214 (6) was immediately to curtail application of a six-year period of limitations in nonmedical malpractice cases resulting from our decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Eneo Assocs. ( 43 NY2d 389 , supra) and Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh ( 78 NY2d 700 , supra). Giving accrued nonmedical malpractice claims the shorter of the time remaining under the former six-year period or three full years from the 1996 amendment’s effective date fails to accomplish the intended result. Indeed, this point is graphically illustrated by both Brothers and Easton. Adopting the formula urged by plaintiffs to those and similar cases would give all such parties the benefit of the prior six-year period of limitations. Such a result would substantially undermine the legislative intent in enacting this amendment.

Moreover, fairness to litigants whose claims would otherwise be time-barred upon the effective date does not require extending the new Statute of Limitations to the shorter of either six years from accrual or three years from the amendment’s effective date. Considering the emphatic and imperative message that it was “essential that Section 214 (6) of the CPLR be amended to reaffirm the legislative intent” that the limitations period for all of these actions should be only three years (see, Sponsor’s Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 623, at 6 [emphasis supplied]), a rule continuing to give many litigants more than

Thus, upon consideration of the foregoing factors, we think an outside one-year grace period for claims immediately time-barred upon the effective date of the amendment to CPLR 214 (6) strikes the appropriate balance between State and litigants’ personal interests for Procedural Due Process purposes. This resolution comports with the legislative goal and the reasonable expectations of potential claimants. It also gives due consideration to the importance of the “subject matter” of the claims affected by the new period of limitations (United States v Morena, supra; see, Ross v Artuz, supra, 150 F3d, at 100). Therefore, nonmedical malpractice plaintiffs immediately barred as of the September 4, 1996 effective date of the amendment shall have the shorter of either the remaining time under the former six-year limitations period or one year from that amendment’s effective date in which to commence their actions (see, e.g., Hanner v Mississippi, supra, 833 F2d, at 59 [arriving at similar conclusion in context of civil rights actions under 42 USC § 1983 ]).

V.

Early comes to us in a significantly different posture for purposes of constitutional analysis. That is because the imposition of the new shortened limitations period did not serve as an immediate bar; instead, even under the newly reduced period, plaintiff had four months remaining in which to commence a malpractice action. Because it is deemed, under such circumstances, that the Legislature intended to give only the remaining period of time to commence the action, we simply look to that time interval to determine if it provides a reasonable opportunity to interpose a malpractice claim (see, e.g., McGuirk v City School Dist., 116 AD2d 363 , 366; Fink v Shedler, 192 F3d 911 , 915-916; Mega v Holy Cross Hosp., 111 Ill 2d 416 , 420-421, 490 NE2d 665 , 667 [1986] [“if under the new statute a reasonable time remains, the new period can be applied, without more”]).

In Early, however, the four months remaining under the new limitations period was unreasonably brief. Such a drastic curtailment of this plaintiffs right to sue is not dictated in order to fulfill the legislative objective. Furthermore, it was not unreasonable for this plaintiff to have expected to be afforded more than four months to start the action. Indeed, the suit was

In Early v Rossback: Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with costs, and the motion of the Rossback defendants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them denied.

In Easton v Sankel: Order affirmed, with costs.

In Rachimi v Robinson Brog Leinwand Greene Genovese & Gluck: Order reversed, with costs, and defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint denied.