Riley v. County of Broome

OPINION OF THE COURT

These appeals call upon us to do what increasingly is asked of courts in this age of statutes: interpret the words of a legislative enactment which the contesting parties construe differently. In particular, we are asked whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) exempts statutorily defined “hazard vehicles” engaged in highway work from the “rules of the road,” and whether it limits the liability of their owners and operators to reckless disregard for the safety of others. We conclude that defendants correctly read the statute, and we hold — as did the courts before us — that the vehicles here were exempt from the rules of the road and their liability limited to reckless conduct.

Riley v County of Broome

Defendant Garwood A. Young, an employee of the Broome County Highway Division, was operating a street sweeper on West Colesville Road in the Town of Kirkwood. Young was driving two or three miles per hour, with the sweeper straddling the shoulder and the road. Plaintiff Betty Riley was also driving on West Colesville Road, in the same direction as the street sweeper. As Riley reached the top of a hill, she saw a “huge patch of fog” — actually a cloud of dirt and dust created by the sweeper — and collided with the sweeper.

Riley and her husband brought this action against Young and the County, alleging that the sweeper caused the accident.

Wilson v State of New York

Claimant John Wilson was driving west from Canajoharie to Utica on Route 5, traveling at 30 to 35 miles per hour. Moderate to heavy snow was falling, rendering visibility poor. Two snowplows owned by the State were operating near the intersection of Route 5 and Route 167, one behind the other in the eastbound passing lane on Route 5. As Wilson approached the intersection, the first snowplow stopped to make a wide turn, and the second snowplow — driven by William Hunt— made a left turn inside the first plow in an attempt to enter Route 167 North. Although Hunt looked, he did not see Wilson’s car approaching, and his snowplow collided with Wilson’s car.

Wilson then brought the present action against the State of New York. The case proceeded to trial before the Court of Claims. At the close of the evidence, the State moved to dismiss, arguing that Wilson had failed to establish that the accident was the result of recklessness. The court granted the motion, holding that a recklessness standard applied because the snowplow was involved in work on a highway within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b), and that the evidence was insufficient to meet that standard. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that since the snowplow qualified as a vehicle “actually engaged in work on a highway” under section 1103 (b), the recklessness standard applied, and the evidence failed to establish that Hunt had acted recklessly ( 269 AD2d 854 ).

The “Hazard Vehicle” Exemption

On appeal to this Court, Riley and Wilson (claimants) contend that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) does not

Thus, we conclude that section 1103 (b) exempts from the rules of the road all vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway, including the “hazard vehicles” in the cases before us.

The Standard of Care

We next turn to the standard of care owed to other drivers by vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway.” Originally, section 1103 (b) provided such vehicles with an unqualified exemption from the rules of the road (see, L 1957, ch 698, §4). In a 1974 amendment, the Legislature added the following sentence to that section:

“The foregoing provisions of this subdivision shall not relieve any person, or team or any operator of a motor vehicle or other equipment while actually engaged in work on a highway from the duty to proceed at all times during all phases of such work with due regard for the safety of all persons nor shall the foregoing provisions protect such persons or teams or such operators of motor vehicles or other equipment from the consequences of their reckless disregard for the safety of others” (L 1974, ch 223, § 1) (emphasis added).

The legislative history explains that this amendment was designed to soften the outright exemption of vehicles engaged in road work from the rules of the road, allowing them to drive at any speed or in any manner “which suits their fancy, without any prohibition from the Vehicle and Traffic Law” (see, Mem of Senator Frank Padavan, Bill Jacket, L 1974, ch 223, at 4). For

In Saarinen v Kerr ( 84 NY2d 494 ), we held that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) — which contains identical language requiring emergency vehicles to act with “due regard for the safety of all persons” and holding drivers responsible for “the consequences of [their] reckless disregard for the safety of others” — imposes a standard of recklessness. Specifically, this Court held that, under section 1104 (e), a plaintiff seeking to recover for injuries caused by an emergency vehicle must show that “ ‘the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow’ and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome” (id., at 501 [quoting Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 34, at 213 (5th ed)]).

Section 1103 (b) imposes the same recklessness standard on vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway. The language here is the same language that we held in Saarinen to impose a recklessness standard. To be sure, as claimants point out, the statute uses the phrase “due regard” as well as “reckless disregard” to describe the standard. But as we stated in Saarinen, “the Legislature’s specific reference to * * * reckless disregard * * * would be unnecessary and, in fact, inexplicable if the conventional criterion for negligence — reasonable care under the circumstances — were the intended standard” (Saarinen v Kerr, supra, at 501 ) (emphasis in original). Thus, “the only way to apply the statute is to read its general admonition to exercise ‘due care’ in light of its more specific reference to ‘recklessness’ ” (id., at 501-502; see also, Bliss v State of New York, 95 NY2d 911 [decided today]).

We decline claimants’ invitation to read the “due regard” and “reckless disregard” language in section 1103 (b) differently from our reading of those very words in section 1104 (e). As a general principle of statutory construction, “whenever a word is used in a statute in one sense and with one meaning, and subsequently the same word is used in a statute on the same subject matter, it is understood as having been used in the same sense” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 236, at 402).

Claimants urge that, as a matter of logic and fairness, vehicles engaged in road work should not enjoy the same level of protection as emergency vehicles, like police cars, fire trucks and ambulances. As we stated in Saarinen, the protection given to emergency vehicles under section 1104 (e) “represents a recognition that the duties of police officers and other emergency personnel often bring them into conflict with the rules and laws that are intended to regulate citizens’ daily conduct,” and that emergency personnel require a “qualified privilege to disregard those laws where necessary to carry out their important responsibilities” (Saarinen v Kerr, supra, at 502 ). The Court recognized, however, that giving emergency personnel this qualified privilege “will inevitably increase the risk of harm to innocent motorists and pedestrians,” and “will necessarily escalate the over-all risk to the public at large” — an increased risk justified by the necessity of accomplishing an “immediate, specific law enforcement or public safety goal” (id., at 502).

As claimants point out, it is unclear that the increased risk to the public is similarly justified for all vehicles engaged in road work. Indeed, criticizing protections given to non-

“Why, for example, should rural letter carriers or tow truck drivers be permitted, in the course of their work, to speed, drive on the wrong side of the road, ignore pedestrian rights and vehicular rights-of-way, and disregard traffic signs and signals — all without sirens or lights being employed — while the driver of an ambulance or civil defense vehicle must employ both lights and bells or sirens in order to be exempt from any rules of the road?” (Id., at 584; see also, Cottingham v State of New York, 182 Misc 2d 928 , 942 [Ct Cl].)

Apt as those concerns may be, the Legislature has spoken clearly, giving vehicles engaged in road work the benefit of the same lesser standard of care as emergency vehicles. Any change in that standard, therefore, must come from the Legislature, not the courts.

Work Area

Finally, there is no merit to claimants’ argument that the protections of section 1103 (b) apply solely to vehicles operating in a designated “work area” as defined in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 160. Section 1103 (b) states that a vehicle “actually engaged in work on a highway” is exempt from the rules of the road. The statute does not require that a vehicle be located in a designated “work area” in order to receive the protection. Significantly, section 160 was not enacted until 1984 — long after section 1103 (b) was adopted. Thus, there is no credible argument that the Legislature only had designated “work areas” in mind when it adopted section 1103 (b).

Claimants’ remaining arguments are without merit.

Accordingly, in each case the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

In each case: Order affirmed, with costs.