Majority
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
By two separate indictments, a Grand Jury charged defendant with two counts each of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and robbery in the first degree. At the time, defendant was represented by The Legal Aid Society.
On April 14, 1998, defendant, represented by new counsel, appeared in Supreme Court to discuss the status of his case. Counsel informed the court that he had just been retained and that defendant had advised him of an alleged prior plea offer of 6 to 12 years. Other than defendant’s averments, the record is silent as to this alleged offer. The court noted that defendant, as a second violent felony offender, was not eligible for an indeterminate sentence. Instead, the court offered defendant a 10-year determinate sentence — the minimum permissible sentence for robbery in the first degree under the circumstances (Penal Law § 160.15 [4]; § 70.04 [2], [3] [a]). Maintaining that the People had offered a lesser sentence, counsel indicated that his client was “hoping” to negotiate a more favorable bargain.
On appeal from his conviction, defendant asserted that counsel rejected the 10-year sentence offer without consulting him and based upon a mistaken belief that defendant could receive an indeterminate sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed and held that defendant waived review of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim as part of his plea agreement.
Assuming, without deciding, that defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim survives his waiver of his right to appeal (see, People v Petgen, 55 NY2d 529 , 534-535, rearg denied 57 NY2d 674 ), we conclude that such a claim is untenable on the record before us. Nothing in the record supports defendant’s contention that he was unaware of the 10-year sentence offer or that counsel rejected the offer without consulting him. Nor does the record conclusively establish that counsel turned down the offer based upon a misunderstanding of the sentencing laws. Without the benefit of additional facts that might have been developed after an appropriate postconviction motion, we cannot conclude that counsel’s actions lacked any strategic or other legitimate explanation (see, People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705 , 708; People v Love, 57 NY2d 998 , 1000; People v Brown, 45 NY2d 852 , 853-854).
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Smith, Levine, Ciparick, Wesley and Rosenblatt concur.
Order affirmed in a memorandum.
Cases cited
- People v. Petgen 55 NY2d 529 at 534-535 p. 923
- People v. Rivera 71 NY2d 705 at 708 p. 923
- People v. Love 57 NY2d 998 at 1000 p. 923
- People v. Brown 45 NY2d 852 at 853-854 p. 923