Majority
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the order of Supreme Court reinstated.
“The Tenant agrees to pay to the Landlord as additional rent during each lease year subsequent to the New York City real estate tax year commencing July 1, 1979 and ending June 30, 1980, Fourteen and one-half (14 1/2%) percent of the dollar amount of any increase in such real estate taxes on the said land, buildings and improvements (of which the demised premises are a part) over and above the ‘base amount of real estate taxes,’ whether such increase in real estate taxes shall be occasioned by an increase in assessed valuation or an increase in tax rate, or both.”
The parties defined the following words:
“ ‘base assessed valuation’ shall be the total fully assessed valuation (made without regard or giving effect to any exemption or abatement) of the parcel of [the subject land] for the New York City real estate tax year commencing July 1, 1979 and ending July [sic] 30, 1980; . . .
“ ‘base tax rate’ shall be the real estate tax for the Borough of Manhattan for the New York City real estate tax year commencing July 1, 1979 and ending June 30, 1980; . . .
“[and] ‘base amount of real estate taxes’ shall be the dollar amount computed by and resulting from the application of the ‘base tax rate’ to the ‘base assessed valuation.’ ”
Accordingly, Barnan has paid 14½% “of the dollar amount of any increase in such real estate taxes” on the premises for the subsequent tax years.
In 2005, Barnan became aware that, since the 1998-1999 tax year, its yearly 14½% tax share of the building’s billable taxes included the tenant-shareholders’ tax abatements and exemptions. Barnan has since claimed that the corporation overcharged it in tax rents as the corporation failed to deduct the tax abatements and exemptions paid to the tenant-shareholders from its proportionate tax liability. Barnan demanded reimbursement, and the corporation refused. In 2006, Barnan commenced this action against the corporation for, among other things, reimbursement of the alleged overcharges. Barnan contends that the lease between the parties entitles it to deduct from its tax rents the tax abatements and exemptions that the corporation pays to the individual tenant-shareholders.
Supreme Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. It found that the tax escalation clause of the lease agreement was ambiguous as to whether tax abatements and exemptions should be excluded from the amount of real estate taxes assessed against the property and relied upon “the course of conduct of the parties since the defendant acquired title to the Building” ( 15 Misc 3d 1133 [A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50962 [U], *4 [2007]). The Appellate Division unanimously modified, on the law, by granting plaintiffs motion for summary relief, directing judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $56,675.77, and denying defendant’s cross motion (Barnan Assoc. v 196 Owners Corp., 56 AD3d 309 [2008]). The court rejected Supreme Court’s finding of ambiguity and application of the voluntary payment doctrine, and concluded that the result below was contrary to cases involving tax escalation clauses (id. at 311).
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur in memorandum; Chief Judge Lippman taking no part.
Order reversed, etc.
Cases cited
- Raleigh Associates, Inc. v. Henry 302 NY 467 at 474 p. 784
- Fairfax Co. v. Whelan Drug Co. 105 AD2d 647 p. 784
- Park Square Garage, Inc. v. New York University 27 AD2d 460 p. 784