People v. Paulman

During a child sexual abuse investigation, defendant made four incriminating statements to the police in successive interrogations spanning a period of several hours. The Appellate Division ruled that one of the statements was inadmissible because it had not been preceded by Miranda warnings. The primary issue presented in this case is whether two statements defendant made after he was given Miranda warnings and waived his right to remain silent should have been suppressed due to the prior, unwarned statement. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the subsequent statements were properly received in evidence.

In the spring of 2002, defendant Kenneth Paulman resided with his girlfriend in an apartment complex in Canandaigua, New York. The People offered evidence at the suppression hearing that, just after midnight on May 4, 2002, the police were contacted by the mother of Ashlyn, a four-year-old girl, who stated that she had information relating to a child sexual abuse investigation. That same night, defendant had called the police and reported that he had been threatened by members of Ashlyn’s family. After speaking to Ashlyn’s mother, New York State Trooper Jean Oliver and her partner went to defendant’s apartment. Defendant answered the door and invited Trooper Oliver inside. Trooper Oliver told defendant that she was there to investigate some allegations of sexual abuse. Defendant spoke freely about the allegations, telling her that his girlfriend frequently babysat Ashlyn and Tiffany, an eight-year-old girl who also lived in the complex. He described an incident when he tickled the naked girls, who had just stepped out of their bath. During this incident, he claimed that he had accidentally slipped a finger into Ashlyn’s vagina. Defendant also detailed other occasions when he and Ashlyn had been in bed and he had rubbed Ashlyn against his penis. When he was advised that Ashlyn had some redness near her vagina, defendant explained that this could have been from his finger or belt buckle. During this conversation, defendant took Trooper Oliver around the apartment and showed her the locations where the various incidents had occurred. Toward the end of their discussion, defendant mentioned the name of another girl from the complex, remarking that “[t]he only mistake I made was with Autumn.” When asked what he meant, defendant admitted that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with Autumn, who defendant

Trooper Oliver next asked defendant to accompany her to the barracks to speak to an investigator. Defendant agreed and rode with the troopers in their patrol car. Upon arrival at the barracks, defendant was seated in the patrol room, an area with two open doors. Defendant was told that another State Police officer—Investigator Christopher Baldwin—would arrive shortly. In the meantime, Trooper Oliver gave defendant a notepad and said: “Why don’t you just start taking some notes then as to, you know, your best recollection as to what has happened.” Defendant composed a statement in which he repeated the admissions previously made concerning his physical contact with Ashlyn and Tiffany. As he was working on the statement, defendant told Trooper Oliver that he was hungry, and she brought him pizza and soda.

When Investigator Baldwin arrived at the barracks at about 3:00 a.m., he saw that defendant was in the patrol room writing on a notepad. Defendant finished the handwritten statement at about 3:30 a.m. He remained in the patrol room consuming his meal until approximately 4:00 a.m., at which time the investigator took defendant to his office at the back of the barracks. Investigator Baldwin read defendant his Miranda rights and defendant acknowledged that he understood them but wished to give a statement. The investigator then began questioning defendant concerning his contact with Ashlyn, Tiffany and Autumn. Defendant made a series of oral admissions, repeating what he had told Trooper Oliver and adding further details pertaining to the incidents. After defendant was again given Miranda warnings at 5:40 a.m., he signed a Miranda waiver and Investigator Baldwin began typing a written statement, recording defendant’s answers to specific questions. Defendant initialed each page and signed the typewritten, question-and-answer statement, which was completed at 7:40 a.m. In this statement, in addition to the sexual contact he had earlier described, defendant admitted having engaged in oral sex with Ashlyn and Autumn and acknowledged incidents involving his girlfriend’s two-year-old son and another 12-year-old girl in the complex. At the conclusion of the interrogation, defendant was formally placed under arrest.

On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court disagreed with the suppression court’s analysis with respect to the handwritten statement, finding that it should have been suppressed because Trooper Oliver’s suggestion that defendant write down his thoughts was the functional equivalent of interrogation, thereby requiring Miranda warnings. Despite this error, the Court concluded that reversal was not warranted because the first, third and fourth statements were properly received in evidence and the improper admission of the second statement amounted to harmless error. Although our analysis differs in some respects from that of the Appellate Division, we also affirm.

In this Court, defendant has abandoned his argument that the first statement—the oral admissions he made to Trooper Oliver in his apartment—should have been suppressed. Conceding that these initial comments were admissible at trial, defendant now contends that the remaining three statements should have been suppressed because the police error in failing to give Miranda warnings prior to eliciting the second, handwritten statement tainted each of the subsequent statements, even though they were preceded by Miranda warnings.

The People continue to argue that defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation when he made the handwritten statement and, as such, there was no Miranda violation. In the alternative, the People submit that even if the handwritten statement was inadmissible as the Appellate Division determined, the subsequent Mirandized statements were nonetheless admissible because they were not part of an unbroken, continuous chain of events flowing from the prior, unwarned statement. Since the admissions in the handwritten statement were the same as those in the other statements, the People maintain that its receipt into evidence at trial was harmless error.

I.

Because the People assert that the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the handwritten statement should have

The Miranda rule protects the privilege against self-incrimination and, “because the privilege applies only when an accused is ‘compelled’ to testify, the safeguards required by Miranda are not triggered unless a suspect is subject to ‘custodial interrogation’ ” (People v Berg, 92 NY2d 701 , 704 [1999]). The standard for assessing a suspect’s custodial status is whether a reasonable person innocent of any wrongdoing would have believed that he or she was not free to leave (see People v Harris, 48 NY2d 208 , 215 [1979]; People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 , 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]). “The term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” (People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316 , 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985], quoting Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291 , 301 [1980]).

Based on this record, we cannot say that the Appellate Division erred in ruling that defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation when, after bringing defendant to the barracks, Trooper Oliver produced a notepad (which defendant had not requested) and told defendant to write down his “best recollection” of what had occurred. These circumstances support the inference that the handwritten statement was not spontaneous but was induced by Trooper Oliver, who should have known that her actions were likely to elicit an incriminating response. That being so, there is no basis to disturb the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the handwritten statement should have been suppressed because it was elicited without Miranda warnings.

II.

Having upheld the determination that an improper, unwarned statement was obtained prior to Investigator Baldwin’s interrogation, we turn to whether this error rendered the subsequent

In Oregon v Elstad ( 470 US 298 [1985]), the Supreme Court suggested that, once Miranda warnings were given, the “taint” of a prior, unwarned statement was dissipated, rendering the subsequent statement admissible at trial. The Court reasoned:

“[A] careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible. The warning conveys the relevant information and thereafter the suspect’s choice whether to exercise his privilege to remain silent should ordinarily be viewed as an ‘act of free will’ ” (id. at 310-311).

Concerned that Elstad could be interpreted as holding that the mere fact that warnings were uttered would be sufficient to justify the admission of subsequent statements, this Court held in People v Bethea ( 67 NY2d 364 [1986]) that more was required under article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution. Adhering to the rule articulated in People v Chapple ( 38 NY2d 112 , 114 [1975]), we clarified that where an improper, unwarned statement gives rise to a subsequent Mirandized statement as part of a “single continuous chain of events,” there is inadequate assurance that the Miranda warnings were effective in protecting a defendant’s rights, and the warned statement must also be suppressed.

To determine whether there is a “single continuous chain of events” under Chapple, New York courts have considered a number of factors, including the time differential between the Miranda violation and the subsequent admission; whether the same police personnel were present and involved in eliciting each statement; whether there was a change in the location or nature of the interrogation; the circumstances surrounding the Miranda violation, such as the extent of the improper question

Defendant contends that our decision in Bethea mandates suppression in this case. In Bethea, after learning about an attempted burglary by two men whose appearance matched that of defendant and his companion, the police stopped them on the street in the vicinity of the crime and questioned them about the contents of a bag they were carrying. Upon discovering that the bag contained a revolver, the police arrested defendant. While transporting him to the police station, one of the officers asked defendant where he had obtained the gun, eliciting an incriminating response. At the precinct, the same officer gave defendant Miranda warnings, and then resumed the interrogation, at which point defendant repeated what he had said in the vehicle. This Court concluded that the Mirandized statement should have been suppressed because it was elicited as part of a single continuous chain of events flowing from the improper, unwarned custodial interrogation in the police car.

In contrast to this case, in Bethea the defendant was arrested, placed in the police vehicle and interrogated while being transported to the police station—the initial incriminating statements were clearly obtained in violation of Miranda requirements. Here, defendant initiated the arrival of police at his home and made incriminating statements while showing Trooper Oliver around his apartment. His first admissions were therefore not the product of police misconduct. Furthermore, in Bethea, there was no significant break in time between the inquiry in the car and the interrogation at the police station, nor was there any change in the nature or tenor of the questioning, while here there was a cessation of interrogation while defendant ate and significant differences in the tenor and method of inquiry. In Bethea, the Mirandized statement was elicited by the same police officer who had accosted defendant on the street, arrested him, and obtained the unwarned statement. Therefore, a reasonable suspect in defendant’s position would not have perceived a distinction between the interrogation in the car and the interrogation at the station. Moreover, the defendant had not previously expressed a desire to talk to the police. The same is not true here, where there was a change in police personnel and a defendant who, from the inception of his encounter with police, expressed a willingness to give a statement.

Order affirmed.