Majority
Headnote
Petit L argent—C on viction in Sessions and Oyer, under Indictment for Grand Larceny.—Decree of Offense.— Punishment of Misdemeanors.—Sections 56, 444, 445, Code Grim. Pro.; Sections 15, 726, Pen. Code.The Penal Code, section 528, defines larceny ; sections 530 and 531 define grand larceny in the first and second degrees; and section 532 declares every other larceny to be petit larceny. The prisoner was indicted for grand larceny and was convicted of petit larceny. We think that this was proper under sections. 444 and 445 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The offense of which he was convicted was of a degree inferior to that of which he was indicted. And we do not think that section 56 of that same Code is to be construed to take from a jury in the Courts of Oyer and Terminer and of the Sessions the power to find a verdict of petit larceny when the prisoner
The next question is as to the length of the sentence.
The sections of the Penal Code above cited are intended to take the place of 2 R. S. (m. p.) 679, section 63, and 690, section 1. Section 535 declares that petit larceny is a misdemeanor, meaning petit larceny as in that Code defined. Section 719 declares that an offense specified in the Code committed after, etc., must be punished according to the provisions of that Code. Section 15 declares the punishment of misdemeanors to be imprisonment for not more than a year, or a fine of $500, or both, unless some other punishment is specially prescribed by the Code or by some other statutory provision. Ho other punishment is specially prescribed by the Code for petit larceny, and none by any other statute, unless 2 R. S. (m. p.), 690, section 1, be in force.
The Penal Code is a general statute intended to define nearly all offenses, and to prescribe the punishment. Section 726 repeals all inconsistent acts so far as they impose any punishment for crime. The penalty imposed by the section of the Revised Statutes above cited is certainly inconsistent with that imposed by the Code. It cannot be understood that the exception made in-section 15 of the Penal Code was to take away the effect of section 726.
The argument of the prisoner is that whenever a punishment had been prescribed for a misdemeanor previously to the Penal Code, which was not in express and specific language repealed, that punishment remains in force.
How if we turn to 2 R. S. (m. p.) 697, section 40, we find a provision for the punishment of all misdemeanors of which the punishment is not prescribed by some other statute. Therefore, according to the argument of the prisoner, a punishment is especially prescribed for every misdemeanor, and therefore every misdemeanor is excepted from section 15 of the Penal Code. This is plainly unreasonable.
The prisoner’s position, if correct, would apply apparently to other cases of misdemeanors. For instance, section 651 of the Penal Code declares certain interference with gas-pipes to be a misdemeanor, but prescribes no penalty. This section is substantially the Act of 1854, cli. 109, sections 1 and 2, by which the crime was declared and a penalty prescribed, of six months imprisonment and a fine of two hundred and fifty dollars. Arc we to understand, then, that a violation of section 651 of the Penal Code is not punishable under section 15 of the samo Code, but that the penalty prescribed in the act of 1854 is in force ?
Under such a construction the Penal Code would cease to be a complete system, as it was intended to be. Section 7.
The judgment and conviction should be affirmed.
Boardman and Bocees, JJ"., concur.
Cases cited
- People ex rel. Comaford v. Dutcher 83 N. Y. 240 p. 439
- People ex rel. Stetzer v. Rawson 61 Barb. 619 p. 439
- Klein v. People 31 N. Y. 229 p. 440
- Keefe v. People 40 N. Y. 348 p. 441