People v. Cole — 10 N.Y. Crim. 216

Majority

p. 216

Supreme Court-General Term-Fifth Department.

October 21, 1892.

PEOPLE v. ANTHONY COLE.

( 48 St. Rep. 351 .)

Headnote

False pretenses—Question for jury.

Upon the trial of defendant, who was indicted for the crime of obtaining a signature of an endorser of a promissory note under false pretenses, with intent to cheat and defraud him, it is properly left to the jury to decide whether the representations which de-"

p. 217

fendant was shown to have made to the endorser were made for the purpose of inducing him to endorse the note, and with intent to cheat and defraud him, and whether they were false and calculated to deceive him.

2. Evidence—False pretenses.

In such case, the procuring of the endorser to endorse other notes-from time to time for a large amount and which finally resulted in financial ruin, is competent evidence bearing upon the motives of' the defendant in procuring the endorsement alleged in the indictment.

Appeal from a judgment of conviction of the crime of obtaining a signature by false pretenses, rendered against th,e defendant at the Monroe county sessions, March 14,1891, 'and also from, an order denying the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict,, and for a new trial.

George A. Benton, dist. att’y, for respondents.

Raines Brothers, for appellant.

The defendant was convicted at the Monro'ecounty sessions of the crime of obtaining the signature of one George E. Harmon as an endorser upon a promissory note by false pretenses, with the intent to cheat and defraud the complainant Harmon, under section 566 of the Penal Code.

The indictment fully and sufficiently states the acts the defendant is alleged to have done, which constitute the crimie he-was charged to have committed.

It will not be necessary nor profitable to rehearse the testimony adduced upon the trial tending to prove the allegations of' the indictment. There was sufficient evidence to establish them. The device resorted to by the defendant to induce the complainant to endorse the note as charged in the indictment, and also to endorse a large number of other promissory notes from time to time, were of such a character as to excite our surprise that Mr. Harmon was deceived by them. We should sup- *■ pose that a person having had the experience in the affairs of the world Mr. Harmon was shown to have had would have a.t once discovered -the fraudulent intentions of the defendant and' would have seen that the transaction was a fraud and a sham.!

p. 218

It is, however, a matter of history that frauds are frequently and successfully practiced upon ordinarily" intelligent people by devices and schemes which to the most of us seem so transparently fraudulent as to excite our surprise that any one could be deceived thereby.

It does not lessen the criminalty of the rogue that his victim was credulous and unwary. The law is intended to protect all classes from the wiles of criminals. It was properly left to the jury to decide whether the representations which the defendant was shown to have made to Mr. Harmon were made for the purpose .of inducing him to endorse the note and with the intent to ■cheat and defraud him, and whether they were false and were •calculated to deceive him. The procuring of Mr. Harmon to •endorse other notes from time to time to a large amount, and which finally resulted in his financial ruin, was competent evidence bearing upon the motives of the defendant in procuring the 'endorsement alleged in the indictment. The evidence of the assignment made by Harmon for the benefit of his creditors! was competent as a part of the history of the ease, though not of any great significance. The rule of law as to what-was necessary for the People to prove to convict was fully and correctly stated to the jury in the charge of the court.

We find nothing in the record calling for a reversal of the •conviction.

The judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, and the proceedings remitted to the court of sessions of Monroe ■county with directions to proceed thereon.

DWIGHT, P. J., and MACOMBER, J., concur.