People v. Taylor

Judgment of death ha,s been pronounced upon the defendant, William G. Taylor, a convict in the state prison at Auburn, for killing Solomon Johnson, a fellow eonviot, on September 20, 1892. The felonious act was executed with great deliberation, and had, evidently, been long premeditated. The method of it accomplishment was planned with great cunning and forethought, and every element, apparently, existed which the law requires to be present in order to establish this most atrocious crime. Counsel, assigned by the court to defend the prisoner, have discharged that most delicate and responsible duty with great diligence and fidelity, and have urged a reversal of this judgment upon the sole ground of the legal irresponsibility of the defendant for the offense of which he has been convicted. It is manif est that this defense has some basis upon which to rest, and that it has not been invented to meet the exigencies of the trial. In determining whether the verdict was against the weight of evidence, or whether justice ’demands that a new trial shall be had, it becomes incumbent

The defendant has been living the life of a felon since 1886, when he was sentenced to Dannemora prison upon a conviction for burglary, for a term of three years, which expired in ■the summer of 1888, having received the usual commutation for good behavior. Very soon after his discharge, and in the same year, he was returned to the prison to serve out two sentences for burglary, aggregating about eleven years. From the time of his readmission bis conduct was exemplary with a single exception. He was obedient and tractable, and readily submitted to all of the requirements of the prison discipline until April 28,1890, when, without provocation or warning, he assaulted his keeper with a hatchet and felled Mm to the floor. He was immediately seized and placed in close confinement. His demeanor was such as to lead the prison physician to suspect that he might be insane.

He was therefore closely watched and examined daily, and this physician reached the conclusion that he was suffering from that form of insanity known as melancholia. His physical symptoms indicated the correctness of the diagnosis. He had the stolid appearance, the slow muscular movements, the flabby, tremulous and coated tongue, and the slow and weak pulse, usually observable in such cases. When questioned as to Ms purpose in assaulting the keeper, he always told the same story, that he had concealed the hatchet in his cell on Saturday to enable Mm to dig Ms way out and escape, and failing in that, and knowing that Ms attempt would be detected, and believing that he would not outlive his sentence, he knocked the keeper down, not intending to kill him, but to secure Ms revolver and kill himself. He avoided the association of others and wished to be allowed to remain in Ms cell, saying that he thought he would either kill himself or some one else if he was allowed the liberty a prisoner was usually given. On September 29, 1890, he was transferred as an insane convict to the asylum for insane criminals at Auburn, and in the certificate of transfer the prison physician stated, among other things, “I believe him to be suffering from temporary melancholia, and not a safe man to beep

The defendant was detained in the asylum until September 20, 1891, when the entry “molt insane” was made in the “case book” opposite his name, and he was transferred to the prison and put to work in the broom shop. The medical superintendent of the asylum states that during this period he was sane, and this entry was made by Ms direction. The assistant superintendent, in whose charge the def endant was, and who had, perhaps, better opportunities to know his mental condition, objected to this entry as not correctly describing bis status, and testifies that during all the time there was a doubt in his mind as to his sanity; that while be expressed no well-defined delusions, his facial aspect and actions were those of a man not mentally sound, and that he favored making an entry that he was recovering, which would indicate that he had been insane and might have a recurrence of the attack, While the statement “not insane” would he construed to mean that he had always been sane; but yielding to the directions of his superior, he made the entry as stated.

The defendant and deceased worked in the same shop and at benches a few feet apart. The latter wa,s a quiet, inoffensive man, and between the two friendly and somewhat intimate relations seem to have existed for some months. From th e time of his admission, in September, 1891, until the homicide, the defendant’s prison record was good. He was quiet, self-contained, diligent, industrious and skillful in Ms work, and was never reported for any misbehavior. It appears, from the testimony of several of the convicts who worked in the same shop, that, in the month of April, he exhibited, without any apparent -cause, a feeling of great hostility to the deceased. The professed occasion for it was, as he claimed, that he had been thwarted in a -scheme which he had formed of making his escape by mearas of a gateway which was in process of construction between the asylum and the prison grounds, and that the 'deceased had informed the prison authorities of Ms design, and thus caused its failure. It would seem that his plan of escape was not a rational orae, if he ever really entertained it; it does

The loss of commutation for good behavior, which he had incurred by his conduct at Dannemora, seemed to weigh heavily upon Ms mind, and he apparently despaired of Ms physical ability to survive the full period of Ms sentence, and his prison life had become so unendurable that he desired to- put an -end to Ms own existence, which he conceived he could not do except in one of the three ways indicated. His morbid condition of mind was aggravated by tih-e effects of a pernicious habit, which he believed bad wrecked Mm both physically and mor

The trial was had on January 10,1893, less than four months after the homicide, and it is shown that there was no change in the mental condition of the defendant during that time. He refused to aid Ms counsel in the preparation of his defense, or give him any specific information in regard to Ms previous life or Ms family, and repeatedly stated in substance to the physician who examined him that he didn’t want any nonsense about the 'thing, and didn’t want Ms trial postponed, but wanted it quickly over, and “to he electrocuted.”

He was thrice examined by the assistant physician of the asylum between the time of the homicide and the trial, who unhesitatingly pronounced him .insane, and added that in his opinion •he was a dangerous lunatic, and suffered from melancholia,, with homicidal delusions. He was also examined three times by another physician, who had given some special study to the subject of insanity, who reached the same conclusion. Both of these physicians say that upon each examination he exhibited a marked tremor, or independent twitching of the small fibres of the tongue, which is characteristic of lunatics. He also had the well-recognized facial expression indicating melancholia and other physical symptoms of that form of mental disturbance, such as cold and clammy hands, and the involuntary movement of the muscles about the mouth. The prison physician at Dannemora affirmed upon oath the truth of the statement contained in the transfer certificate, that he believed him then to be insane, with suicidal and homicidal tendencies.

On the part of the prosecution five medical experts were examined, and all of them were of the opinion, clearly and unequivocally, that the defendant was sane. This opinion was not based upon hypothetical questions or an assumed state of facts, but was derived from repeated personal examinations. All

In this state of the evidence the issue of sanity was a proper •subject for final determination by the jury, and we do not think that this court, even if it possessed the power, should disturb their verdict. But the rule is now firmly established by repeated decisions of this court, that in exercising the jurisdiction conferred by section 528 of the Criminal Code in capital oases, we shall he governed by the practice regulating the review of ■questions of fact upon appeal to the supreme court, and that in such oases, if there is a fair conflict in the evidence, or it is such •that different inferences can be properly drawn from iit, the determination of the jury will not be interfered with, unless it is clearly against the weight of evidence, or appears to have been influenced by passion, prejudice, mistake or corruption. People v. Loppy, 128 N. Y. 629 ; 40 St. Rep. 410 ; People v. Trezza, 125 N. Y. 740 ; 36 St. Rep. 149 ; People v. Fish, 125 N. Y. 136 ; 34 St. Rep. 840 ; People v. Stone, 117 N. Y. 480 ; 27 St. Rep. 823 .

If, in the judgment of this court, there was a rational doubt of the guilt of the defendant, it would not he a sufficient ground for reversal. Under our system of criminal jurisprudence, it becomes the exclusive province of the jury to determine whether the evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused is so lacking in convicting force as to leave an •intelligent and discriminating mind in doubt as to the truth of the charge contained in the indictment.

Counsel relies with great confidence upon the proof of am insane delusion as to the part which the deceased had taken in preventing the execution of the defendant’s plan of escape, but this delusion, if established, would not of itself be a sufficient answer to the present indictment. It may be that if the question of its existence were separately submitted to a jury they might find, as we might be compelled to find, if submitted to us, that the weight of evidence seems to indicate its existence. That fact, if conclusively established, would fall far short of a defense. An insane delusion with reference to the conduct and attitude of another cannot excuse the criminal act of taking his life, unless it is of such a character that, if it had been true, it would have rendered the homicide excusable or justifiable. If the defendant had actually planned a mode of escape from prison, and had confided Ms scheme to the deceased, and the latter , had betrayed his confidence, and informed the authorities of his purpose, and by means of such information it had been frustrated, it would have afforded the defendant no justification for Ms act, but would have augmented its enormity, because inspired by the unholy motive of revenge. How then can the false belief, standing by itself, that these things had happened, affect the criminal nature of the defendant’s wrong?

The provision of the Revised Statutes, part 4, chapter 1, title e7, section 2, which declared that “No act done by a person in a state of insanity can be punished as an offense,” was abrogated by the Penal Oode, which provided, section 17, that responsibility is to be presumed, and the burden of disproving it is upon the accused, and, section 21, that he cannot be excused from criminal liability as an insane person, except upon proof that at the time of committing the alleged criminal act he was •laboring under such a defect of reason as either to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or that the act was. wrong. Partial insanity, or incipient insanity, is not sufficient,, if there is still the ability to form a correct perception of the legal quality of the act and to know that it is wrong. If, when a specific act is contemplated, be has the power to know whether it is wrong to do it and right to refrain from doing it the law presumes that he has also the power to choose between the right and the wrong course of action, and will not permit either courts -or juries to speculate as to its possible non-existence. Eminent alienists criticise the rule of the Penal Code,, because it excludes consideration of the question whether the accused possessed sufficient powers of self-restraint to forbear the commission of an act which he clearly perceived to be criminal. They -contend that it is unreasonable and unjust to-punish a human being for that which he does not have the power to refrain from doing, but if such a result may follow, which we by no means admit, it is an -argument to be addressed to the body which makes the law, and not -to the tribunal whose sole duty it is to construe, apply and enforce it.

The learned physicians who testified that, in their judgment,.-the defendant was insane and irresponsible, candidly admitted that they did not approve of the statutory measure -of responsibility, and that their opinion was not circumscribed by it, and that the defendant, when he killed the deceased, undoubtedly 'knew that the act was a violation of the law of the state. It' must be admitted that he so understood it, for it is evident that

The verdict -of the jury in this case is fortified by the report of a special commission appointed pursuant to the provisions of section 658 of the Criminal Code. Before sentence was pronounced the defendant’s counsel moved for the appointment of this commission to determine his present sanity, and the trial court appointed a physician of high standing, and eminent in his profession as a specialist in the treatment of the insane, to make the examination. The commissioner was attended by the district attorney and the counsel for the defendant; all the evidence taken at the trial and appearing in this record was read to Mm; the hearing occupied three days, and it is evident that it was of the most searching and impartial character, and the learned commissioner reported that after having heard the evidence, and personally examined the defendant on several different occasions and obtained Ms family history, he is of the opinion that the defendant was sane at the time of the examination and is now sane. As it is quite clear from the evidence before us that the defendant’s mental condition at the time of the trial was not in any material respect different from what it was at the time of the homicide, this report renders it Mghly improbable that any error of judgment was committed by the jury in determining the principal issue submitted to them.

We think the witness, Mead, was properly allowed to charac

It is insisted that the charge to the jury contained an erroneous instruction to the effect ’that the defendant was responsible for his act if he had sufficient mental vigor and capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in the abstract. We do not think the charge was fairly susceptible of such a construction. The learned trial judge instructed the jury with great clearness and precision upon the statutory rule of responsibility for crime, and directed their minds to the very point upon Which the rule rests, and repeatedly charged .them, in substance, that if the defendant’s mind was so far impaired or deranged as to render him incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act he was perpetrating, or that the act was wrong, he should be acquitted, and that if they had any reasonable doubt upon the subject he should he given the benefit of it. Wherever ref erence is made throughout the charge to the power of discrimination between right and wrong, it is evident that the ■particular act charged in the" indictment is intended, and the jury must have so understood it. Single expressions cannot he dislocated from the context and construed as if they were the ■statement of separate and independent propositions; but the ■entire exposition of the law upon a given point by the judge must he taken, and when the charge is so analyzed it is apparent that no error was committed; but the'prisoner was ac

,The judgment of conviction must, therefore, be affirmed.

All concur, PECKHAM and O’BRIEN, JJ., in result.