Majority
Headnote
it'. Forgery—Second degree. ‘J. — The indictment -charged the defendant with feloniously writing or- endorsing the name of "John Diez upon the back of a promissory note, and of uttering and putting off the same to one Sidney S. .Cross. The note was dated at Lockport, N. Y., April 14, 1890, and is as follows: «1156.00.
“Seven months from date I promise to pay to the order of E.A. Longstaff, one hundred and fifty-six dollars at the Merchants’ Bank, Lockport, N. Y. Value received, with interest. ■ “(Signed) STEPHEN TOWER.”
1 On the back of the instrument was the genuine endorsement in writing of one E.
The indictment, in the accusing part thereof, charges the defendant with the crime of forgery in the second degree. This ¡crime, Penal Code, § 511, is distinct and separate from the crime of uttering and putting off forged paper, under section 521, though each crime is forgery in the second degree. From this it is argued, by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the two crimes ought not to be joined in one count. If there existed any objection to the indictment of this nature, we are of the opinion that the same was waived by the failure of the defendant to demur to it on that ground. Code Grim. Pro. §§ 323, 331. The verdict was, that the defendant was guilty as charged in the indictment. Being general in its terms, it was, under the indictment, a finality in respect to both the making and the uttering of this forged paper; so that the defendant cannot again be convicted of the crime of forging or uttering it. ' ■ :
Other points are made in the brief of the learned counsel for the appellant, but they do not, in our judgment, merit special ■attention. They relate to the failure of the case to show that .the def endant was ever arraigned upon the indictment, or that he pleaded thereto. These matters were waived by the defendant going to trial upon the indictment upon the merits of the charge, and cannot be raised for the first time after a conviction, inasmuch as there was nothing in these omissions which tended to prejudice the rights of the defendant, and, consequently, they should be disregarded. Code Crim. Pro. §§ 285,684; People v. Johnson, 110 N. Y. 134 ; 16 St. Rep. 846 ; People v. Myers, 2 Hun, 6 ; People v. Bradner, 107 N. Y. 1 ; 10 St. Rep. 667 ; People v. McHale, 39 id. 758 .
We have looked into the testimony contained in the case upon ■the merits, and find that there was ample evidence to sustain the verdict and the judgment of the court entered thereon, upon the ground that the defendant feloniously uttered and put off as genuine the forged endorsement of Diez.
Judgment and conviction appealed from affirmed:
DWIGHT, P. J., and LEWIS, J., concur.
Cases cited
- People v. Johnson 110 N. Y. 134 p. 96
- People v. Bradner 107 N. Y. 1 p. 96