People v. Orr

The defendant was indicted and convicted of the crime of seduction under promise of marriage. The statute which defines and regulates that offense provides:

“A person who, under promise of marriage, seduces and has sexual intercourse with any unmarried female of previous chaste character, is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both. No 'conviction can be had for the offense specified in section two hundred and eighty-four, upon the testimony of the female seduced, unsupported by other evidence.” Pen. Code, §§ 284, 286.

That the evidence of the complainant, if properly corroborated, was sufficient to justify the conviction of the defendant is unquestioned. But the defendant contends that the evidence of the complainant was not corroborated to the extent required by section 286, and, consequently, that the defendant should have been acquitted. It seems to be settled in this state that the evidence required must be corroborative of the promise of marriage and the carnal connection, and need not extend to the facts that the female seduced was of previous chaste character, or unmarried.1 Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203 ; Boyce v. People, 55 id. 644; People v. Kearney, 110 id. 188; 17 St. Rep. 165 ; Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 38 , 44. In the latter case it was also held that, as to the promise of marriage, the provision of the statute is satisfied by proof of circumstances which usually attend an engagement of marriage,

'Without attempting to state the evidence in detail which was corroborative of that given by the complainant, a careful study of the proof contained in the appeal book leads us to the conclusion that under the authorities in this state bearing upon the question 'the evidence of corroboration was sufficient to justify the submission of the case to. the jury. On the trial, after the complainant had testified that the offense was committed on February 4, 1894, and that when committed her vagina was lacerated, that there wias a flow of blood, and that Dr. Kinne had treated her, the people called Dr. Kinne as a witness, who, under the defendant’s objection and exception, testified to having examined the complainant, either late in. the winter or early in the spring of the year 1894, and that such examination revealed a wounding .and inflammation of the soft tissues, a swelling and larceration of the mucous membrane of the passage of the vagina, with evidences of bleeding, and that he prescribed for her at that time. We think this evidence was-admissible a,s showing a circumstance which tended to corroborate the evidence of the complainant as to illicit intercourse, and that the defendant’s objections and exceptions were not well taken.

Dr. McKenna was also called as a witness for the people, and after testifying that he knew thq, complainant, he testified that hé first met her at his office between the 20th and 25th- of October, 1894. He was then asked:

“Yon may state whether or not you made an examination of her at that time. (Objected to as incompetent, improper, immaterial, and hearsay, and too remote and in no sense a cor

The defendant contends, that the admission of this evidence was error, and cites the case of People v. Kearney, 110 N. Y. 188 ; 17 St. Rep. 165 , as sustaining that contention. In that case the defendant was indicted for seduction, and the complainant testified that the offense was committed in July, and that the defendant had frequent intercourse with her until December. The prosecution was permitted to show, under objection and exception, that she had a child in August of the-next year. This was held error, as it did not tend to show illicit intercourse thirteen mouths before the birth of the child. That case is very clearly distinguishable from this. The purpose of the evidence in that case was only to show the fact that the complainant was pregnant in November, while the seduction took place in the preceding July. If the evidence objected to in the case at bar had been only to the effect that the-complainant was pregnant in October, the doctrine of the case cited might apply. In this case no such evidence was in fact admitted. The proof here was that the witness exámined the complainant, and that the next day he saw the defendant and had a conversation with him. The doctor did not even testify that complainant was pregnant. The -testimony which he gave

Nor do we think the court erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecutrix and Dr. McKenna tending to show that the defendant tried to induce the former to have an abortion performed. The proof was of conversations with the defendant in regard to the condition of the prosecutrix, and included a proposition by Mm that an abortion should be procured. This was, we think, so far a part of the transactions between the prosecutrix and the defendant as to render the conversation between them admissible. In tended, at least, to corroborate the statement of the prosecutrix as to the relations wMch existed between herself and the defendant and show that he sought to prevent publicity of her condition which resulted from a course of action commenced by the perpetuation of the crime charged. People v. Murphy, 135 N. Y. 450 ; 48 St. Rep. 426 ; Hope v. People, 83 N. Y. 418 , 427; Pierson v. People, 79 id. 424 .

We have carefully examined all the remaining exceptions to which our attention has been called by the appellant’s brief, but have found none that would justify a reversal of the judgment, or that require special discussion. It follows that the judgment should be affirmed.

Judgment of conviction of the court of sessions of Onondaga county, and order appealed from, affirmed. After the judgment is entered in the judgment book, a certified copy of the entry shall be forthwith remitted to the clerk of Onondaga county, with whom the original judgment roll is filed, in accordance with the provisions of section 547 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Supporting evidence, upon trial of indictment for seduction, under promise of marriage, is required only as to promise of marriage and carnal connection. Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 43 ; Kenyon v. People, 26 id. 203; Boyce v. People, 55 id. 644; People v. Kearney, 110 id. 191: 17 S. R. 165; rev’g 47 Hun, 130 ; 13 S. R. 264; People v. Orr, 92 Hun, 199 ; 71 S. R. 169.

Such evidence need be only such as the character of these matters admits of being furnished. Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 43 ; Kenyon v. People, 26 id. 203; Boyce v. People, 55 id. 644.

Supporting evidence is not required upon the questions of the previous chaste character of the female seduced and that she was unmarried. People v. Kearney, 110 N. Y. 191 ; 17 S. R. 165; rev’g 47 Hun, 130 ; 13 S. R. 246; People v. Orr, 92 Hun, 199 ; 71 S. R. 169.

Direct or positive additional evidence of any of the material facts, constituting the offense, is not necessary. Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 646 .

Testimony of an additional witness is not required. People v. Kenyon, 5 Park. 254.

Facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction and otherwise established in the case, may supply the corroborating evidence.. People v. Kenyon, 5 Park. 254; People v. Orr, 92 Hun, 199 ; 71 S. R. 169.

Evidence of intercourse by defendant with prosecutrix subsequently to time of alleged seduction, is admissible. People v. Kearney, 110 N. Y. 194 ; 17 S. R. 165; rev’g 47 Hun, 130 ; 13 S. R. 246.

When evidence of the birth of a child is incompetent. People v. Kearney, 110 N. Y. 194 ; 17 S. R. 165; rev’g 47 Hun, 130 ; 13 S. R; 246; see Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 38 .

Question whether the female is sufficiently supported to justify a conviction, is for jury. Crandall v. People, 2 Lansing, 309.

Consent to sexual intercourse upon conditional promise of marriage. People v. Hustis, 32 Hun, 58 ; Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203 ; Boyce v. People, 55 id. 644; People v. Van Alstyne, 144 id. 361; 63 S. R. 66; rev’g 78 Hun, 509 ; 29 Supp. 542; People v. Duryea, 81 Hun, 390 ; 63 S. R. 131; 30 Supp. 877.