Majority
Headnote
1. Police—Failure of Oaptain to Suppress House of Ill-fame— Greater New York Charter, section 315—Penal Code, sections 117, 154.This appeal is from a judgment allowing a demurrer to an indictment. The defendant, during the time stated in the indictment, was a police captain in the city of Hew York in command of the Twelfth precinct in that city. The indictment charged him with the crime of wilfully omitting to perform a duty enjoined upon him by law as a public officer, in that, as such public officer, he knowingly permitted a large number of houses of prostitution to be maintained within that precinct from the 22d day of September, 1899, continually, until the 18th day of September, 1900, and knowingly and wilfully omitted and neglected to Suppress said houses, or any of them, or to use the means within his power as such officer for that purpose.
The demurrer was sustained by the learned recorder, as appears from the opinion delivered by him, upon the ground that the indictment did not contain a plain and concise statement of the acts constituting the crime, and his ruling is sought to he sustained on the appeal substantially upon the same ground, and also upon the further ground that the indictment is bad for duplicity in that more than one crime is charged therein.
A person who keeps a house of ill-fame or prostitution is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Penal Code, sec. 322.) Such house is a common nuisance, and as such it was the duty of the defendant) as a captain of the police in charge of the pre
Nor do we understand that it is seriously questioned, as a general proposition, that a public officer who willfully omits to discharge a duty imposed upon him by virtue of his office is guilty of a misdemeanor—but it is urged that the defendant here cannot be punished for such omission because sections 117 and 154 of the Penal Code apply only to the omission to discharge a duty connected with the office “ where no special provision shall have been made for the punishment of such delinquency,” and that there is a special provision provided by statute for the punishment of members of the police force of the city of New York who omit or neglect to properly discharge their duties. In this connection our attention is called to certain sections (270-272, 300) of the Greater New York Charter, which, in effect, provide that the government and discipline of the police department of the city of New' York shall be lodged in the police board, in which there has been vested the power of imposing fines and dismissing from the force as a punishment or penalty for the omission of duty, and that this provision is a special one for the punishment of officers of the police force of that city who omit to perform the duties imposed upon them within the meaning of sections 117 and 154 of the Penal Code. But there is no force in this claim. The same contention was made in People v. Meakim, 133 N. Y. 214 , and it was there held that the special provision referred to in these sections is some special provision of the criminal law imposing a criminal liability for the neglect of duty, and that neither liability
This brings us to the consideration of the main questions presented, viz.: (1) Whether the indictment contains a plain and concise statement of the acts constituting the crime, and (2) whether more than one crime is charged in the indictment.
(1) The crime charged in this indictment is the willful omission to perform a duty enjoined by law upon the defendant as a police officer, and the fact specified, as showing that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, is that he did not suppress and prevent the maintenance of houses of ill-fame in his precinct at the time stated. The allegation is, that there were certain houses of ill-fame in which unlawful and disorderly conduct and practices were committed, and divers common prostitutes and disorderly persons resorted to and resided therein and solicited men, etc., in front thereof. This is a proper allegation as characterizing the houses. Wfiiile I am of the opinion that the words “houses of ill-fame ” would have been sufficient without any further description, it certainly does not take from the sufficiency of the statement of the acts constituting the crime to add thereto a statement of acts which constitute the houses of the character described. The charge is that the defendant did not suppress and prevent the maintenance of houses of this character, and the further statements contained in the indictment are simply added to show their character, nothing more and nothing less. “ Certain houses of ill-fame ” are the words, in which unlawful and' disorderly practices were committed; to which common prostitutes resorted; in which they resided and in front of which they solicited, etc. It is the omission of duty on the part of the defendant to suppress and prevent the maintenance of houses of this character of which the people complain. Hence the words in the indictment that the defendant omitted and neglected “ to use and exercise . all means within his power . . . for the prevention of the keeping and maintenance of the said houses of ill-fame . and for the detection and arrest of the person or persons keep
(2) This brings us to the remaining question, and that is, whether the indictment charges the defendant with the commission of more than one crime. We are of the opinion that it does not. It is true that if the defendant willfully and knowingly permitted one house of ill-fame to be maintained within his precinct he was guilty of the crime charged in this indictment, but the allegation that he permitted over 100 of such houses to be maintained does not render him the less guilty, nor does it charge him with an additional offense. The crime is the same. The gravamen of the offense alleged is neglect of duty in failing to suppress or close such houses, and in this respect the charge is analogous to one of conspiracy, which consists in the unlawful and corrupt agreement of the parties to lit to do an unlawful act, which agreement is entirely distinct from the unlawful act which the parties had in mind when they entered into the agreement or conspiracy. For this reason it has been held that parties who enter into a conspiracy are, by that act, guilty of but one offense whether their agreement Is to commit one or many crimes. State v. Kennedy, 63 Iowa, 200 . Here the offense of which the defendant is charged, as
It follows, therefore, that the learned recorder erred in allowing the demurrer to the indictment, and for that reason the judgment appealed from must be reversed.
O’Brien, Ingraham and Hatch, JJ., concurred; Vais Brunt, P. J., concurred in result.
Judgment reversed.
Cases cited
- Weiss v. Herlihy 23 App. Div. 608 p. 240
- People v. Meakim 133 N. Y. 214 p. 240, p. 241
- People v. Norton 7 Barb. 477 p. 240
- People v. Weldon 111 N. Y. 569 p. 243
- People v. Buddensieck 103 N. Y. 487 p. 244
- Bork v. People 91 N. Y. 5 p. 244
- Woodford v. People 62 N. Y. 117 p. 244