p. 58It is now held that the recognizance need not recite the special facts which gave the officer jurisdiction, as the entering in a recognizance being the voluntary act of the party he admits the authority of the magistrate and acknowledges the regularity of the proceedings in which it is taken.
Mofiorn by defendants to vacate judgment and execution.
William G-. Cooke, for motion.
Eugene A. Philbin, District Attorney, for People.
The defendants, principal and surety on a bail bond given at the Eighteenth Precinct Police Station House, claim that because it recites that the principal is held to answer the complaint of “Sus. Person” (an offense unknown to the law), the bond is void, and hence a judgment entered on a forfeiture thereof and an- execution to- collect the same must be vacated on their application. The claim is.based on the argument that the principal was in custody upon a charge of what under the law was no offense at all, and that the arrest and detention were not only wrongful, but the whole proceeding void ab origine. That the abbreviated term used indicates no offense in law is not so plain. Where there is reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed a felony he may be arrested without a warrant. Code Crim. Pro., section 177. Yet the belief is generally nothing more than a well-grounded suspicion. Such a person is, therefore, regarded in- police parlance as a “suspicious person,” the designation aptly denoting tire offense. The condition of the bond was not only to produce the prisoner before the magistrate on the following day, but he was to there “remain tioi answer, subject to any order of the magistrate and render himself in execution thereof.” The complainant appeared in court on August twentieth, the day specified in the bond, and charged thie prisoner with extortion, a crime which may be either felony or misdemeanor, according
p. 59to circumstances. Penal Code, sections 552, 557. If the defendant had been in actual custody the proper officer would have produced him to answer the charge, and the object of the bail bond is to put the prisoner as much under the power of the court as the officer whose place the sureties take would have done if the bond had not been given. It was formerly held that the recognizance should so far state the crime charged as to show the ease to he one over which the officer taking it had jurisdiction. People v. Koeber, 7 Hill, 39 ; People v. Young, id. 44 . But subsequently, in People v. Kane, 4 Den. 530 , it was held by the same court that the recognizance need not recite the special facts which gave the officer jurisdiction, and the cases above cited were in this respect overruled. In
Champlain v. People, 2 N. Y. 82 , the rule laid down in People v. Kane, supra, was adopted by the Court of Appeals, and has ever since been the settled law of the state.
Gildersleeve v. People, 10 Barb. 35 . The reason of the rule is that, the entering into a recognizance being the voluntary act of the party, he admits the authority of the magistrate and acknowledges the regularity of the proceedings in which it is taken. In this respect the case is distinguishable from one where the liability arises from a proceeding in invitum. Gildersleeve v. People, supra. The inaccurate or inadequate recital of the offense in the bond in no- manner affects its validity. The Code of Criminal Procedure (section 684) provides that “Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleadings or proceedings, .nor an error or mistake therein, renders it invalid, unless it have actually prejudiced the defendant, or tend to his prejudice in respect to a substantial right.” Ho substantial or other right of the defendants has been.' prejudiced in this instance. Acting on this provision, the court in People v. Gillman, 125 N. Y., 372 , held that 'the omission to recite in the hail bond the offense charged did not prejudice the defendant, that the recital is not the essence of the undertaking of bail, and that the defendant dis
p. 60charged, on bail may ba tried upon any other charge subsequently made. Besides, on every equitable principle, the bond has obtained for the defendants all the benefit that could he derived from the suretyship, and they should now be estopped from setting up its invalidity. Kelly v. McCormick, 28 N. Y. 323 ; Chamberlain v. Appelgate, 2 Hun, 510 ; Bates v. Merrick, id. 571 . It follows thaJti the defendants’ motion to vacate the judgment and execution must he denied, with ten dollars costs. Motion denied, with ten dollars costs.